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EDITORS' NOTE
In February of 2007, the Denver University Law Review hosted a
Symposium, entitled "Immigration: Both Sides of the Fence," at the Uni-
versity of Denver Sturm College of Law. The Symposium attracted over
100 professors, students, practitioners, and public policy experts from
across the United States who all share a common interest-immigration.
In discussing and choosing the topic of immigration, the Law Re-
view Editorial Board was committed to presenting both sides of the im-
migration debate. Further, we wanted to have a high-level discussion,
which we knew might be difficult with such an emotionally-charged
topic. To that end, we invited experts with diverging opinions about
immigration and the environment, national security, the rule of law, and
the economy. And, we were thrilled with the results. This Symposium
Issue of the Law Review consists of articles authored for the Symposium
and reflects the varied opinions and lively discussion of the Symposium.
First, Richard Lamm, Co-Director of the Institute of Public Policy
Studies at the University of Denver and former Governor of Colorado, in
his article, Immigration: The Ultimate Environmental Issue, warns that,
if immigration continues at its current rate, our environment will be in
jeopardy. Governor Lamm also discusses illegal immigration and its
effect on the economy, poverty, and health care.
Next, Brian Slocum, Assistant Professor of Law at Florida Coastal
School of Law, in his article, The War On Terrorism and the Extraterri-
torial Application of the Constitution in Immigration Law, explores the
"entry fiction" doctrine in immigration law. Professor Slocum predicts
that if the Supreme Court recognizes that Guantanamo detainees have at
least some constitutional rights, the "entry fiction" doctrine may end,
which should lead to judicial recognition that some inadmissible aliens
possess some constitutional rights, including rights against indefinite
detention.
Kristina Campbell, Staff Attorney at the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund in Los Angeles, Marlin Burke, an immi-
gration attorney, and Matthew Parlow, Assistant Professor of Law at
Chapman University School of Law, present competing views about
what role local governments should have in regulating immigration. Ms.
Campbell, in her article, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordi-
nances: A Legal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, and Mr. Burke, in his
article, Reexamining Immigration: Is It a Local or National Issue?, argue
against local regulation of illegal immigration. In contrast, Professor
Parlow, in his article, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration
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Policy, asserts that local government should be able to regulate immigra-
tion to supplement federal immigration regulation.
Matthew Wilson, Assistant Professor in the University of Denver's
Economics Department, in his article, The Economic Causes and Conse-
quences of Mexican Immigration to the United States, examines why
Mexicans immigrate to the United States, and the impact of their immi-
gration on the U.S. economy.
Marisa Cianciarulo, Assistant Professor of Law at Chapman Uni-
versity School of Law, and Regina Germain, Legal Director of the Rocky
Mountain Survivors Center, both write from extensive experience in
refugee and asylum law. Professor Cianciarulo, in her article, Counter-
productive and Counterintuitive Counterterrorism: The Post-September
11 Treatment of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, criticizes post-September
11 anti-terrorism legislation for erroneously targeting refugees and asy-
lum-seekers. Ms. Germain, in her article, Putting the "Form" in Immi-
gration Court Reform, challenges the Attorney General to institute pro-
cedural rules for immigration courts.
Finally, Dr. Saby Ghoshray of the Institute of Interdisciplinary
Studies, in his article, Is There a Human-Rights Dimension to Immigra-
tion?: Seeking Clarity Through the Prism of Morality and Human Sur-
vival, highlights the importance of analyzing immigration through a hu-
man-rights perspective.
We would like to thank Professor Jeff Joseph, Professor and Faculty
Advisor Michael Massey, Law Review Office Coordinator Graciela
Aguirre, and Director of Events Lauri Mlinar, whose guidance and assis-
tance helped make our Symposium and this Symposium Issue a success.
Further, we would like to thank and acknowledge three important speak-
ers from our Symposium: Margaret Stock, Associate Professor at the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, Benjamin Johnson,
Director of the Immigration Policy Center at the American Immigration
Law Foundation, and Christine Cimini, Associate Professor and Director
of Clinical Programs at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
Also, we are grateful to Erik Lemmon, Gretchen Eoff, and Jeffrey Hurd,
the incoming Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor, and Senior Articles Edi-










Every generation has its challenges, almost inevitably challenges
different from that of their parents. The great challenge of public policy
is to correctly identify the new challenges and the new realities that soci-
ety is faced with. Public policy is a kaleidoscope, time changes the pat-
terns we are faced with, and we have to be wise enough to react to the
new challenges as these new patterns evolve.
One new pattern/challenge must be to look at the issue of the envi-
ronment with new eyes. Our globe is under new dramatic environmental
pressure: our globe is warming, our ice caps melting, our glaciers reced-
ing, our coral is dying, our soils are eroding, our water tables falling, our
fisheries are being depleted, our remaining rainforests shrinking. Some-
thing is very, very wrong with our eco-system. The environment issue is
hydra-headed and complicated, but it is of immense importance that we
have all aspects of the issue on the table.
One issue in the current environmental debate, however, is strangely
absent: immigration. Immigration is the ultimate environmental issue,
but U.S. environmental leaders are AWOL on this issue. The United
States with low immigration will stabilize its population at about 350
million shortly after the middle of this century.' With current levels of
immigration, the United States will double in size and then double
again.2 The census projections call for an America of 420 million people
by 2050 and a billion by the end of this century.3 Can you imagine the
eco-system, already under great strain, with one billion consuming
Americans? Our current immigration policy is leaving our grandchildren
an unsustainable America of a billion people, which I suggest is public
policy malpractice.
t Richard D. Lamm is a Certified Public Accountant and a lawyer. He is currently a profes-
sor and Co-Director of the Institute of Public Policy Studies at the University of Denver. He was the
Governor of Colorado from 1974 to 1987. He earned his J.D. from University of California (Boalt
Hall) in 1961 and his B.A. from the University of Wisconsin in 1957.
1. Lindsey Grant, Forecasting the Unknowable: The U.N. "'World Population Prospects:
The 2002 Revision," NEGATIVE POPULATION GROWTH FORUM, June 2003, at 7, available at
http://www.populationmedia.org/issues/NPG%20Forum%2OPaperO603.pdf.
2. See id; see also Minnesotans For Sustainability, United States Population Growth: the
Numbers, United States Population Growth Graph, http://www.mnforsustain.org/united_
states._population growthgraph.htm [hereinafter MFS, U.S. Population Graph] (see Census 2000
Population Projections to 2100, Middle, High Series).
3. See Grant, supra note 1, at 7; MFS, U.S. Population Graph, supra note 2.
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The environmental community would not tell you this (though most
know). A combination of political correctness and the recent tendency of
the environmental leadership to play Democratic politics have silenced
the almost universal recognition of the early environmental community
that population is an indispensable part of environmentalism.
Environmental leaders in the 1970s had a formula, I=PAT, which
postulated that environmental impact was the product of POPULATION,
AFFLUENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY. 4 To Gaylord Nelson who con-
ceived Earth Day and the early environmental leaders, leaving out Popu-
lation would be like having a bicycle with only one wheel. Today's
environmentalists will discuss U.S. air pollution policy, U.S. wilderness
policy, U.S. water-quality policy, U.S. billboard policy, but never a hint
of U.S. population policy.
Here's my simple experiment I use on my environmental friends
who have tragically lost their voice on population. Assume that I had a
magic wand and could wave it and accomplish all the goals of today's
environmental leadership, but did nothing about the current immigration
rate. Is there a scenario where a billion Americans at the end of this cen-
tury would live in an environmentally-sound America? Have you been
to China? India? We could do everything on the current environmental
agenda yet still have an unlivable nation. The self-imposed tragedy of
the environmental movement in the United States is that the current envi-
ronmental agenda will not get us to an environmentally-sound America.
On the contrary, it locks in a myriad of environmental traumas as the
United States careens toward a billion Americans.
There is a concerted effort in the environmental community to keep
immigration out of the dialogue. But the subject is so central to the envi-
ronment that it keeps popping out. The President's Council on Sustain-
able Development concluded in 1996: "We believe that reducing current
immigration levels is a necessary part of working toward sustainability in
the United States.",6 National commissions have made similar assess-
ments since 1972. 7
4. See Minnesotans For Sustainability, Population, http://www.mnforsustain.org/
population.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2007); Wickipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_PAT
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
5. See generally BILL CHRISTOFFERSON, THE MAN FROM CLEAR LAKE: EARTH DAY
FOUNDER GAYLORD NELSON (2004).
6. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, POPULATION AND
CONSUMPTION TASK FORCE REPORT (1996), available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/
PCSD/PublicationsITFReports/pop-toc.html.
7. See generally id.
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The National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society, have
both warned that increasing population and increasing consumption
threaten to overshoot the earth's ecological carrying capacity.
8
In my view most of the historic ways that societies have grown and
developed may be obsolete. I believe we are at a great historical turning
point that has to move from the growth paradigm to the sustainability
paradigm. Could I be wrong? Of course! But increasingly we are
warned by national and international bodies that planet earth is over-
driving its headlights and heading for major traumas. Yet one major,
indispensable factor is missing from the debate: population.
How could the ecosystem, already showing major signs of collapse,
handle a billion consuming Americans. Few Americans want to double
the size of America and then double it again. Imagine for a minute that
we had taken the advice of President Nixon's Commission on Population
Growth and the American Future released in 1972.9 The Commission
recommended, among other things, that America act to end illegal immi-
gration and to freeze legal immigration at 400,000 a year.10 The Com-
mission found that "the health of our country does not depend on [popu-
lation growth], nor does the vitality of business, nor the welfare of the
average person."" Strong words. Wise words.
Headed by John Rockefeller, the "Rockefeller Commission"
strongly urged stabilizing the population of the United States and asked
Americans to get over their "ideological addiction to growth."' 2 America
at that time had about 200 million Americans, used far less petroleum,
and had a much smaller "ecological footprint" on the world environ-
ment. 13 But the nation did not listen to the Commission.
It is unfortunate that American policy makers did not listen. We
have added almost 100 million Americans since the Commission's brave
8. In February 1992, prior to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992), the Royal Society of London and the U.S. National Acad-
emy of Sciences issued a joint statement entitled "Population Growth, Resource Consumption, and a
Sustainable World." See Statement, National Academy of Sciences and Royal Society (Feb. 1992),
available at http://dieoff.org/page7.htrn.
9. Dennis Hodgson, Population Thought, Contemporary, in ENCYLOPEDIA OF POPULATION
769 (Paul Demeny & Geoffrey McNicoll eds., vol. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.faculty.fairfield.edu/faculty/hodgson/Courses/soI 84/popdocs/EofPContPopThought.pdf.
10. See COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH & THE AMERICAN FUTURE, POPULATION AND THE
AMERICAN FUTURE: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE
AMERICAN FUTURE ch. 13 (1972) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.population-security.org/rockefeller/0 13_immigration.htm.
I. See id., available at http://www.population-security.org/rockefeller/00I_population
growth and the american future.htm#Letter%2Oof/20Transmittal
12. See id, available at http://www.population-security.org/rockefeller/012_.population
stabilization.htm.
13. See generally Global Footprint Network, www.ecofoot.net (last visited Apr. 24, 2007)
(explaining the concept of "ecological footprint").
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and farsighted declaration.' 4 What problem in contemporary America
was made better by population growth and immigration, asks Professor
Al Bartlett? We now have over 300 million Americans,' 5 we consume
far more non-renewable resources, and our "ecological footprint" is one
of the major factors in a deteriorating environment worldwide.
The geometry of population growth is relentless. The first census
(in 1790) found less than 4 million Europeans in America. 16 Two-
hundred years later (in 1990) we had approximately 260 million Ameri-
cans. 17 That means we had six doublings of the original European popu-
lation (4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256). Please note that two more doublings
give us over a billion people sharing America.
There are a number of people who postulate that our current popula-
tion of 300 million Americans is not itself sustainable, let alone 420 mil-
lion or a billion.18 Sustainability looks at the long term: Will our re-
sources allow 300 million Americans to live a satisfying life at a decent
level of living for the indefinite future? Will our children and grandchil-
dren inherit a decent and livable America? We have not only put this
question off limits, we have made it taboo.
This is not an issue of immigrants, but of immigration. What possi-
ble public policy advantage would there be to an America of 500 mil-
lion? Do we lack for people? Do we have too much open space? Too
much park land and recreation? What will 500 million Americans mean
to our environment? There are similar non-environmental questions. Do
we need a larger military? Are our schools unpopulated? Do we not
have enough diversity? Will we live better lives if our cities double in
size? Does immigration help our health care system? Will doubling our
population help us build a more fair and just America? Do you want an
America of one billion people? These questions seem to answer them-
selves. 19
14. See MFS, U.S. Population Graph, supra note 2 (noting that U.S. population was approxi-
mately 209 million in 1972); U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clocks - POPClocks,
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.
Census Bureau, POPClocks] (estimating that the U.S. population was approximately 301 million on
March 29, 2007).
15. See U.S. Census Bureau, POPCIocks, supra note 14.
16. See David Bustamante, Consul for Public Affairs, U.S. Consulate General in Milan,
Lecture at the UniversitA di Venezia CA Foscari: Through the Golden Door: Immigration to the
United States (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://milan.usconsulate.gov/news/
NEENG 121206 PAO CaFoscari.htm
17. See MFS, U.S. Population Graph, supra note 2.
18. See Andrew Buncombe, US Population Hits 300 Million, But Is It Sustainable?, THE
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/
article 1 834360.ece.
19. JOHN L. MARTIN, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE EFFECT OF
MASSIVE IMMIGRATION ON POPULATION CHANGE: INCREASED IMPACT ON LARGE METROPOLITAN
AREAS 4 (2006), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename-research_
immigrationandpopchange.
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I do not believe you can have infinite population growth in a finite
world. We are living on the shoulders of some awesome geometric
curves. The 2000 Census revealed how rapidly immigration is causing
our population to skyrocket. The equivalent of another California has
been added to the nation-32 million people since 1990.20 Demogra-
phers calculate that immigration is now the determining factor in causing
America's rapid population growth-immigrants and their U.S.-born
children accounted for more than two-thirds of population growth in the
last decade, and will continue to account for approximately two-thirds of
our future growth.21 Clearly, America's population "growth issue" is an
immigration issue.
The environmental problems just around the corner will require
new, bold, creative leadership. There was a zoo in the 1960s, which put
up a sign in part of the exit complex, which said "See The World's Most
Dangerous Animal," and you went around the corner and there was a
full-length mirror. Humans are the world's most dangerous animals.
Similarly, I am haunted by a casual remark that the great biologist E.O.
Wilson made recently. Wilson observed that the human species is the
only species that, were it to disappear, every other species would bene-
fit. 22 I suspect this is true. The human species has itself become the
chief change agent of the environment. We face an environmental world
where all past is prologue.
I. THE U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM
(JORDAN COMMISSION)
I would recommend to you the findings of the Jordan Commission
(the "Commission") headed by the liberal icon, the late Congresswoman
Barbara Jordan. Appointed in 1990, the Commission issued a series of
reports and recommendations which urged Congress to return U.S. im-
migration policy to the historic goals of reuniting nuclear families, pro-
viding employers with skilled workers, and providing humanitarian aid
to refugees. 23 The Commission and Barbara Jordan specifically recom-
mended cutting legal immigration to 550,000 immigrants chosen for the
skills they could bring to America.
24
Important to this Symposium, the Commission came out strongly
against illegal immigration: "The credibility of immigration policy can
be measured by a simple yardstick: people who should get in do get in;
20. See U.S. Census Bureau, POPClocks, supra note 14; MFS, U.S. Population Graph, supra
note 2.
21. See MARTIN, supra note 19, at 2.
22. See generally EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE CREATION: AN APPEAL TO SAVE LIFE ON EARTH
(2006).
23. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, LEGAL
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people who should not get in are kept out; and people who are judged
deportable are required to leave. 25
The Commission recommended additional barriers to employ-
ment of illegal immigrants, including a computerized registry to verify
work eligibility and utilizing the already-existing penalties against em-
ployer who knowingJy hire illegal aliens.26 Its stated intention was to
eliminate the "pull factor" that attracted desperate illegal immigrants to
unscrupulous employers.2 7
II. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
America would have been wise to adopt the recommendations of
the Jordan Commission. I have already given you my reasons for sup-
porting the Commission's recommendations on legal immigrants: I be-
lieve we must build a sustainable society and stabilize our population.
Now let us turn to the question of illegal immigration.
The foundation of any immigration policy is that immigrants should
come through a process that is procedurally and substantively fair. It
almost seems naive to start out the argument that we are a nation of laws,
and that people should come here legally. This is not a mere formality as
some imply, or a tiresome technicality: remember that there are millions
of people patiently waiting to come to America, and illegal immigrants
skip the line. To continue to tolerate this practice is not only a legal is-
sue, it is morally unfair to those waiting to come legally. The argument
should stop there, but it doesn't, so let's look at some of the public policy
reasons against the institution of illegal immigration.
A. Economic Impact of Illegal Immigration
Illegal immigration is having a heavy economic, social, and demo-
graphic impact and it is past time to make a bipartisan case for control-
ling illegal immigration. I first got interested in illegal immigration
when a Colorado packing plant fired a group of Hispanic Americans and
replaced them with illegal immigrants. A small group of the fired work-
ers came to me, as Governor, to complain. There was little I could do. I
called the President of the packing plant who nicely told me to mind my
own business and claimed that all his new workers had green cards,
which indeed they had, bought in the underground market along with
fake Social Security Cards for $25 apiece. Some time later, the Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Service (INS) raided the plant, but the workforce
evaporated during the raid, to return (or to be replaced by other illegal
25. See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY iii (1994), available at http://www.utexas.edu/
lbj/uscir/exesum94.pdf.
26. See id.
27. Id. at xxx.
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immigrants) shortly thereafter. The plant continued to employ a largely
monolingual Spanish-speaking workforce until it was bought out and
closed ten years later.
It is easy to see why this underground workforce is attractive to em-
ployers. The owner of this particular packing plant essentially told me
he was not going to pay his (legal) workers $16 an hour, plus benefits,
when he could hire illegal workers at $10 an hour without benefits. This
type of reasoning will forever lock the bottom quartile of our American
earners into poverty: for how are they ever to obtain a decent wage when
employers have access to endless pools of illegal unskilled labor? Illegal
immigrants are generally good, hard-working people who will quietly
accept minimum wage (or below), don't get or expect health care or
other benefits, and if they complain, they can be easily fired. Even the
minimum U.S. wage is attractive to workers from countries whose stan-
dard of living is a fraction of ours.
But that is not to say it is "cheap labor." It may be "cheap" to those
who pay the wages, but for the rest of us it is clearly "subsidized" labor,
as we taxpayers pick up the costs of education, health, and other munici-
pal costs imposed by this workforce. These have become a substantial
and growing cost as the nature of illegal immigration patterns has
evolved.
For decades illegal immigrants were single men who would come
up from Mexico or Central America, alone, pick crops or perform other
low-paid physical labor and then go home. They were indeed "cheap
labor." But starting slowly in the 1960s, and steadily increasing to this
day, these workers either bring their families or smuggle them into the
country later. They become a permanent or semi-permanent population
living in the shadows, but imposing immense municipal costs. Illegal
immigration today isn't "cheap" labor except to the employer. It is labor
subsidized by the U.S. taxpayer; where a few employers get the benefit
and the rest of us pay. These costs ought to be obvious to all, but the
myth of "cheap labor" and "jobs Americans won't do" persists. But let
us examine it in more detail using our experience in Colorado.
It is hard to get an exact profile of the people who live in the under-
ground economy, but studies do show the average illegal immigrant fam-
ily is larger than the average American family.28 It costs Colorado tax-
payers over $6,376 per child just to educate a child in our public schools
28. See DONALD RICE, DEFEND COLORADO Now, A COMPENDIUM OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
DATA 4 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.defendcoloradonow.com/docs/coststudydr
2006mar28.pdf.
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(and probably closer to $12,000 per child per year for non-English speak-
ers).
29
Realistically no minimum-wage workers, or even low-wage work-
ers pay anywhere near enough taxes to pay for even one child in
school.30  Even if illegal immigrants were paying all federal and state
taxes, Colorado's estimated 131,000 illegal alien children in Colorado
school systems (out of an estimated Colorado population of 250,000 ille-
gal immigrants) 31 impose gargantuan costs on our taxpayers. This figure
is actually a significant understatement because there are an estimated
287,000-363,000 additional children born to illegal immigrants each year
in the United States 32 (and these children are considered U.S. citizens),
clearly adding to the total impact of illegal immigration.
We have here in Colorado, and increasingly nationwide, single-
family houses with three or more families of illegal immigrants earning,
at the most, between $15,000 and $25,000 per family, but with multiple
kids in the school system costing our taxpayers more in education costs
alone than all three families gross in wages. 33 Studies show that ap-
proximately two-thirds of illegal immigrants lack a high-school di-
ploma.34 Further, there is a significant fiscal drain on U.S. taxpayers for
each adult immigrant (legal or illegal) without a high-school education.
29. COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUB. SCH. FIN. UNIT, UNDERSTANDING COLORADO SCHOOL
FINANCE AND CATEGORICAL PROGRAM FUNDING 5 (2006), available at
http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdefinance/download/FY2006-07BrochureFinal.doc ("In budget year
2006-07, Total Program funding for all 178 school districts is projected to range from $5,875 per
pupil to $13,608 per pupil, with an average across all districts of $6,376 per pupil.").
30. Minimum-wage workers earn $5.15 per hour or $10,712 per year if they work full time.
See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) (West 2007) (designating minimum
wage at $5.15 per hour). Households with incomes between $10,712 and $20,000 must pay between
$1,073 and $2,626 in federal income taxes, see U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040 Tax Table
(2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/ilO40tt.pdfportlet-3, and between $498 and
$928 in Colorado State income tax, see Colorado Dep't of Revenue, Form 104 Colorado Individual
Income Tax Return Tax Table (2006), available at http://www.revenue.state.co.us/
PDF/06104taxtables.pdf.
31. See Tom Tancredo, A Day Without an Illegal Immigrant, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE,
May 1, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTBIOTVINDFkNTYwOTg4YwYxMThkZm
E2MWZhMmVjMWM = (stating that there are 131,000 illegal alien children in Colorado's schools);
Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform, The Colorado Illegal-Immigration Crisis: Colorado
Solutions, http://www.cairco.org/events/canpresentation_2005oct22.html (last visited Mar. 29,
2007) (estimating that 250,000 illegal immigrants live in Colorado).
32. Federation for American Immigrant Reform, Anchor Babies: The Children of Illegal
Aliens, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters4608 (estimat-
ing that illegal aliens give birth to 287,000 to 363,000 children each year in the United States); see
also Steven A. Camarota, Births to Immigrants in America 1970-2002, THE BACKGROUNDER
(CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES), July 2005, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/
2005/back8O5.pdf (noting that almost one in every four births in the United States in 2002 was to an
immigrant mother).
33. See RICE, supra note 28, at 9.
34. See Rich Lowry, Poor Trend, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Apr. 04, 2006, http://www.
nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry200604040747.asp.
35. See generally STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE HIGH
COST OF CHEAP LABOR: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET (Aug. 2004);
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But don't get caught up in the battle of studies: just use your com-
mon sense and thoughtfully consider whether a low-income family with
three or four kids in the school system are paying anything close to what
it costs to educate their kids. These are expensive families to provide
with governmental services. Some employers are getting cheap labor
and externalizing the costs of that labor to the rest of us.
Americans pay in more ways than taxes. Cheap labor drives down
wages as low-income Americans are forced to compete against these
admittedly hard working people.36 Even employers, who don't want to
wink at false documents, are forced to lower wages just to be competi-
tive.37 It is, in many ways, a "race to the bottom" fueled by poor people
often recruited from evermore-distant countries by middlemen who profit
handsomely. It isn't only wages, the employers of this abused form of
labor often violate minimum wage requirements, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration standards, and overtime laws. Further, if in-
jured, illegal workers often have no access to Worker's Compensation.
38
The Americans who pay the price are those at the bottom of the eco-
nomic ladder who directly compete with this illegal workforce. The very
people that liberals profess to speak for and care about pay the price in
lost and suppressed wages while employers get the benefits of reduced
wages. Professor George Borjas of Harvard, an immigrant himself, es-
timates that American workers lose $190 billion annually in depressed
wages caused by the constant flooding of the labor market from new-
comers.
39
The dilemma is compounded by the fact that approximately forty
percent of illegal workers are paid in cash, off the books.40 Go to any
construction site, almost anywhere in America, and you will find illegal
workers who are paid cash wages with no taxes withheld. Virtually
every city in America has an area where illegal immigrant workers
gather and people come by to get "cheap" cash wage labor. High costs,
low taxes, downward pressure on wages, this is not cheap labor; this is
the most expensive labor a community could ever imagine.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
36. Jeanette Wiemers, A Question That Cuts Through Party Lines, THE TEXAS JOURNALIST,
http://journalism.utexas.edu/texasjournalist fall06/storyp2.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
37. See Steven Malanga, The Right Immigration Policy, CITY JOURNAL, Fall 2006, at 14.
38. Travis Tritten, New Bill Targets Illegal Labor: Similar Ideas Focus of National Debate,
SUN NEWS, Feb. 9, 2007 (State and Regional News).
39. Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Do Immigrants Really Take Jobs That Americans Won 't Do?
NEWSHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 22, 2004 (Financial Section).
40. See generally LOUIS REA & RICHARD PARKER, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN SAN DIEGO
COUNTY: AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND REVENUES (1993) (report prepared for the California State
Senate, Special Committee on Border Affairs); DAVID S. NORTH & MARION F. HOUSTOUN, THE
CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY (1976).
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B. Supply-Side Poverty
Consequently, we have a group of workers who pay no, or reduced
withholding taxes, with above-average birthrate4' (thus above-average
impact on schools), impacting our school system, with more, and more
arriving every year.42 It is Orwellian to call this "cheap labor." It is
"supply side" poverty added to our society so a few employers can get
"cheap labor." It is happening nationwide. Mortimer B. Zuckerman,
Editor-in-Chief of U.S. News and World Report, speaking of U.S. pov-
erty asks:
So why haven't overall poverty rates declined further? In a word-
immigration. Many of those who come to the United States are not
only poor but unskilled. Hispanics account for much of the increase
in poverty-no surprise, since 25 percent of poor people are His-
panic. Since 1989, Hispanics represent nearly three quarters of the
increase in the overall poverty population. Immigration has also
helped keep the median income for the country basically flat for five
straight years, the longest stretch of income stagnation on record.
43
C. Health Care Impact
The health care cost of this illegal workforce is also significant and
also subsidized by U.S. taxpayers. You can go to virtually any emer-
gency room in Colorado and you will hear Spanish as the predominant
language. "Colorado has one of the highest rates of new mothers who
speak little or no English."44 Increasingly we are seeing elderly grand-
parents with health problems present in emergency rooms as extended
families consolidate.45 No, we don't know for sure that they are illegal,
because it is against federal law to check, but it is safe to assume that
most are. Denver Health alone estimates that they spend one million
taxpayer dollars just in interpreting for non-English speakers.4 6 What
would the total taxpayer cost of interpreting be statewide, and that is just
a fraction of the total health care costs? The cumulative cost of this
41. See Steven A. Camarota, Birth Rates Among Immigrants in America. Comparing Fertility
in the U.S. and Home Countries, THE BACKGROUNDER (CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES), Oct.
2005, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back105.pdf (reporting that immigrant women
in the U.S. have higher fertility than women in their home countries); Marta Hummel, Immigrant
Birthrate on the Rise; A New Report Adds Fuel to the Debate Over Those Who Enter the Country
Illegally, NEWS & RECORD (GREENSBORO, NC), July 8, 2005, at Al ("Nationally in 2002, 23 percent
of all births in the United States were to immigrant mothers, nearly half of them coming from Mex-
ico.").
42. See Lewis, supra note 39 ("Research finds that immigrants, like the poor in general,
burden public resources such as schools and hospitals.").
43. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Debt to Ourselves (Poverty in the United States), U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Oct. 3, 2005, at 60, available at 2005 WL 15460370.
44. Fernando Quintero, Many New Mothers Don 't Speak English, State Among Highest,
Census Bureau Says, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 13, 2005, at 15A.
45. See generally Madeleine Pelner Cosman, Illegal Aliens and American Medicine, J. AM.
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS, Spring 2005, at 6.
46. See Quintero, supra note 44.
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"subsidized" labor is impossible to ascertain and difficult to even esti-
mate, but it is immense and growing as our population of these workers
grows. A few benefit, the rest of us pay.
It is technically illegal for illegal immigrants to claim Medicaid, but
as the Health and Human Services Inspector General found, "Forty-seven
states allow self-declaration of U.S. citizenship for Medicaid" and over
half of those "do not verify the accuracy of U.S. citizenship statements as
part of their posteligibility quality control activities. 47 The barn doors
are wide open! Families without a word of English boldly declare them-
selves U.S. citizens and nobody checks! When states don't use the tools
available to them, it is more the states' fault than those abusing the sys-
tem.
Many of my liberal friends like to think of themselves as "citizens
of the world" who dislike borders, and indeed we all realize we live in a
more interdependent, interconnected world. But "to govern is to choose"
and if everyone is my brother and sister than nobody will ever get cov-
ered by social programs that liberals compassionately seek. I have been
fighting all my life for universal health care, but we can't have "the best
health care system in the world" combined with Swiss cheese borders.
Social and redistributive programs require borders. It is fine to think of
yourself as a citizen of the world, or a loving Christian, but we solve
most problems in a national context and therefore we owe a greater
moral duty to our fellow Americans than we do to non-citizens. Ameri-
cans must defend borders or they will lose all the social programs that
they care about! No social program can survive without geographic lim-
its and defined beneficiaries.
We often hear that forty-three million Americans are without health
insurance, but this figure is likely overestimated, because it includes over
ten million illegal immigrants.48 Most of the estimated ten million peo-
ple living illegally in America do not have health insurance.49 More and
more hospitals are going broke because of the constant stream of unin-
sured, particularly in our border states. 50 The Census Bureau estimates
that 11.6 million people in immigrant households are without health in-
surance.51  Of course not all immigrants are illegal, but the impact is
47. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SELF-DECLARATION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP FOR MEDICAID (OEI-
02-03-00190) ii (2005), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-03-00190.pdf.
48. See Cosman, supra note 45, at 6.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES, WITHOUT COVERAGE: IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON THE SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE
POPULATION LACKING HEALTH INSURANCE 5 (2000), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2000/coverage/uninsured.pdf; Steven A. Camarota & James R. Edwards
Jr., Uninsured Immigrants Burden the Health Care System, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Oct. 1,2001.
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clear and substantial. 52 The problem is much like when the gods con-
demned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain,
and the stone would fall back of its own weight. It is not unlike when
you expand education funding or Medicaid and give extra state aid to
impacted hospitals, but the problems grow faster than the solution. We
use the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to cover
uninsured children, but a new flood of immigrant children without health
insurance quickly overcomes our gains.53 The Center for Immigration
Studies has estimated that for a recent five-year period, immigrants and
their children accounted for fifty-nine percent (2.7 million people) of the
growth of the uninsured.
54
Ironically, the price of compassion is restriction. The only way we
can help America's poor is to develop programs which are not constantly
diluted by the rest of the world's 6 billion, no matter how sympathetic
those people may be.
CONCLUSION
"In every age," writes Jacob Bronowski in The Ascent of Man,
"there is a turning-point, a new way of seeing and asserting the coher-
ence of the world., 55 We metaphorically must give birth to a whole new
world. Our new environmental issues, like global warming, will not just
take a legislative victory or public awareness campaign, it will take a
revolution in the way we see and make sense of our basic civilization and
the human role in the universe.
I believe that we are surrounded with evidence that increasingly
shows that something is fundamentally wrong with our historic ways of
looking at the world. Yesterday's solutions have become today's prob-
lems, and these problems are of a different scale and coming at us with
increasing velocity. The growth paradigm that allowed us to create
wealth, reduce poverty, and increase living standards is becoming obso-
lete. Those human traits which allowed us to prevail over the ice, the
tiger and the bear-in a time of an empty earth continue to operate long
after we are no longer an empty earth.
Reg Morrison in his book, The Spirit in the Gene, suggests that
those genes that saved a species now are on course to destroy us. 56 He
suggests that we are hard-wired by survival traits to grow and over-
consume and that now, unless controlled, these traits will drive us into
52. See Cosman, supra note 45, at 6.
53. See CAMAROTA & EDWARDS, supra note 51, at 5; Steven Camarota, Wrestling Health
Care, BALT. SUN, Aug. 22, 2000.
54. See sources cited supra note 53.
55. JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 20 (1973).
56. See generally REG MORRISON, THE SPIRIT IN THE GENE: HUMANITY'S PROUD ILLUSION
AND THE LAWS OF THE NATIVE (1999).
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oblivion.57 Evolution moves too slowly to correct the dilemma that evo-
lution put us in by its past slow progress.
58
Ecologically we are sailing on uncharted waters while moving at
unprecedented speed. We have lost our anchor and our navigational in-
struments are out of date.
When I entered high school in 1950, there were 2.6 billion people
on earth, and there were 50 million cars.59 Now there are over 6 billion
people on earth, and our car population has increased ten-fold to over
500 million; and within twenty-five years it is projected there will be 1
billion cars on the world's roads.6°
Nothing in our past prepares us for the environmental problems that
we are faced with. We cannot grow our way out of these problems; we
cannot use history to put them into perspective. The lessons we have
learned living on an empty earth teach us the wrong lessons. We are still
trying to "be fruitful, multiply, and subdue" an earth that now needs sav-
ing. Contemporary life is a rock rolling downhill, gathering speed. It
presents us with a series of problems of nature, for which the lessons of
history are not only useless, but teach us the wrong lessons.
The famous economist Kenneth Boulding said that the modern hu-
man dilemma is that all our experience deals with the past, yet all our
problems are challenges of the future. The lessons we have learned in
the past do not help and in many ways are counter-productive in solving
the problems of sustainability. Our economic models have become ecol-
ogically unsustainable.
Humans appear throughout history to be insatiable creatures. There
appears at this time to be no reasonable limit on "more," "bigger," or
"faster" or "richer." If we haven't already hit carrying capacity, it is just
a matter of time.
We cannot solve growth-related problems with more growth; we
must move to sustainability. It took a billion years or more for nature to
create the limited stocks of petroleum and mineral wealth which modern
technology and human ingenuity have recently learned to exploit. But
we are squandering our one-time inheritance of cheap energy and handy
resources. The models so painstakingly developed over 300 years to
create more jobs and more goods and services must be dramatically
modified.
57. See generally id.
58. See generally id.
59. See generally WALTER YOUNGQUIST, GEODESTINIES 461 (1997).
60. See generally id.
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For quite some time, the prevailing judicial view has been that it is
constitutional for the government to indefinitely (even permanently) de-
tain within the United States aliens who have been stopped at our bor-
ders. The justification for these decisions is that even though these
aliens are located within the United States they are deemed, under a
doctrine known as the "entry fiction," to be outside the territory of the
United States, and thus beyond the reach of the Constitution. Recently,
however, courts have struggled with issues involving the definition and
scope of the entry fiction. Courts have faced similar issues involving the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution in cases involving the
current Guantanamo "enemy combatant" detainees. In this Article, Pro-
fessor Slocum argues that a recognition by the Supreme Court that the
current Guantanamo detainees possess at least some constitutional
rights should compel courts to conclude that aliens stopped at our bor-
ders and detained within the United States also possess constitutional
rights, including the right to be free from indefinite detention. Even if
the Court declines to recognize that the Guantanamo detainees possess
constitutional rights, lower courts should continue to reevaluate the defi-
nition and scope of the outdated and unnecessarily harsh entry fiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two cases:
(1) The President authorizes the arrest and detention of an elderly
woman in Switzerland who for years has written large checks to a charity
that ostensibly helps orphans in Afghanistan. In reality, the charity is a
front to finance al-Qaeda activities. The woman, a Swiss national, is
arrested in Switzerland and detained by the United States on Guan-
tanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba ("Guantanamo"). The U.S. government
labels the woman an "enemy combatant" and declares that it intends to
detain her indefinitely, until the end of the government's "War on Terror-
ism."
2
(2) The President authorizes the seizure and detention of a Cuban
national who flees Cuba by boat in order to immigrate to the United
States. The Cuban national is arrested off the shores of the United States
but is detained in an American prison in Louisiana. The Cuban govern-
ment refuses to accept the return of the Cuban national and indicates that
it will never do so. The U.S. government declares that it will detain the
2. This hypothetical is modified from a hypothetical posed by a district court judge to gov-
ernment counsel during oral argument in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,
475 (D.D.C. 2005). Government counsel asserted that the government would have authority to
detain the elderly woman. See id. The government has also indicated that it intends to hold some of
the enemy combatant detainees indefinitely. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 540 (2004)
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he Government asserts a right to hold Hamdi under these
conditions indefinitely, that is, until the government determines that the United States is no longer
threatened by the terrorism exemplified in the attacks of September 11, 2001"). For a description of
how the government has used Guantanamo for anti-terrorism purposes see Diane Marie Amann,
Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 267-74 (2004).
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Cuban national indefinitely, although it may release him on "parole" if
one of its periodic reviews of his dangerousness warrants such release.3
The cases described above raise many important questions regard-
ing the constitutional rights of aliens indefinitely detained by the United
States.4 For example, do either of the aliens in cases (1) and (2) possess
any constitutional rights? If both are entitled to constitutional protec-
tions, do they have the same constitutional protections? If the Supreme
Court first determined in case (1), a terrorism-related case, that the de-
tainee possesses at least some constitutional rights, would the decision
compel a subsequent finding that the detainee in case (2), a traditional
immigration case,5 also possesses constitutional rights, including a lib-
erty interest sufficient to preclude indefinite detention? If a court deter-
mined that the Cuban national in case (2) could not constitutionally be
detained indefinitely, would the government still be able to effectively
use immigration provisions to protect national security?
It may seem quite counterintuitive that in 2007 the United States
could permanently detain human beings without formal charges or any
type of judicial oversight, but at this time it is not clear that either the
Swiss national in case (1) or the Cuban national in case (2) possess any
constitutional rights. Currently, courts are wrestling with the issue of
whether the government's terrorism-related alien detainees on Guan-
tanamo possess constitutional rights.6 For quite some time, immigration
law has struggled with similar issues involving the extraterritorial reach
of the Constitution. In fact, the denial of constitutional rights to aliens
stopped at the U.S. border is one of the major reasons why immigration
law has long been notorious for its failure to comply with the rule of law
and its isolation from other areas of public law.7
This Article discusses how the judicial resolution of the constitu-
tional rights of the Guantanamo alien detainees, which case (1) repre-
sents, may present a unique opportunity for reconsideration of the long-
3. This hypothetical is intended to describe facts similar to those of a typical "Mariel Cu-
ban." In 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban nationals fled Cuba and were intercepted off the
shores of the United States. Many of the Mariel Cubans were "paroled" into the United States, but,
until recently, all of the Mariel Cubans were subject to the possibility of indefinite detention in U.S.
jails. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining why the Mariel Cubans are no longer
subject to indefinite detention); see also Eliot Walker, Note, Safe Harbor: Is Clark v. Martinez the
End of the Voyage of the Mariel?, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 121 (2006). The Mariel Cubans were
subject to indefinite detention because Cuba has refused to accept their return. In addition, no other
country has expressed a willingness to accept the Mariel Cubans. See Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S.,
418 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005).
4. The term "alien" is considered by many to be pejorative. Case law and the Immigration
and Nationality Act refer extensively to "alien" and "alienage," however. See infra note 18 (defin-
ing the term). In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the term will be used in this Article.
5. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (defining immigration law as the law governing
the admission and expulsion of aliens).
6. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the cases).
7. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (explaining immigration law's isolation from other areas of public law).
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standing problem in immigration law of the constitutional rights of aliens
stopped at the border and sometimes detained indefinitely, which case
(2) represents. Many commentators have recently focused on the gov-
ernment's use of immigration laws to combat terrorism and how these
actions have undermined sound immigration policy. 8 Scholars have also
recently focused a great deal on the egregious violations of human rights
committed in the War on Terrorism.9 Little attention, however, has been
paid to the possibility that future terrorism-related decisions, by declaring
that the Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights, could im-
pact immigration law in a positive manner.
Part I of this Article describes the inherent connection between the
current Guantanamo detention cases and immigration law. Part II de-
scribes the traditional understanding of the territorial limits to the appli-
cation of the Constitution in immigration law and how this traditional
understanding is now being questioned by some courts. In addition, this
Part describes how courts in the current Guantanamo detention cases
have addressed similar issues involving the extraterritorial application of
the Constitution.
A detailed analysis of whether the current Guantanamo detainees
should be recognized as possessing constitutional rights (as well as the
identity and breadth of those rights) has been made by other scholars and
is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, Part III argues that judicial
recognition that the Guantanamo detainees possess at least some consti-
tutional rights should lead to the recognition that detainees in the same
position as the Cuban national in case (2) also possess at least some con-
stitutional rights, including the right to be free from indefinite detention.
Contrary to the government's likely arguments, such a holding would be
relatively modest and would allow the government to continue to use
immigration laws, including laws authorizing detention, for national se-
curity purposes.
I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND
IMMIGRATION LAW
Most of the government's immigration activities are not related to
terrorism and, undoubtedly, much of its anti-terrorism activities are not
related to immigration law.' Nevertheless, there is an undeniable con-
8. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962963; Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First, How
Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OxFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (2006) (arguing that the War Against Terrorism has violated the tradition of
requiring the "government to abide by the Constitution's restrictions on its power no matter where or
against whom it acts").
10. Before September 11, 2001, it was especially true that the government's immigration
activities were mostly not connected to its anti-terrorism efforts. See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism,
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nection between the two. Immigration law has long been a tool used to
pursue various interests of the political branches, including ones related
to national security and foreign policy." Although the relevant provi-
sions have been amended at various times to extend or retract the gov-
ernment's powers, the Immigration and Nationality Act has consistently
contained provisions that have given the executive branch authority to
consider foreign policy consequences when making decisions regarding
deportation.' 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has on more than one occasion
acknowledged that immigration laws serve multiple purposes, especially
ones connected to foreign policy.
13
The War on Terrorism is no exception to the historical use of immi-
gration laws to serve foreign policy and national security purposes. Im-
migration functions have been transferred to the Department of Home-
land Security, formally making immigration a national security concern
in a more direct way than in the past. Immigration provisions are espe-
cially tempting for the government to use in combating terrorism because
aliens have fewer constitutional protections than do citizens, and immi-
gration law is largely unconstrained by the rule of law.' 4  Not surpris-
ingly, immigration laws have been used in various ways to help combat
terrorism, including facilitating the detention of terrorist suspects.1 5 In-
deed, the government's use of immigration laws in its War on Terrorism
Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313,
316 (2000) ("Immigration policies with foreign policy dimensions are by far the exception rather
than the rule. The vast bulk of immigration enforcement involves routine matters such as poverty,
crime, regulatory violations, and protection of the domestic labor market."). Due, in part, to the
country's high immigration and deportation rates, it is still true now.
11. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 38-45 (2007); David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 988-1003 (2002).
12. For current provisions see, for example, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) (2006) (providing
authorization to deport if an alien's presence in the United States could result in "adverse foreign
policy consequences"); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(2)(C)(iv) (2006) (providing that the "Attorney General
may disregard [an alien's designation of a country to which he would like to be deported] if the
Attorney General decides that removing the alien to the country is prejudicial to the United States");
8 C.F.R. § 215.3 (b), (c) (2004) (providing that the Attorney General may block the departure of an
alien from the United States when it would be deemed prejudicial to national security interests to
permit him to depart).
13. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(referencing the government's power "to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that
country's nationals"); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (noting that decisions relating to
immigration "may implicate our relations with foreign powers").
14. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the lack of constitutional restrictions on the government's
creation and use of immigration laws); see also Brian G. Slocum, Courts vs. The Political Branches:
Immigration "'Reform" and the Battle for the Future of Immigration Law, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2007).
15. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (explaining how the government has used
immigration laws for national security purposes). The government has been explicit about its intent
to use immigration laws to fight terrorism. See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocu-
mented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September I 1th "Pale of Law, " 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 639, 642 (2004) (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft, "Let the terrorist among us be
warned: If you overstay your visa even by one day we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you
will be kept in jail and kept in custody as long as possible.").
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has made some immigration commentators fear that immigrants have
been unfairly linked to the figure of the terrorist. 1
6
In turn, even when the government's anti-terrorism actions do not
directly involve the application of specific immigration laws, they can
have a connection to immigration law. Unlike case (1) described above,
case (2) is traditionally considered to be an immigration case because the
Cuban national intended to immigrate to the United States (and immigra-
tion law refers to the federal law "governing the admission and the ex-
pulsion of aliens"),17 but both .'ase (1) and case (2) involve "aliens." 18
Even in situations, such as case (1), where the alien is not attempting to
enter the United States, a judicial decision that resolves territorial issues
regarding the availability of constitutional protections for aliens can have
a substantial impact on immigration cases. As mentioned above, courts
have recently struggled with the long-standing and controversial issue in
immigration law of which, if any, constitutional rights should be afforded
aliens, such as the Cuban national in case (2), who are considered to have
been stopped at the border.' 9 Thus, as this Article argues, the judicial
recognition that the alien in case (1) (similarly situated to the detainees in
the current Guantanamo cases) possesses constitutional rights, even
though arrested and detained outside of U.S. sovereign borders, should
help clarify that the Cuban national in case (2) also possesses constitu-
tional rights.
II. ALIENS AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Some commentators on the current Guantanamo detention cases
have been puzzled about why citizenship or territoriality should matter in
determining the constitutional rights of detainees at Guantanamo. ° To
immigration scholars, such a focus is not surprising. In immigration law,
both status and territoriality have historically been crucial in determining
the scope of applicable constitutional rights although, as indicated above,
the degree to which territorial issues should affect the constitutional
16. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Decoupling "Terrorist" from "Immigrant:" An Enhanced
Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201 (2003).
17. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255, 256; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545,
547 (1990) (defining immigration law as the law governing the admission and expulsion of aliens,
rather than the more general law of aliens' rights and obligations, such as their tax status and eligibil-
ity for government benefits and employment).
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (defining an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States").
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court's "Enemy Combatant" Decisions:
Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
409, 410 (2005) (arguing that the "Court never provided a coherent theory explaining why citizen-
ship should determine the scope of constitutional protections for those classified by the executive as
'enemy combatants').
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rights of aliens is a source of much debate and confusion.2' Section A of
this Part describes the confusion in immigration law regarding the appli-
cation of the Constitution to aliens stopped at the border. Section B de-
scribes the issues involving the extraterritorial application of the Consti-
tution in the current Guantanamo cases.
A. The Territorial Distinction and the "Entry Fiction" in Immigration
Law
Constitutional rights in immigration law are based on the "plenary
power doctrine," the territorial distinction, and the "entry fiction." The
Supreme Court has consistently maintained that, based on the United
States' existence as a sovereign state, the government possesses unfet-
tered "plenary power" to control immigration, and aliens, consequently,
possess far fewer constitutional rights than do citizens when the govern-
ment's immigration powers are being utilized.22 The constitutional rights
that aliens do possess are based on a longstanding territorial distinction.
Deportable aliens, those aliens deemed under immigration law to have
made an "entry" into the United States, are entitled to due process and
other constitutional rights.23 For constitutional (but no longer statutory)
purposes, an "entry" occurs even if the alien enters the country surrepti-
tiously.
24
Under the standard account, inadmissible aliens, considered under
immigration law as having not made an entry, have fewer, if any, consti-
tutional rights.25 Even if the Attorney General has "paroled," but not
21. Immigration law scholars have addressed these issues for some time. See, e.g., Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Com-
pact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11
(1985). As a result of the current Guantanamo detention cases, other scholars are also examining
issues relating to the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geogra-
phy of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501 (2005) (arguing that the historical importance of territori-
ality should be reexamined).
22. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) (asserting that the power to
deport is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to
its safety, its independence and its welfare .. "); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regula-
tion of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 862, 862 (1989) (stating that early cases
"denied virtually any authority for the judiciary to review substantive decisions as to which classes
of aliens should be entitled to enter or remain in the country").
23. Deportable aliens are entitled to at least due process rights. Whether, and to what extent,
they possess other constitutional rights is a matter of debate. See Brian G. Slocum, Canons, The
Plenary Power Doctrine and Immigration Law, 34 FL. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
24. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) (holding that "[i]t is
important to note at the outset that our immigration laws have long made a distinction between those
aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who are within the United
States after an entry, irrespective of its legality." (quotation omitted)). On September 30, 1996,
Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, which changed the definition of "deportable"
to only include those aliens who have been "admitted" into the U.S. See Brian G. Slocum, The
Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 524-25 (2003)
(explaining IIRIRA's changes to immigration terminology).
25. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (stating that "an alien seeking admission
to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for
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formally admitted, an inadmissible alien into the country, under a con-
cept known as the "entry fiction" the alien is still considered to be at the
border, even though he or she may actually have lived and worked in this
country for many years.26 Needless to say, the entry fiction has been
harshly criticized by immigration scholars and others. 7
Application of the territorial distinction and entry fiction in immi-
gration law has produced some of the most egregious examples of the
rejection of the rule of law known to American jurisprudence. In one of
the most notorious cases, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
28
Mezei was excluded without a hearing based on confidential informa-
tion.29  Because Mezei could not establish his nationality, other nations
would not take him, and he remained confined by the government on
Ellis Island.30  Despite the indefinite, and potentially permanent, nature
of his detention, the Court held that Mezei's due process rights were not
violated because Mezei was treated "as if stopped at the border" and thus
had no due process rights.3'
The Mezei case is widely considered to be an example of the entry
fiction because Mezei was detained on Ellis Island rather than outside of
the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative .... [H]owever, once an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his consti-
tutional status changes accordingly.") (citations omitted). In IIRIRA, Congress substituted the term
"inadmissible" for "excludable" wherever the latter term appeared in the INA. I use the terms "in-
admissible" and "excludable" interchangeably. In using the term inadmissible, I intend for it to be
understood as synonymous with excludable, even if doing so is somewhat inaccurate, and to only
include those aliens who are deemed under immigration law to have been stopped at the border.
26. Congress has explicitly indicated that the parole of an alien into the country should not be
considered an entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006) (specifying that "parole of such alien shall
not be regarded as an admission of the alien"). Courts have uniformly agreed that a parole should
not be considered an entry. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-90 (1958) (holding
that an alien paroled into the United States had not effected an entry); see also Charles D. Weissel-
berg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 954 (1995) (describing the entry fiction). The importance of having
entered the United States has led to significant litigation regarding whether an alien could be deemed
to have made an entry. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (determining whether a
return from a visit of a couple of hours in Mexico was an entry).
27. See, e.g., Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal
Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDoZO L. REV. 51, 89-96 (1989) (lamenting that the entry fiction
is the primary determinant of procedural due process despite its "acknowledged falsity and outra-
geousness"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389-96 (1953).
28. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
29. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
30. See id. Before his return from a trip abroad to visit his dying mother, Mezei had lived in
the United States for twenty-five years and was married to an American citizen. Id. at 216-17
(Black, J. dissenting).
31. Id. at 212 (holding that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." (quotation omitted)). The Mezei case is not an
anomaly. The Court has made similar statements in other cases about the rights of inadmissible
aliens. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding that the
Attorney General was authorized to exclude the wife of a United States citizen without a hearing);
Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (holding that an alien who had been released into the
country for almost ten years was nevertheless "still in theory of law at the boundary line and had
gained no foothold in the United States." (citation omitted)).
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U.S. territory.32 Other cases, however, provide a better picture of how
courts have held that the entry fiction still retains its constitutional sig-
nificance even when the aliens are imprisoned within the United States
after having lived within the country for extended periods of time after
being paroled. In Gisbert v. Attorney General,33 for example, the detain-
ees were Mariel Cubans who had arrived in 1980 on the Mariel boatlift
and were granted parole into the United States.34 The detainees commit-
ted crimes, however, and, after the completion of their criminal sen-
tences, were imprisoned indefinitely by the government.35 Despite their
indefinite imprisonment within the United States, the Fifth Circuit held
that the detainees had no due process rights and thus no constitutional
right to be free from indefinite detention.36
Similar to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gisbert, lower courts have
almost uniformly held that the government has constitutional authority to
indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens, even those aliens who have lived
in the United States for long periods of time. 7 Typically, these aliens are
indefinitely detained after they have received a final order of deportation
but their countries of origin refuse to accept their returns. In some cases,
the intransigence of the country of origin raises the possibility of perma-
nent detention. Perhaps the most notorious example is the thousands of
Cubans who, like the detainees in Gisbert, came to the United States on
the Mariel boatlift in 1980 and were subject to indefinite detention within
the United States after Cuba refused to accept their return.38 Cuba's in-
transigence is not unique, however. Other nations have also refused to
accept the return of their citizens.39
Despite the uncompromising reasoning in decisions such as Mezei,
the definition and scope of the entry fiction, as well as the significance of
territoriality, is now unclear.4° What is clear is that the doctrine is not as
absolute as it might have once seemed. In Landon v. Plasencia,41 the
Court indicated that a long-term resident alien had due process rights
even though she had been stopped at the border after a brief stay outside
32. See, e.g., David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention,
51 EMORY L. J. 1003, 1033-34 (2002).
33. 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
34. See Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1439-40; see also supra note 3 (describing the Mariel boatlifi).
35. See Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1439-40.
36. See id. at 1442-43; see also Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1443, 1449 (9th
Cir. 1995) (rehearing en banc) (holding that a Mariel Cuban detained by the government for the
previous ten years "in a variety of prisons" within the United States did not "have a constitutional
right to be free from detention, even for an extended time").
37. See Slocum, supra note 23, at 43.
38. See supra note 3.
39. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684-86 (2001) (stating that one of the aliens
was indefinitely detained because his country of origin, Cambodia, does not have a repatriation
agreement with the United States and would not accept his return).
40. See Alvarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
"precise reach of the entry fiction doctrine is unclear" (citation omitted)).
41. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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of the country.42 In some recent cases, lower courts have indicated that
even inadmissible aliens who were never legal residents at all possess at
least some due process rights.43 Other courts, somewhat inconsistently,
have suggested that the "entry fiction" means that inadmissible aliens do
not possess procedural due process rights, but that they do have other
constitutional rights. 4
The confusion regarding the application of the Constitution to aliens
stopped at the border extends outside the traditional parameters of immi-
gration law. The rights of inadmissible aliens are based on a territorial
distinction, but some courts have, without much analysis of territoriality
issues, held that the entry fiction determines aliens' "rights with regard to
immigration and deportation proceedings" but does not limit the right of
aliens detained within United States territory to "humane treatment.,
45
Other courts have disagreed about the applicability of specific constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Fourth Amendment.46
Recent Supreme Court cases have not clarified the confusion re-
garding the reach of the Constitution. In Zadvydas v. Davis,4 7 the Su-
preme Court stated that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens
(those aliens considered to have entered the United States) would raise
serious constitutional issues. The Court rejected the government's argu-
ment that Mezei controlled, noting that the case before it involved de-
42. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 33-34.
43. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding
that "[t]he fact that [inadmissible] aliens are entitled to less process ... does not mean that they are
not at all protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003). While the Sixth Circuit recognized a due process right to be free from
indefinite detention, other courts have recognized more limited due process rights. See Ngo v. INS,
192 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that excludable aliens who could not be removed were
entitled, as a matter of due process, to periodic review of the necessity for their continued detention);
Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that apart from "protection[s]
against gross physical abuse," aliens seeking initial admission are entitled to no constitutional due
process protections).
44. See, e.g., Alvarez-Garcia, 378 F.3d 1094 (suggesting that inadmissible aliens possess
equal protection rights, although denying the specific claim of an equal protection violation); cf
Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that the entry fiction "applies to
procedural due process challenges such as Sierra's. This case does not involve, and we do not ad-
dress, a substantive due process challenge... " (citation omitted)); Barrera-Echavarria, 44 F.3d at
1449 (explaining that "[w]hile it is... clear that excludable aliens have no procedural due process
rights in the admission process, the law is not settled with regard to nonprocedural rights").
45. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Martinez-Aguero v.
Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the entry fiction only applies to immigration
proceedings and aliens stopped at the border have a constitutional right to be free from false impris-
onment and the use of excessive force by law enforcement personnel).
46. Compare Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d 618 (holding that the "entry fiction" would not be
applied outside the immigration context and that the alien had a Fourth Amendment right to be free
from false imprisonment and use of excessive force), with United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that even an alien who had been deported and then entered
the country illegally was not entitled to Fourth Amendment rights). See Linda Bosniak, A Basic
Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 411 (2002) (arguing that "if a paroled [Mariel
Cuban] is arrested on criminal charges, he is entitled to full criminal due process by virtue of his
presence here, and his lack of entry is irrelevant").
47. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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portable not inadmissible aliens, and the "basic territorial distinction"
"runs throughout immigration law.''48  Because of the serious constitu-
tional concerns raised by the authorization of indefinite detention, the
Court interpreted the current INA provision authorizing detention, 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), as only allowing detention for a six month period
unless there is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future .... ,49 The Court reasoned that it was not required by
the case to "consider the political branches' authority to control entry
into the United States," terrorism, or "other special circumstances," and
thus had left no "unprotected spot in the Nation's armor." 50  Subse-
quently, however, the Court held in Clark v. Martinez,51 that it had estab-
lished the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas and that inter-
pretation must control even if the detention at issue involved inadmissi-
ble rather than deportable aliens.52
Based on the standard account of the entry fiction, the Cuban na-
tional in case (2) may not be entitled to any constitutional rights, even
though he is physically located in the United States.5 a Certainly, if the
executive branch possessed statutory authority to detain him indefinitely,
it could do so without violating the Constitution.54 But some lower
courts have challenged the standard account and have questioned
whether the Court's most extreme statements about the constitutional
rights of inadmissible aliens can really be taken literally.55
48. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94; see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power:
The Meaning and Impact ofZadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 375 (2002) (noting that
that the Court's opinion in Zadvydas "reaffirm[s] ... the border/interior distinction as a constitu-
tional matter").
49. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, 701. The Court's decision was technically one of statutory
interpretation, but courts have treated the decision as though it also made binding statements regard-
ing the constitutional rights of aliens. See Slocum, supra note 23, at 22.
50. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96 (citation omitted).
51. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
52. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380-81.
53. This is especially true if the governmental actions at issue could be said to involve immi-
gration law. Governmental actions outside of immigration law involving inadmissible aliens may be
subject to closer constitutional scrutiny, although the extent of such protections is a matter of debate.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The idea that inadmissible aliens have no constitu-
tional rights may intuitively strike some as an absurd overstatement, but the law is certainly not clear
that they have any constitutional rights. During oral argument in Clark v. Martinez, for example,
Justice Stevens asked the government attorney whether the government could just "shoot" the Mariel
Cubans. The government attorney responded, "Absolutely not" but gave no answer when Stevens
asked why. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (No. 03-878).
54. The Court's decision in Martinez abruptly ended the ability that the executive branch had
enjoyed for decades to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens. Congress is of course free to amend
the INA to once again grant the executive branch the power to indefinitely detain any inadmissible
alien. Thus, the potential that the executive branch will once again attempt to indefinitely detain
inadmissible aliens remains.
55. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 410.
If [inadmissible] aliens were not protected by even the substantive component of consti-
tutional due process, as the government appears to argue, we do not see why the United
States government could not torture or summarily execute them. Because we do not be-
lieve that our Constitution could permit persons living in the United States ... to be sub-
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Unfortunately, even the decisions of the courts that have expressed
reservations about an extreme version of the entry fiction have raised
more questions than they have answered. If some of the extreme state-
ments about the rights of inadmissible aliens cannot be taken literally,
what rights do inadmissible aliens possess? If, as some courts have sug-
gested, the "entry fiction" deprives inadmissible aliens of some constitu-
tional rights but not others, what principle serves to distinguish amongst
the constitutional rights?56  How can it be that the entry fiction is de-
pendent on the view that the Constitution does not apply because the
alien has not entered the United States, but that this territorial fiction
mysteriously vanishes depending on whether the claim can be said to fall
within immigration law?
57
B. The Current Guantanamo Detention Cases and the Territorial Dis-
tinction
Not surprisingly, in the current Guantanamo detention cases courts
have struggled with the same constitutional issues that have perplexed
courts in immigration cases. Similar to immigration law, status is impor-
tant. It is likely that citizens are entitled to due process protections, even
when they have allegedly engaged in combat against the United States
and are detained outside the country. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,58 the Court
held that the President could not detain Hamdi, a United States citizen, as
an "enemy combatant" without the "essential constitutional promises" of
due process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard before a
neutral decision maker.59 In a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor indi-
cated that the Court would have reached the same conclusion regarding
the scope of constitutional rights possessed by Hamdi even if he had
been detained in "Afghanistan or even Guantanamo Bay.",
60
jected to any government action without limit, we conclude that government treatment of
[inadmissible] aliens must implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
56. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing how some courts have stated that
the entry fiction may only deprive inadmissible aliens of procedural due process rights). While it is
important to highlight the unanswered questions regarding the constitutional rights of inadmissible
aliens, it is not the intention of this Article to define precisely the constitutional rights inadmissible
aliens should be afforded. This Article instead focuses on how a judicial recognition that the current
Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights should result in a subsequent judicial recognition
that inadmissible aliens possess due process rights sufficient to preclude indefinite detention. See
infra Part III.A.3.
57. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (describing how some courts have stated
that the entry fiction is limited to immigration law).
58. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
59. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
60. Id. at 524 (indicating that it is "not at all clear why [detention in the United States as
opposed to overseas] should make a determinative constitutional difference"). Illustrating the issues
of the interplay of status and territoriality that these cases raise, a lower court has held that an alien
captured within the United States and held as an enemy combatant is to be subject to the same due
process protections as the Court outlined in Hamdi, rejecting the detainee's arguments that his cap-
ture within U.S. territory entitled him to greater protections. See AI-Marri v. Wright, 443 F. Supp.
2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006). It has also been suggested that detainees captured in the theatre of war who
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Lower courts, in cases involving refugees and ones involving the
current detainees, have disagreed about whether alien detainees on Guan-
tanamo possess constitutional rights, however.61 The United States holds
the territory under a grant of indefinite duration that gives the govern-
ment complete jurisdiction and control over the territory.62 The determi-
nation of whether Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights
typically turns on how Guantanamo is characterized. Guantanamo is not
seen as functionally equivalent to the United States, but such a charac-
terization has not been necessary to a holding that the detainees possess
some constitutional rights. When Guantanamo is seen as equivalent to
an unincorporated U.S. territory (a territory not clearly destined for state-
hood), courts typically hold that the detainees possess constitutional
rights.63  Only "fundamental" constitutional rights are protected, how-
ever.64 When Guantanamo is characterized as equivalent to foreign terri-
tory, however, courts typically hold that the detainees have no constitu-
tional rights, although some scholars believe such decisions are errone-
ous.
65
Although the Court has had the opportunity, it has not yet clearly
decided the constitutional rights of the Guantanamo detainees. In Rasul
v. Bush,66 the Court indicated that it considers Guantanamo to be "terri-
tory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control" but not "ultimate sovereignty.' 67 The Court held that the de-
tainees at Guantanamo had a right under the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241, to challenge the legality of their detention, even though the United
are citizens of the country with whom we are at war may lack constitutional rights. See Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Detainee Cases of 2004 and 2006 and Their Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 33
(2006).
61. See Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (2004)
(describing the refugee cases).
62. See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1197-98 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that for habeas
purposes, Guantanamo was a part of the sovereign territory of the United States); see also In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 462-64 (D.D.C. 2005) (recognizing the "special
nature of Guantanamo Bay" and characterizing it as the "equivalent of a U.S. territory in which
fundamental constitutional rights exist."); Neuman, supra note 61, at 15, 34-43.
64. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (holding that "[o]nly
'fundamental' constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of those territories" (citations omit-
ted)).
65. See, e.g., Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311,321 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that the detain-
ees are held on foreign territory and determining that they therefore have no constitutional rights); Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004). The decisions holding that the detainees lack constitutional rights typically rely on
cases such as Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, where the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to a search of a nonresident's property in Mexico. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 781-85 (1950) (rejecting the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment).
Professor Neuman argues that the detainees should receive due process protections regardless of
how Guantanamo is classified. See Neuman, supra note 61, at 44-53 (arguing that the Court should
hold that long-term detainees held in an offshore prison are entitled to fundamental due process
protections).
66. 542 U.S. 466.
67. Id. at 476 (quotation omitted).
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States lacked formal sovereignty over the territory.68 In the fifteenth, and
last, footnote in the opinion, the Court stated that:
[Being] held in Executive detention for more than two years in terri-
tory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged
with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe[s] "custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 
69
which is all that the habeas statute requires.
Soon after the Court's decision in Rasul, many prominent legal
scholars argued, based mostly on the quoted passage above, that the
Court held, or at least strongly implied, that the aliens possess constitu-
tional rights. 70 Lower courts disagreed, though, about how the case
should be interpreted. In one case, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,
71
the district court held that the Court in Rasul indicated that the aliens
detained on Guantanamo possess a "fundamental right to due process. 72
In another case, Khalid v. Bush,73 the district court held that the Court's
decision in Rasul was merely a statutory holding and that even if the
detainees have a statutory right to habeas corpus, they do not have con-
stitutional protections.74
The Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,75 involving a
Yemeni national captured by the United States in Afghanistan and de-
68. See id at 484.
69. Id at 483 n. 15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006)).
70. In addition to the language quoted above in the text, the fifteenth footnote in Rasul also
cited to Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Verdugo-Uquidez, 494 U.S. 259, where he argued
that "the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question
are foreign or domestic." Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). As noted above,
some scholars have interpreted the Rasul footnote as indicating that the detainees possess constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology
After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005) (arguing that the "majority opinion
strongly suggests in a footnote that foreign nationals in U.S. custody at Guantanamo .. .possess
constitutional rights" but noting that the "opinion leaves ambiguous the reason why foreign nationals
have constitutional rights there-whether because they are human beings in long-term U.S. custody
or because of the special character of U.S. authority at Guantanamo"); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guan-
tanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2026-28 (2005)
(arguing that the Court at least hinted that the detainees possess constitutional rights); Neal K.
Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
49, 55 (stating that the "sharp reference to Justice Kennedy's Verdugo concurrence underscores the
point-that certain fundamental rights may apply abroad"). Some commentators would no doubt
argue that, even apart from the language in the footnote, the Court's statutory holding compels the
recognition that the detainees possess constitutional rights. See Hart, supra note 27, at 1393 ("The
great and generating principle of this whole body of law-that the Constitution always applies when
a court is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus"); Roosevelt, supra at 2026 (suggesting that the
scope of habeas jurisdiction should be deemed to be coextensive with the scope of substantive fed-
eral rights).
71. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443.
72. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
73. 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
74. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
75. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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tained on Guantanamo, was similarly decided without a determination of
the constitutional rights possessed by the detainees. In Hamdan, the Su-
preme Court invalided the military commissions set up by the govern-
ment to try the Guantanamo detainees on the basis of federal statutes
relating to military justice, treaties relating to the treatment of military
detainees, and the customary international laws of war.76 While the deci-
sion is undoubtedly important, by deciding the case on non-constitutional
grounds, and thus allowing Congress to legislate around the decision, the
Supreme Court did not quite deliver the "knockout blow" that some
commentators had described the decision as delivering.77
Soon after the Hamdan decision, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA), which purported to strip federal courts of ju-
risdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by any "alien" detained by
the United States as an "enemy combatant." 78 Recently, the D.C. Circuit
held that the statute clearly stripped courts of jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions and that the statute was constitutional with regard to the
alien detainees on Guantanamo because an alien captured abroad and
detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States is not pro-
tected under the Suspension Clause.79 In the D.C. Circuit's view, the
Supreme Court's decision in Rasul rested only on statutory interpretation
and did not compel a constitutional holding in favor of the detainees.8 0
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Guantanamo is no different than a foreign
country because Congress has made clear that Cuba, and not the United
States, has sovereignty over Guantanamo.81
III. IMMIGRATION LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY ABSENT THE
"ENTRY FICTION"
Now that Congress has eliminated statutory habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion, resolution of the Guantanamo cases will likely force the Supreme
Court to decide the constitutional rights of the detainees.82 Section A
76. See Ariel Zemach, Taking War Seriously: Applying the Law of War to Hostilities Within
an Occupied Territory, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 645, 655-56 (2006) (describing the Hamdan
decision).
77. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, More Real Than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule
of Law, and Comparative Executive "'Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
51, 51 (2005-2006) (describing the "common view" that the Court had delivered a "knockout
blow").
78. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950j, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
79. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991-94, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
80. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 992 n. 10.
81. See id. at 992. On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court in Hamdan also
held that Hamdan was not constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus because, although he has been a
prisoner of the United States for five years, his detention on Guantanamo "lacks the geographical
and volitional predicates necessary to claim a constitutional right to habeas corpus." See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16-18 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted).
82. Such a decision may not be immediate, however. The Supreme Court has denied certio-
rari in Boumediene. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478. The Court may decide to hear the
case at a later date, however. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, provides
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explains why judicial recognition that the Guantanamo detainees possess
constitutional rights should lead to subsequent judicial recognition that
inadmissible aliens detained within the United States also possess consti-
tutional rights, including rights against indefinite detention. Section B
argues that the recognition that at least some inadmissible aliens possess
constitutional rights would not undermine the government's national
security efforts. Thus, as Section C explains, recognition that the Cuban
national from case (2) possesses constitutional rights against indefinite
detention would not necessarily mean that the Swiss national from case
(1) also possesses constitutional rights against indefinite detention.
A. The Possibility that the Current Guantanamo Cases Could Lead to
the End of the "Entry Fiction" in Immigration Law
1. The Effects of a Holding That the Detainees Lack Constitutional
Rights
The range of possible grounds for a decision regarding the constitu-
tional rights of the current Guantanamo detainees is, of course, relatively
large. For example, the Supreme Court could decline to address whether
the current detainees possess fundamental constitutional rights on the
basis that even if they do, such rights do not include a right to habeas
corpus. 83 Conversely, the Court could hold that the current Guantanamo
detainees do not possess any constitutional rights. Any of the Court's
possible holdings would likely not prevent any lower court from reexam-
ining the entry fiction and holding that aliens located within the United
States (even if under the entry fiction) possess at least some constitu-
tional rights, however.84 A decision by the Supreme Court that territori-
ality will continue to retain its importance in determining constitutional
for limited review by the D.C. Circuit of certain determinations of the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals. The statute will undoubtedly be challenged on the basis that it does not provide a consti-
tutionally adequate substitute for habeas corpus. If it is challenged on this basis, it is probable that
the Court will grant certiorari. Three Justices (Justices Breyer, Souter and Ginsburg) dissented from
the denial of certiorari in Boumediene, and Justices Steven and Kennedy issued a statement indicat-
ing that they would agree to hear the case if aliens seek to establish that they would agree to hear the
case if the aliens seek to establish that they have been injured by the Detainee Treatment Act. See
127 S. Ct. 1478. In any case, review of the constitutional rights of the alien detainees would not be
likely if Congress passes legislation restoring habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Habeas Corpus Resto-
ration Act of 2006, S. 4081, 109th Cong. (2006). The passage of such a statute would again present
the possibility of nonconstitutional decisions.
83. For a discussion of the complexities of the Suspension Clause issues see Amanda Tyler, Is
Suspension a Political Question, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 408-12 (2006); James E. Pfander, The Limits
of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 537-38 (2006).
84. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (describing the judicial confusion regarding
the definition and scope of the entry fiction). Indeed, the Court could hold that the current Guan-
tanamo detainees lack constitutional rights for reasons unconnected to immigration law, such as, for
example, their status as "enemy combatants," although a decision relying solely on such a basis
seems unlikely. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (indicating that its
decision holding that the alien detainees on Guantanamo lack protection under the Suspension
Clause was based on territoriality and that enemy alien status played no role); see also Rotunda,
supra note 60, at 33 (indicating the possibility that detainees captured in the theatre of war who are
citizens of the country with whom we are at war may lack constitutional rights).
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rights would not necessarily compel the continuing recognition of territo-
rial fictions. In other words, a holding that aliens detained on foreign
territory do not possess constitutional rights should not preclude a hold-
ing that detainees on U.S. soil do possess constitutional rights.
A decision by the Court regarding the constitutional rights of the
current Guantanamo detainees would thus not likely prevent lower courts
from eliminating the entry fiction and holding that aliens have due proc-
ess rights sufficient to prevent indefinite detention.85 A holding that an
alien in the position of the Cuban national in case (2) possesses constitu-
tional rights sufficient to preclude indefinite detention would not, how-
ever, require the elimination of the entry fiction.86 Certainly, inadmissi-
ble aliens may constitutionally be detained pending their deportation.
87
However, as some courts have recognized, inadmissible aliens have con-
stitutional rights (including due process rights) that protect them from
governmental actions that occur outside of immigration law.88 Indefinite
detention when there is no foreseeable possibility of deportation could be
analogized to these cases outside of immigration law that recognize that
inadmissible aliens possess constitutional rights. As the Court stated in
Zadvydas, once deportation is no longer foreseeable, the immigration
justification for the detention is absent and continued detention is thus
unreasonable. 89  Thus, indefinite detention could be characterized by
courts as government action that occurs outside of immigration law. At
the same time, courts could continue to hold that inadmissible aliens
85. Indeed, although it is in the minority, the Sixth Circuit has already held that indefinite
detention of inadmissible aliens is unconstitutional. See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386
(6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003).
86. In any case, lower courts would not of course be able to overrule Supreme Court prece-
dent and would thus have to distinguish Mezei and other entry fiction cases. In Rosales-Garcia, the
Sixth Circuit did just that in holding that the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens is unconstitu-
tional. Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d. at 413-14 (claiming that the Court in Mezei "explicitly grounded
its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attor-
ney General that Mezei presented a threat to national security").
87. Cf Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (stating that "detention or
temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclu-
sion or expulsion of aliens, would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those
accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while ar-
rangements were being made for their deportation.").
88. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
89. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
527 (2003) (reasoning that the potentially indefinite detention in Zadvydas "did not serve its pur-
ported immigration purpose" because it affected aliens for whom removal was "no longer practically
attainable" due to the aliens' native countries refusing to accept their return); Cole, supra note 32, at
1007 (arguing that "preventive detention should be constitutionally permissible only where neces-
sary in aid of removal."). A decision that indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens, like indefinite
detention of deportable aliens, is outside of immigration law would not require a court to directly
overrule Mezei. See supra note 86. It would, however, require a somewhat aggressive interpretation
of Zadvydas, considering that the Court indicated that indefinite detention of deportable aliens was
outside of immigration law when deportation is not foreseeable, but, at the same time, emphasized
the territorial distinction in immigration law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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have no constitutional rights with regard to immigration and deportation
proceedings. 90
2. The Effects of a Broad Holding That the Detainees Possess Con-
stitutional Rights
If the Court holds that the Guantanamo detainees possess constitu-
tional rights, however, the decision should compel lower courts to con-
clude that (at least some) inadmissible aliens possess constitutional
rights. A broad (and very unlikely) holding by the Court that Guan-
tanamo is not equivalent to an unincorporated U.S. territory, but that the
Constitution binds the federal government wherever it acts would raise
many difficult issues for immigration law.91 Such a ruling could be con-
strued as overruling the "basic territorial distinction" in immigration law
and establishing that all inadmissible aliens potentially possess at least
92some constitutional rights. Discounting the importance of territory as a
determinant of constitutional rights would not, however, necessarily un-
dermine the importance of status. The recognition that inadmissible
aliens have constitutional rights would not mean that they would be enti-
tled to the same rights as deportable aliens.93 Courts would undoubtedly
hold that inadmissible aliens have fewer constitutional rights due to their
diminished connection to the United States.94
Nevertheless, many would be troubled by the idea that aliens with
little or no connection to the United States would be able to make consti-
tutional claims regarding actions by the U.S. government that occur on
foreign soil. Consider, for example, a national of a foreign country, say
Switzerland, who applies for a visa at a consulate in Switzerland that
would allow her to enter the United States. The Swiss national claims
that her application was denied because of her political associations, in
violation of the First Amendment. 95 Recognizing such claims would be a
significant departure from our current system.96 In essence, such recog-
90. See Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987).
91. See Neuman, supra note 61, at 44; see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text
(describing the different ways that courts have characterized the status of Guantanamo).
92. See supra Part II.A (describing the territorial distinction in immigration law).
93. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (explaining the differences between inad-
missible and deportable aliens).
94. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (indicating that the nature of constitutional protections
"may vary depending upon status and circumstance" (citation omitted)); see also David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v.
Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (describing how immigration status affects constitutional rights).
95. A holding that the Constitution applies wherever the government acts could be limited
(and most likely would be) to only the application of certain constitutional provisions, such as due
process. See Roosevelt, supra note 70, at 2042-43. Even if the hypothetical above involved a due
process claim, instead of a First Amendment claim, however, many would no doubt still be troubled
by the idea that an alien with little or no connection to the United States could make constitutional
claims when the government action in question occurs on foreign soil.
96. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 60 (D.D.C. 1998) (re-
jecting the aliens' constitutional challenge to the procedures for expedited removal of aliens arriving
in the United States without proper documentation because, as aliens seeking initial admission, they
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nition could mean that any alien who comes into contact with our immi-
gration system (even through voluntary application) would possess at
least some constitutional rights.97 While some commentators would no
doubt celebrate such an extension of the reach of the Constitution, specu-
lation about the effects of a broad constitutional holding described above
is likely purely academic considering the unlikelihood of such a decision.
3. The Effects of a Narrow Holding That the Detainees Possess
Constitutional Rights
A narrower (and much more likely) ruling by the Court that catego-
rizes Guantanamo as equivalent to an unincorporated United States terri-
tory and holds that the detainees therefore have fundamental constitu-
tional rights should still impact immigration law even if the Court does
not make any broad statements about the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution.98 Such a holding would not necessarily lead to the recogni-
tion of constitutional rights for all inadmissible aliens, however. For one
reason, many alleged constitutional violations would involve nonresident
aliens in foreign territories. Thus, the narrower holding would not raise
the question of whether the precedents precluding a constitutional chal-
lenge in the visa example above should be reconsidered.
A narrower ruling should raise questions about the continuing valid-
ity of the entry fiction in immigration law, though.99 A holding that
maintained that detainees being held indefinitely on Guantanamo possess
fundamental constitutional rights without subsequent repudiation (in all
jurisdictions) of the principle that detainees being held indefinitely in the
United States possess no constitutional rights would be arbitrary and
nonsensical. °00 Similar to a broad holding, a narrow holding would not
compel the recognition that deportable and inadmissible aliens possess
equivalent rights (or even that inadmissible aliens possess a great deal of
constitutional protection), but it could place inadmissible aliens in a simi-
had no procedural due process rights); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 617 (2006) (stating that "[a]s extraterritorial decision makers ... consular
officers have substantial de facto leeway, employ informal procedures, and are not subject to judicial
review.").
97. See Hiroshi Motomura, Review Essay, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and
the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1567, 1579 (1997) (questioning whether the alien in the posi-
tion of the Swiss national described above should be able to make a constitutional claim).
98. See Neuman, supra note 70, at 2073-74 (predicting that the cases will be resolved on
issues peculiar to Guantanamo). Another possibility is a narrower holding that turns on the special
circumstances involving long-term detention by the government rather than the characterization of
Guantanamo. See Neuman, supra note 61, at 44-53.
99. Or, to put it another way, the decision could resolve the current confusion regarding the
entry fiction by leading to a clarification by lower courts that the entry fiction only means that inad-
missible aliens have less constitutional protection than do deportable aliens, not that they are entirely
without constitutional protection.
100. Of course, the entry fiction itself is arbitrary and nonsensical, so there is no guarantee that
the entry fiction would be reexamined on the basis of the outcome of the current Guantanamo cases.
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lar position as deportable aliens with regard to indefinite detention.10' If
inadmissible aliens possess due process protections, even if to a lesser
extent than deportable aliens, there may be no principled basis for deter-
mining that deportable aliens, but not inadmissible aliens, have a due
process liberty interest against indefinite detention. 10 2  This would be
especially true if, as discussed above, a court were to characterize the
indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens as falling outside the scope of
immigration law. 1
03
B. The National Security Implications of the Recognition of Constitu-
tional Rights for Inadmissible Aliens
A decision that inadmissible aliens have constitutional rights against
indefinite detention would undoubtedly be opposed by the government
on national security grounds. '04 The government would likely claim that
a decision eliminating the entry fiction and preventing the indefinite de-
tention of inadmissible aliens would prevent it from controlling entry
into the country. A foreign state could, for example, simply refuse to
accept the return of its citizens, knowing that the U.S. government would
likely be forced to eventually release the aliens into the United States. 5
The government would argue that elimination of the entry fiction would
thus violate the promise of the Court in Zadvydas that by recognizing the
territorial distinction in immigration law, it left no "unprotected spot in
the Nation's armor."'1 6  Such fears would likely be taken seriously.
101. Cf Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and Preventative De-
tention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 113-20 (2005) (arguing that Congress could not constitutionally author-
ize indefinite detention even for terrorist suspects).
102. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694-95 (stating "[n]or are we aware of any other authority that
would support. . . limitation of due process protection for removable aliens to freedom from deten-
tion that is arbitrary or capricious"); cf id at 690 (requiring a "sufficiently strong special justifica-
tion.., for indefinite civil detention"). Any distinction between deportable and inadmissible aliens
would be especially weak if one concludes that deportable aliens who entered the country surrepti-
tiously would be protected from indefinite detention under Zadvydas. See supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text (explaining the Zavydas decision). As of now, this issue is undecided. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text (explaining that the definition of deportable aliens for both constitu-
tional and statutory purposes used to include surreptitious entries into the United States but now the
statutory definition only includes lawful entries).
103. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
104. Cf Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700 (responding to the government's national security and
foreign policy concerns about its decision).
105. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing a situation, the Mariel boatlift, where
a foreign state authorized the departure of its citizens and refused to accept their return). One possi-
ble (but highly objectionable) way around the problem would be for the government to house the
aliens on foreign soil. See Neuman, supra note 70, at 2074 (noting that the government could "relo-
cate its operations for maritime enforcement of U.S. immigration laws against refugees, economic
migrants, and smugglers" to more "authentically extraterritorial venues"). This would only be a
feasible alternative, however, if aliens detained on foreign territory do not possess constitutional
rights that could be asserted against detention. See Part III.A.2. (discussing the possibility that the
Court could hold that aliens located on foreign territory possess constitutional rights).
106. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96. Of course, the Court followed up its decision in Zadvydas
by holding that the government did not have statutory authority to detain inadmissible aliens indefi-
nitely; see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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Lower courts have assumed the legitimacy of the scenario described
above in justifying the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens.
0 7
Nevertheless, the government's national security fears would be
misplaced. Elimination of the entry fiction would not result in open bor-
ders. It would only give inadmissible aliens some constitutional rights.
Most, if not all, of the government's existing anti-terrorism related meas-
ures that involve immigration laws (as well as those that involve non-
immigration laws) would still be allowed if the entry fiction were to be
eliminated.108 Eliminating the entry fiction would not, after all, necessar-
ily eliminate the plenary power doctrine. 10 9 Thus, governmental actions
would, for the most part, not be subject to mainstream constitutional con-
straints.
Detention, likely even indefinite detention, would still be constitu-
tionally permissible in some circumstances'10 In Zadvydas, the Court
made clear that special circumstances such as terrorism might require
"heightened deference" to Congress when a court considers a statute that
provides for terrorism-related detention of deportable aliens."' Un-
doubtedly, the "heightened deference" to Congress would be even more
heightened for a statute that provided for the detention of inadmissible
aliens. At the very least, short-term detention would be constitutionally
permissible. In Demore v. Kim," 2 for example, the Court held that the
mandatory detention of criminal permanent resident aliens pending their
deportation hearings does not violate due process, stating that "[i]n the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Con-
gress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citi-
zens." l 3 Thus, the government would still be able to use federal immi-
107. See Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating
that "[a] judicial decision requiring that excludable aliens be released into American society when
neither their countries of origin nor any third country will admit them might encourage the sort of
intransigence Cuba has exhibited in the negotiations over the Mariel refugees."); Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957, 975 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that "this approach would ultimately result in our
losing control over our borders. A foreign leader could eventually compel us to grant physical
admission via parole to any aliens he wished by the simple expedient of sending them here and then
refusing to take them back."), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). The same problem could arise currently,
however, under the Court's decision in Zadvydas if the aliens entered the country surreptitiously
instead of being stopped at the border. See supra note 102.
108. 1 am not endorsing all of the government's anti-terrorism efforts, but merely explaining
how they would not be jeopardized by the elimination of the entry fiction.
109. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing the plenary power doctrine).
110. Arguably, the Court has already acknowledged that the terrorism-related detainees on
Guantanamo may be indefinitely detained. See infra note 122.
111. 533 U.S. at 696 (stating that "[we do not] consider terrorism or other special circum-
stances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.").
Subsequent to Zadvydas, Congress passed a statute providing for the indefinite detention of terrorist
suspects. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001 § 412, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2006).
112. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
113. Demore, 538 U.S. at 521, 530 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
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gration laws to arrest and detain aliens suspected of terrorist ties, as it did
after the September 11 th attacks without constitutional problems.'
1 14
The government would also be able to continue its other controver-
sial (and many would say ill-conceived) uses of immigration laws to
enhance national security. Eliminating the entry fiction certainly would
not prevent the government from tracking the movements of foreign na-
tionals who enter the United States. The government would thus not be
prevented from having registration programs like the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which requires nationals of
certain countries to be fingerprinted and photographed upon entry, to
register periodically with the government, and to comply with exit con-
trols when they leave the country.1 15 The government would thus be able
to continue to engage in racial profiling and selective treatment of Arabs
and Muslims, including singling them out for deportation.1 6 In addition,
the government would still be able to take a myriad of other actions, such
as closing removal hearings and targeting aliens based on their political
associations. 1 17
C. Inadmissible Aliens, Indefinite Detention, and Legal Fictions
It is intuitive to believe that issues of national security inevitably
lead to greater judicial deference to the political branches' assertions of
authority, and decreased respect for constitutional and human rights.
18
While undoubtedly true in large part, the current Guantanamo detainee
cases present an opportunity for courts to counter that assumption, at
114. See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences
of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction
Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 609, 620-22 (2005) (describing the massive arrests
that occurred after the attacks of 9/11); Donald Kerwin, The Use and Misuse of "National Security "
Rationale in Crafting U.S. Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 749, 749-50
(2005); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Pro-
ceedings, 50 LoY. L. REV. 149, 152 (2004).
115. See Akram & Karmely, supra note 114, at 630-32 (describing the NSEERS program).
116. See id. at 630-31 (describing how the government has engaged in racial profiling and
selective treatment of Arabs and Muslims). Thus far, challenges to the government's activities have
not been particularly successful. See, e.g., Zafar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11 th Cir.
2006) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that it
was not an equal protection violation to require the aliens to register pursuant to the NSEERS proc-
ess and rejecting the petitioners' argument that the NSEERS program infringed their equal protec-
tion rights by "precipitat[ing] them being placed in these discretionary removal proceedings by the
Attorney General" because the record did not support the argument)); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678,
681-82 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that NSEERS program violated equal protection).
117. See generally Neuman, supra note 10 (describing the difficulties of challenging immigra-
tion decisions on the basis of the First Amendment). Some courts have recognized certain First
Amendment limitations on the government in the context of deportation proceedings, however. See
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is a First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings that was violated by a government directive
that required closure of "special interest" deportation proceedings).
118. Cf Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surro-
gates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1642 (1992) (explaining how
the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence for aliens became less favorable "at the height of
McCarthyism and the nation's preoccupation with the perceived Communist threat").
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least as regards the entry fiction in immigration law. Under the standard
theory of the entry fiction, the Cuban national in case (2) does not have
any constitutional protections and may be detained in a U.S. prison in-
definitely without violating the Constitution. 19  As explained above, a
judicial recognition that the detainees on Guantanamo possess constitu-
tional rights should change the outcome of case (2).120 The Cuban na-
tional would have constitutional rights, including, absent evidence of a
national security threat or other special circumstances, constitutional
rights that should be recognized as sufficiently strong to prevent indefi-
nite detention.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to join the debate regarding the
precise constitutional rights that should be guaranteed the current Guan-
tanamo detainees. Nevertheless, while the recognition that the aliens on
Guantanamo possess constitutional rights could lead to the elimination of
the entry fiction in immigration law, the government would still be able
to take use immigration and other laws to ensure national security.'
2'
Thus, the Swiss national from case (1) might have fundamental constitu-
tional rights, but those rights may not be sufficient to prevent indefinite
detention. 122
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court ultimately rules that the
current Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights, it is time for
the entry fiction to be further redefined, or eliminated altogether.123 It is
true that legal fictions are not unique to immigration law. 124  Fictions
should be discarded, however, when they are unnecessary and im-
moral. 25 Thus, because there is no need for a legal fiction that pretends
that aliens imprisoned within the United States are actually outside our
territory and thus unprotected by the Constitution, 126 the entry fiction
should be discarded.
119. See supra Part II.A. (describing the entry fiction and indefinite detention). The executive
branch would also need statutory authority in order to detain the Cuban national indefinitely, which
it does not currently possess. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The current lack of
statutory authority should not give inadmissible aliens much comfort, however. Such authority can
easily be granted the executive branch.
120. See supra Part III.A.3.
121. See supra Part III.B.
122. It is perhaps true that not even citizens have a right to be free from indefinite detention
when they are detained as enemy combatants. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)
(stating that detention was authorized, in a case involving a citizen, for as long as "United States
troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan"). But see Corrado, supra note 101.
123. As discussed earlier, the entry fiction can be defined to exclude indefinite detention on the
theory that indefinite detention when deportation is not foreseeable is outside of immigration law,
and thus outside the scope of the entry fiction. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
124. See Note, Lessons From Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the Law,
115 HARV. L. REv. 2228 (2002).
125. The entry fiction is unnecessary because the government can ably protect national security
without resorting to the entry fiction. See supra Part IlI.B.
126. There have been arguments that eliminating the entry fiction could compel the govern-
ment to refuse to parole aliens into the country. See Martin, supra note 94, at 81-83, 99-100 (stating
that granting parolees due process protections may induce restrictions on the parole program); see
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Perhaps it is time for a new legal fiction, the "detention fiction,"
that allows inadmissible aliens to avoid indefinite imprisonment while
recognizing the extreme limits on their claim to remain in the United
States. Ordering an alien released on parole is not equivalent to afford-
ing the alien legal admission into the country. Although temporarily free
of custody, an inadmissible alien has no legal right to remain in the
United States and can be deported whenever the United States is able to
do so. In addition, an alien released on parole may be subjected to re-
lease conditions that aim to meet the government's security concerns.
127
Releasing the alien is no more a legal "entry" than is holding him in cus-
tody within the United States. Thus, under the detention fiction, an alien
would be legally considered to be detained by the government, but would
be free from imprisonment. Such a legal fiction is certainly less prepos-
terous than the current entry fiction, and is a good deal more humane.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to deny that human rights have been a major casu-
alty of the War on Terrorism. Counterintuitively, though, the War on
Terrorism may have some positive effects on immigration law because it
may help lead to the elimination of the entry fiction. While this would
result in the recognition that inadmissible aliens possess constitutional
rights, and thus move immigration law closer to the rule of law ideal, its
effects should not be overstated. Immigration law would still suffer from
unnecessary unfairness and discrimination, and the government would
still be able to use immigration laws for national security purposes.
Nevertheless, national security issues may dominate the current dis-
course on immigration law, but given the many reasons for our current
high-volume admission system, immigration responses to terrorism will
always be secondary. 2 8 Despite the modest nature of the changes that
the elimination of the entry fiction would bring, the possible recognition
that even aliens stopped at our borders possess fundamental constitu-
tional rights should be celebrated.
also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (stating that government
could choose to "keep entrants by sea aboard the vessel pending determination of their admissibil-
ity"). It is true that the government could choose to detain aliens in a purely foreign territory and
perhaps not be bound by the Constitution. See supra note 105. It is, however, a rather weak argu-
ment that the entry fiction should not be eliminated because the government may then look to indefi-
nitely detain aliens on foreign soil rather than within the United States.
127. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (stating that the issue before the Court was "not between
imprisonment and the alien 'living at large"' but rather "between imprisonment and supervision
under release conditions that may not be violated" (citation omitted)).
128. See David A. Martin, Preventive Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy
Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 307 (2004).
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LOCAL ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDINANCES:
A LEGAL, POLICY, AND LITIGATION ANALYSIS
KRiSTINA M. CAMPBELLt
INTRODUCTION
Obtaining comprehensive immigration reform is one of the most
important legal issues facing the Latino community today. For the na-
tion, virtually every family, business, and community is touched by im-
migration. In 2006, when millions marched for comprehensive immigra-
tion reform, prospects for federal action increased. During the summer
of 2006, as the U.S. House failed to move forward to complete legisla-
tive action, frustrations by anti-immigrant activists led to a small number
of cities and towns attempting to enact restrictions and prohibitions
against illegal immigrants at the local level. These measures violate the
Constitution, and pit neighbor against neighbor. Immigration policy
must be established and enforced at the federal level, as local ordinances
threaten to discriminate against all Latinos, citizen and newcomer alike.
This Article describes some of the local ordinances that have been
enacted across the country and their legal flaws, provides arguments that
can be utilized against them, and gives an overview of the current legal
challenges against these ordinances throughout the United States. Part I
describes the origin of these anti-immigrant ordinances and the types of
ordinances that were enacted in their wake, in particular the first local
anti-immigrant ordinance passed in the United States in Hazleton, Penn-
sylvania. Part II discusses the legal arguments against these types of or-
dinances, in particular federal preemption of local immigration laws and
possible violations of the Fair Housing Act. Part III provides a brief
overview of the litigation that has been brought against municipalities
that have enacted local illegal immigration relief ordinances, and the
current status of those cases. The Conclusion summarizes the article and
looks forward to the next step in combating local anti-immigrant ordi-
nances from a legal, policy, and litigation standpoint.
I. THE SAN BERNARDINO MODEL ORDINANCE AND
THE HAZLETON RESPONSE
A. The City of San Bernardino Illegal Immigration ReliefAct of 2006
While the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania has gained the most noto-
riety for passing a local immigration restriction ordinance, the recent
t Staff Attorney, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Los Angeles,
California.
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wave started in San Bernardino, California.' The head of a group called
"Save Our State" attempted to place on the ballot a local ordinance that
would have: (1) regulated the activities of day labor agencies and prohib-
ited day laborers from soliciting employment in the City of San Bernar-
dino; (2) denied city permits, contracts, or grants to businesses that em-
ployed unauthorized immigrants; (3) imposed monetary fines on busi-
nesses that employed unauthorized immigrants; and (4) mandated that all
official city business be conducted in English only.2  Together with La-
tino community activists and the ACLU of Orange County, attorneys
from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF) provided legal arguments to the mayor and city council of
San Bernardino, who voted down the ordinance by a vote of 4-3.
While the San Bernardino City Council did not approve the anti-
immigrant ordinance, the author of the proposal, Joseph Turner, at-
tempted to get the measure placed on the ballot as a voter initiative dur-
ing the November 2006 general election.3 However, in June 2006, San
Bernardino County Superior Court Judge A. Rex Victor ruled that not
enough petition signatures had been gathered to qualify the measure for a
public vote and refused to allow the initiative on the November ballot.
4
B. The City of Hazleton Illegal Immigration ReliefAct Ordinance of
2006
Although the City of San Bernardino was unsuccessful in enacting
its anti-immigrant ordinance, the battle against these types of local laws
attempting to regulate immigration was just beginning. Through the
Internet and conservative talk radio, local city council members in other
towns across the country heard about the San Bernardino effort and pro-
posed anti-immigrant efforts of their own.5 The first city to pass and
1. In the summer of 2006, the website www.SaveSanBernardino.com detailed the provisions
of the City of San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act ordinance. The website is currently
available for viewing at Save San Bernardino, http://www.campaignsitebuilder.com/templates/
displayfiles/tmp168.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12147&Trial=false (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
2. San Bernardino, Cal., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, §§ 4-8 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance], available at
http://www.campaignsitebuilder.com/templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SitelD=843&PagelD=
12147&Trial=false (click on "Initiative Text").
3. See Martin Kasindorf, California City Votes on Immigration Issue Today, USA TODAY,
May 15, 2006, at 4A.
4. See The Watchdog, Judge Rules Against San Bernardino Illegal Immigrant Petition,
http://www.immigrationwatchdog.com/?p=1409 (June 26, 2006).
5. Among the municipalities introducing ordinances within 30 days of the passage of the
Hazleton Ordinance are Avon Park, FL; Palm Bay, FL; Riverside, NJ; and Shenandoah, PA. See
Oren Dorell, Towns Take Aim at Illegal Immigration, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 2006, at 3A; Eric
Simpson, Anti-Immigrant Ordinance Defeated in Palm Bay, Florida, THE MILITANT, Sept. 11, 2006,
available at http://www.themilitant.com/2006/7034/703455.html. Additionally, at least half a dozen
other cities nationwide have expressed their intention to propose local immigration-related ordi-
nances. See Matt Birkbeck, Constitution is at Core of Immigration Debate, THE MORNING CALL,




attempt to enact an anti-immigrant ordinance was Hazleton, Pennsyl-
vania, whose city council approved the "City of Hazleton Illegal Immi-
gration Relief Act Ordinance" on July 13, 2006, which was originally set
to take effect in 60 days.6
In defending the ordinance, the mayor of Hazleton, Lou Barletta,
stated, "Illegal immigrants are destroying the city. I don't want them
here, period."7 As such, the Hazleton ordinance, as originally enacted,
would have punished those who rent to, employ, or conduct business
transactions with "illegal aliens," and made English the city's official
language.8 However, in response to a complaint filed by the ACLU and
other civil rights groups and law firms in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in August 2006 that challenged
the Ordinance, 9 the City of Hazleton abandoned the first draft of its ordi-
nance and passed a revised version of the Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance on September 21, 2006, as well as a registration and official
English-Only ordinance.'
The City of Hazleton Registration Ordinance (Registration Ordi-
nance) required "occupants" of any "premises" to register their personal
information, including "proof of legal citizenship and/or residency" with
the City of Hazleton, and required "occupants" to pay an "occupancy
permit fee" of $10.00 for each occupant. 1 Additionally, the Registration
Ordinance stated that all persons age 18 or older who reside at a premises
had to obtain an occupancy permit prior to occupying such premises.
12
The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, as revised, required City
of Hazleton officials to investigate allegations of instances of individuals
believed to be harboring "illegal aliens" or employing "unauthorized
workers" reported by "any City official, business entity, or City resi-
6. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-16 (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton Ordi-
nance 2006-16], available at http://www.clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chdocs/public/IM-PA-0001-
0007.pdf.
7. See Robert Tanner, Illegal Immigration Now a Local Issue, TULSA WORLD, July 20, 2006,
at A12, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articlelD=060720NeA12
llleg37342&breadcrumb=Article%20.
8. Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, §§ 4-6.
9. In response to the initial complaint filed against it, on September 2, 2006, the court ap-
proved a stipulation whereby the City of Hazleton agreed not to enforce its ordinance and the plain-
tiffs agreed not to seek an injunction against enforcement of the Ordinance. See John Davidson, Red
Orbit, Truce Reached Over Illegal-Immigrant Law: Hazleton Won 't Enforce Ordinance and Oppo-
nents Won't Seek Injunction (Sept. 2, 2006), http://www.redorbit.com/news/politics642612/truce_
reachedover illegalimmigrant law hazletonwontenforceordinance and/index.html.
10. See Kent Jackson, Mayor Signs New Illegals Law, HAZLETON STANDARD-SPEAKER, Sep.
22, 1006, available at http://smalltowndefenders.com/public/node/41. The current versions of all
three ordinances are available for viewing at the Washington University Law Civil Rights Litigation
Clearinghouse, http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/detail.php?id=5472.
11. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 7 (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton Ordi-
nance 2006-13], available at http:// http://www.clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chdocs/public/IM-PA-000 1-
0020.pdf.
12. See Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13, supra note 11, §§ 1-7.
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dent., 13 The Registration Ordinance, which defined "illegal alien" as an
"alien who is not lawfully present in the United States, according to the
terms of United States Code Title 8, section 1101 et. seq," 14 stated that
property owners or homeowners who provided shelter to "illegal aliens"
were to be deemed as "harboring illegal aliens," and subject to penalties
including revocation of rental licenses, prohibitions against collecting
rent from any tenant-not just their "illegal alien" tenants-and mone-
tary fines for subsequent violations.' 5
Additionally, the City of Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance attempted to regulate employers and subject them to penalties
for hiring or employing an "unlawful worker," which was defined as:
[A] person who does not have the legal right or authorization to work
due to an impediment in any provision of federal, state or local law,
including but not limited to a minor disqualified by nonage, or an un-
authorized alien as defined by United States Code Title 8, subsection
1324a(h)(3). 6
The Ordinance prohibited recruiting, hiring, employing, and "per-
mit[ting], dispatch[ing], or instruct[ing] any person who is an unlawful
worker to perform work in whole or in part within the City," and pro-
vided that business licenses could be suspended and business operations
disrupted if an employer was found to be in violation of the provisions.' 7
Aside from the legality or illegality of the Hazleton Ordinance, the
impact of the city's attempt to regulate immigration at the local level had
immediate and far-reaching consequences within the City of Hazleton
and beyond. People of color-in particular Latinos-left the City of
Hazleton within a short time following passage of the anti-immigrant
ordinances. 1 The targeting of "illegal aliens" that brought suspicion on
anyone who might be suspected of not being lawfully present because of
their skin color made the non-white residents of Hazleton-citizen and
non-citizen alike-fearful of being subject to harassment and singled out
as a nuisance, a public burden, or worse-a criminal.' 9 As such, in re-
sponse to these revised ordinances, the same groups that challenged
Hazleton's first anti-immigrant ordinance once again filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on October
13. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, §§ 4.B-5.B (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter






17. Id. §§ 4.A-4.B.
18. See Steve Mocarsky, Citizen Reaction to Suit as Varied as Population, TIMES LEADER,




30, 2006, challenging the ordinances as unconstitutional under both fed-
eral and state law.2°
The challenge to the Hazleton Ordinance was the first of several
challenges brought against these types of ordinances across the country.
While the various ordinances differed slightly in their individual provi-
sions, the core arguments against these laws are the same-that these
ordinances are unconstitutional because they are preempted by federal
immigration law, that they violate the due process rights of employers,
employees, landlords, and tenants, and that they violate the Fair Housing
Act. These legal arguments, along with several others, are discussed in
detail with regard to these ordinances in Part II.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
ORDINANCES AND REPERCUSSIONS FACED BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYERS,
LANDLORDS, AND TAXPAYERS
The attempts by local government to regulate illegal immigration,
and to enact and enforce local immigration laws clearly exceed the
power delegated to municipalities and law enforcement. 21 As seen above
in the discussion of the San Bernardino and Hazleton ordinances, while
the actual provisions may vary, the local laws attempting to regulate ille-
gal immigration typically contain provisions that: (1) penalize local busi-
ness for employing unauthorized immigrants by restricting their access to
business licenses and prohibiting them from receiving city grants and
city contracts; (2) prohibit the renting and/or leasing of property to unau-
thorized immigrants in the municipality, and provide civil and/or crimi-
nal penalties against individuals who rent or lease property to unauthor-
ized immigrants; and (3) bar city business or publications in languages
other than English. 2
If the local initiatives attempting to regulate illegal immigration that
are being introduced around the country are passed, they will most likely
be preempted by federal law and struck down as unconstitutional. 23 Ad-
ditionally, the impact such local ordinances will have on the communi-
ties in which they are enacted will extend far beyond the undocumented
immigrants who are the target of this proposed legislation. In particular,
the repercussions of local illegal immigration laws such as the Hazleton
Ordinance will have a dramatic and disproportionately negative effect on
employers, landlords, and other citizens and residents attempting to con-
20. See First Amended Complaint at 4, Lozano v. Hazleton, No. 6-CV-56-JMM (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 30, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/27220lgl20061030.htnl.
21. The U.S. Constitution gives the federal government exclusive control over immigration
matters, and United States Supreme Court has held that regulation of immigration "is unquestionably
exclusively a federal power." See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, §§ 4-6.
23. Federal law preempts most state and local immigration laws, with a narrow exception for
tangential matters. See, e.g., DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.
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duct their usual course of business. As such, even if these local immigra-
tion laws are successful in their goals of diminishing the presence of ille-
gal immigrants in the cities and towns that adopt such initiatives, the
high price for both defending and enforcing these ordinances will fall to
the very people these laws ostensibly seek to protect-the citizens and
taxpayers of the respective municipalities. And the jobs, housing, and
other issues will not disappear-they will emerge in neighboring com-
munities, which is another reason why local government should remain
out of immigration enforcement.
In proposing and enacting ordinances directed at the local regulation
of illegal immigration, city council members made broad, sweeping dec-
larations regarding the alleged blight attributable to illegal immigrants.
24
Blaming illegal immigrants is easier than acknowledging that they have
been attracted to the area by jobs, that their presence allows others to stay
employed, and that the real target should be passing and enforcing labor
laws that prevent exploitation, something that local governments are
empowered to do. Many employers-particularly agricultural employ-
ers, which have traditionally relied almost exclusively on both legal and
illegal immigrant labor-fear that regulations prohibiting the employ-
ment or tenancy of illegal aliens will have the unintended consequence of
forcing them out of business.25 Additionally, it has also been shown that
both legal and illegal immigrants, rather than being a burden or a detri-
ment to society, do not take away jobs from other Americans and in fact
play an important role in the United States economy.
26
However, the fact remains that regardless of the benefits communi-
ties may reap from immigrant labor, local anti-immigrant ordinances
inhibit rather than protect the rights of ordinary citizens. Local illegal
immigration ordinances do not merely infringe on the ability of illegal
immigrants to work and live in the cities and towns that have passed such
initiatives, but they also prevent legal residents of the affected munici-
palities from enjoying the equal protection of the law. These ordinances
24. The City of Hazleton, in section 2 of its Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, stated
that:
Illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, contributes to overcrowded classrooms
and failings at schools, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to sub-
standard quality of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their
cost and diminishing their availability to lawful residents, and destroys our neighbor-
hoods and diminishes our overall quality of life.
See Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, § 2. The City of Hazleton offered no empirical
evidence to support any of these claims. Id.
25. See Juliana Barbassa, Worker Gap Hits Organic Growers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 11,
2006; Are Farmworkers Scared Off By Immigration Law?, HAZLETON STANDARD SPEAKER, July
30, 2006; Michigan Farmers Want Congress to be Careful in Dealing With Immigration, MICHIGAN
LIvE, Aug. 1, 2006; Shortage of Citrus Pickers Looms, MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 2006.
26. See, e.g., Patricia Launt, Migrants Filling the Gap, THE CHRONICLE-HERALD (Canada),




are not only burdensome and unenforceable in a practical sense, they are
unconstitutional for the reasons outlined below.
A. Restriction of Business Permits, Contracts, and Grants to Employers
Who Hire or "Aid and Abet" Illegal Immigrants
1. Local Illegal Immigration Ordinances Regulating Employers Are
Preempted by Federal Immigration Law
As discussed previously, immigration law is within the exclusive
province of the federal government. In 1941, the United States Supreme
Court ruled in Hines v. Davidowitz27 that Pennsylvania was precluded by
the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940 from enacting a statute that
required the registration of aliens.28 The Supreme Court later held that
state or local laws attempting to regulate immigration will be invalid if
the state or local law: 1) impermissibly regulates immigration; 2) ad-
dresses an area in which Congress has extensively or comprehensively
legislated; or 3) frustrates or creates an obstacle to federal law.29 Because
Congress has enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)30 gov-
erning the substantive areas of law that local ordinances such as the
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act attempt to regulate, such local
laws are preempted by the Supremacy Clause" and must be struck down.
a. Local Laws That Prohibit the Hiring of Illegal Immigrants
Are Preempted by INA § 274A
Most local ordinances attempting to regulate illegal immigration
contain at least one provision that prevents employers from hiring illegal
immigrants and imposes either monetary, civil, or criminal penalties (or
some combination thereof) for doing so.32 However, Congress has al-
ready legislated in this area, and the resulting law is codified as INA
§ 274A.33 In addition to a general prohibition against hiring, referring,
recruiting for a fee, or continued employment of illegal aliens, INA
§ 274A expressly preempts any state or local law imposing civil or crimi-
nal sanctions upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for
employment, unauthorized aliens.34 Therefore, local ordinances that
27. Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
28. 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
29. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); see also Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
30. INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (West 2007).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
federal laws and treaties are the supreme law of the land. See id.
32. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, § 4 (stating that "[a]ny entity... that
knowingly employs, retains, aids or abets illegal aliens or illegal immigration into the United States,
whether directly or by or through any agent, ruse, disguise, device or means . . . shall from the date
of the violation or its discovery ... be denied and barred from approval of a business permit, re-
newal of a business permit, any city contract or grant . .
33. INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a.
34. Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
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prohibit the hiring of illegal immigrants, and their prescribed statutory
penalties, are preempted by federal law.
b. Local Laws That Prohibit the "Aiding or Abetting" of Ille-
gal Immigrants Are Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1324
Many of the local laws attempting to regulate immigration also pro-
hibit the "aid[ing] and abet[ting]" of illegal immigrants.35 However,
such provisions are preempted by INA section 274, which governs the
bringing in and harboring of illegal immigrants, and can in some circum-
stances extend to the transportation, encouragement, or inducement of
illegal immigrants to reside in the United States.36
In addition to INA section 274, Congress has enacted a federal
criminal statute to punish individuals who aid and abet illegal immi-
grants.37 Therefore, local governments have no authority to establish
penalties for "aiding and abetting" illegal immigrants since Congress has
already seen fit to regulate this area of law both civilly and criminally.
More importantly, local residents are not familiar with the federal body
of law that defines "aiding and abetting." New local laws will involve
local police investigating all sorts of complaints from local residents that
may have nothing to do with aiding or abetting, or nothing to do with
unauthorized immigrants.
c. Local Laws That Impose "More or Different" Requirements
on Employers to Verify That Employees Are Not Illegal
Immigrants Are Preempted by 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6)
State and local governments are prohibited from passing laws that
serve as obstacles to federal law.38 Some of the proposed local initiatives
contain provisions that require employers to go beyond the face of
documents presented for employment purposes and conduct independent
investigations regarding the legitimacy of the documents. 39 However,
under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6), employers are prohibited from requesting
''more or different" documents than those specified in the statute when
35. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, § 4.A.
36. See United States v. Fuji, 301 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Aguilar, 883
F.2d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1072 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. Acosta De Evans, 531 F.2d 428,430 (9th Cir. 1976).
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2007).
38. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000) (holding that state and
local laws are nullified if they conflict with, are contrary to, repugnant to, different from,, inconsis-
tent with, or interfere with federal law).
39. See, e.g., San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4.B.4 ("Each
agency must conduct extensive background checks on each prospective day laborer seeking day
labor employment to verify the veracity of all identification information and to ensure that each
applicant is legally authorized to work in the United States.").
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evaluating an individual's immigration status upon hiring, recruiting, or
referring them for employment.40
Because these provisions place the burden on the employer to go
above and beyond what is required under federal law to ensure that their
employees are eligible to work in the United States, the result is that em-
ployers are obligated to act as defacto immigration enforcement officers.
Not only do employers not have the training, skill, or authority to make
such determinations, laws instructing employers to conduct their own
investigations regarding the accuracy of employment documents are
likely to lead to mistakes and subject employers to being sued by the
United States Department of Justice.41 Local immigration laws make
things more difficult for employers in their cities, but not the neighboring
towns. And, when the federal government sues the employer, the local
government will not defend them or pay the fines levied against them.
2. The Imposition of Strict Liability for Hiring Illegal Immigrants
Violates Employers' Rights to Due Process
The majority of ordinances being considered for implementation by
municipalities nationwide attempt to regulate illegal immigration by im-
posing civil and criminal penalties on employers of illegal immigrants,
regardless of the employer's compliance with both federal and state law
to ensure that their employees are legally authorized to work in the
United States.42 In addition to being preempted by federal law,43 such
provisions are also most likely unconstitutional violations of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they penalize employers
without taking into consideration due diligence on the part of the em-
ployer.44 Additionally, the imposition of civil and criminal penalties
40. INA § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324b(a)(6) (West 2007); see also Rivera v. NIBCO,
Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004).
41. See 8 U.S.C.A. §1324b(a)(6); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2007) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, ethnicity, or
national origin). Requiring employers to independently verify the immigration status of employees
who have already presented legal employment documents-potentially based on nothing more than
their skin color or accent-could result in violations of Title VII and make employers vulnerable to
litigation. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
42. See San Bemardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 2, § 4.B.2. ("[A day labor
agency] assumes strict liability with respect to ensuring that all day laborers matched with a contract
employer are legally authorized to work in the United States.").
43. INA § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(h)(2). The INA provides a "good faith" defense
for employers who have attempted to ensure that their employees are legally authorized to work by
following the steps provided by federal law. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(a)(3).
44. The City of Hazleton Immigration Relief Act Ordinance states that an employer is guilty
of aiding and abetting an illegal immigrant if they are found to have engaged in "funding, providing
goods and services to or aiding in the establishment or continuation of any day labor center or other
entity providing similar services, unless the entity acts with due diligence to verify the legal work
status of all persons whom it employs. ... See Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, §
4(A)(iii). Because the Ordinance fails to define what exactly constitutes "due diligence" on the part
of the employer to assure the legal employment status of its employees, the result is that an employer
may be unconstitutionally penalized under the ordinance without due process of law.
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against employers without allowing them to defend themselves is another
potential violation of the Due Process Clause.45
Many of the proposed local ordinances attempting to regulate illegal
immigration punish employers who are discovered to have undocu-
mented individuals in their employ, regardless of the employers' knowl-
edge or intent. The implementation of such draconian measures will al-
most certainly result in employers being fearful of hiring anyone who
they may perceive, rightly or wrongly, to be an illegal immigrant based
upon that person's race, color, or national origin. As discussed in the
next section, this could give rise to employer liability for employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin of United
States citizens and legal immigrants in violation of both Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196446 and federal immigration law.
3. Requiring Employers to Act as De Facto Immigration Officials
Subjects Them to Potential Liability for Employment Discrimi-
nation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Employers who are subject to local ordinances that prohibit the em-
ployment of illegal immigrants and that impose strict liability against
employers for violation of such laws will potentially refuse to hire per-
sons who they believe are illegal immigrants based on their race, color,
or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. This law applies to employers with as few as fifteen employees.47
Not only would this invite costly and time-consuming litigation, but
it would create ill will among the community and hostility between
neighbors. Such initiatives would also have the effect of discriminating
against citizens and legal immigrants and denying them their constitu-
tional rights. Employers will be vulnerable to lawsuits if they attempt to
comply with a local law that is constitutionally suspect. Additionally,
employers may violate state and federal anti-discrimination laws if they
cease hiring individuals from certain ethnic groups or subject them to
more rigorous scrutiny than others because they believe they might be
undocumented immigrants.
These ordinances ultimately have the effect of forcing local busi-
ness owners into the dilemma of potentially violating federal civil rights
law in order to comply with local law. Because these local laws regulat-
ing illegal immigration expose employers to liability for employment
45. See Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378, 387 (E.D. Ky. 1993); Lee v.
Newport, No. 91-5158, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1991) (holding that without allowing the plain-
tiff the opportunity to offer a defense by demonstrating actual or constructive knowledge of illegal
acts of her employees, the city could not revoke or suspend her occupational license in violation of
the right to due process).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.
47. Id. § 2000e(b).
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discrimination under Title VII, their implementation would be potentially
devastating.
4. Taxpayers Will Have to Bear the Cost of Any Legal Challenges
Brought Against the Municipalities as a Result of the Enactment
of Illegal Immigration Ordinances
It is common for municipalities to include a section regarding the
local government entity's "Duty to Defend" local laws should their legal-
ity be challenged.a8 This means that the taxpayers of the towns and cities
that enact these laws of questionable legality will be obligated to pay the
costs associated with defending the ordinance, both on the merits and on
appeal.
The amount of expense and time involved in defending a federal
lawsuit against these ordinances should not be underestimated. Given
the congested dockets of modern-day federal courts, it is not an exag-
geration to say that a civil rights lawsuit against a municipality will take
several years merely to reach trial, much less resolve all issues on appeal.
For example, if a group of persons were to contend that the city or
town's prohibition on employing illegal immigrants violates their right to
contract or earn a livelihood under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Accordingly, tax-
payers should be aware that their money will be used to fund years of
litigation to defend ordinances that will, ultimately, most likely be struck
down as unconstitutional.
B. Forbidding Property Owners from Renting or Leasing Property to
Illegal Immigrants Violates Federal Civil Rights Law
1. The Fair Housing Act (FHA)
49
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits housing practices that dis-
criminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 50 Following the
San Bernardino model that was rejected by its city council, other cities
that are considering immigrant restriction bills have included provisions
that prohibit the renting or leasing of property to illegal immigrants
within their municipalities. 51  These laws generally levy fines against
property owners found to be renting to illegal immigrants,52 and a few of
48. See San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 2, § 11 ("If any part or
parts of this section are challenged in court, the City shall defend the legality of this section until all
appeals have been exhausted and a final judgment is enacted.").
49. FHA §§ 801-820,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 2007).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604.
51. Hazleton Ordinance 2006-16, supra note 6, § 5.A. ("Illegal aliens are prohibited from
leasing or renting property in the city. Any property owner or renter/tenant/lessee in control of
property, who knowingly allows an illegal alien to use, rent or lease their property shall be in viola-
tion of this section.").
52. The San Bernardino model ordinance imposes a minimum fine of $1,000 against property
owners in violation of their respective prohibitions on renting or leasing property to illegal immi-
grants. See San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 2, § 7.C.
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the proposed ordinances impose strict liability on anyone who rents or
leases property to illegal immigrants.53
These proposed ordinances clearly violate the Fair Housing Act. As
discussed previously, it is illegal for employers to discriminate against
persons based on their race, color, or national origin when attempting to
comply with a local ordinance that prohibits the employment of undocu-
mented immigrants. Property owners also may not discriminate against
individuals on the basis of race, color, or national origin under the Fair
Housing Act. As such, there is concern that local ordinances prohibiting
the rental of property to undocumented persons will lead to landlords
turning away United States citizens and legal permanent residents whom
they believe may be illegally present merely because of their race, color,
or national origin in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Local laws that
restrict property owners' ability to rent or lease to "illegal aliens" without
defining that term are not only unenforceable and void for vagueness,
they also have the effect of encouraging racial and ethnic profiling of
persons seeking to contract with landlords.
These proposed restrictions on renting property to "illegal aliens"
are unconstitutionally vague. Not only is the term "illegal alien" not a
legal term of art that can be applied to describe an individual's immigra-
tion status, a person's immigration status can change from unlawfully
present to lawfully present or from lawfully present to unlawfully present
in a short period of time. Moreover, many families are of "mixed" immi-
gration status, meaning that some households have citizens and lawfully
present immigrants living under the same roof as unauthorized immi-
grants, and a landlord's refusal to rent property to legally present indi-
viduals in such households could subject property owners to liability as
well.
Because landlords and city officials have no authority or expertise
to determine the immigration status of potential tenants or the validity of
documents presented to verify immigration status, the inevitable result of
such ordinances is that landlords will avoid renting to persons of certain
ethnic backgrounds, particularly Latinos, in order to avoid liability under
these local immigration restrictions. It is also likely that misuse or mis-
application of these laws will harm neighbors and business competitors
in the municipalities.
Like employers, property owners do not have the means or the au-
thority to determine whether an individual has legal or illegal immigra-
tion status. Attempting to penalize landlords for renting or leasing prop-
53. Id. § 7.A. ("Illegal aliens are prohibited from leasing or renting property. Any property
owner or rent/tenant/lessee in control of property who allows an illegal alien to use, rent or lease
their property shall be in violation of this section, irrespective of such person's intent, knowledge, or




erty to illegal immigrants is tantamount to warning property owners to
refrain from renting or leasing to any person who, in the landlord's
judgment, might be an "illegal alien." This kind of provision will almost
certainly be enforced in a discriminatory and disproportionate manner
against legal immigrants and other persons of color whose ethnic ori-
gin-Latinos in particular-may subject them and their immigration
status to additional scrutiny because of stereotypes and prejudice.
Property owners will be vulnerable to lawsuits for violating the
FHA if they abide by the restrictive renting and leasing provisions con-
tained in many of these anti-immigrant ordinances. By the same token,
however, failing to comply with these local ordinances will subject land-
lords to substantial monetary fines-in some cases regardless of the
lengths they go to ensure that their tenants have legal immigration status.
Prohibitions requiring landlords to check documents, restrict the type of
tenants they have, and subjecting them to local fines or federal law-
suits-without any way for landlords to verify immigration status-
benefits no one.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
The provisions of the anti-immigrant ordinances prohibiting the
renting or leasing of property to "illegal aliens" may also give rise to
litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states that "[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right... to make
and enforce contracts, to sue ... and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens. 54 Section 1981 has been interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court to extend to private contracts, and it has
also been interpreted to prohibit discrimination against legal aliens'
rights to contract and earn a living.55 Therefore, citizens and legal immi-
grants who are denied the right to rent or lease property under such laws
may be able to sustain a cause of action under § 1981 if they are dis-
criminated against because of their race, and property owners would
most likely be personally liable.56
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1982
A United States citizen who is harmed by these anti-immigration
provisions may also have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
which provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property. 57 Clearly, a United States citizen who is denied her right to
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2007).
55. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948).
56. See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982.
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rent or lease property by a landlord who believes she might be an "illegal
alien" based on her race, color, or national origin has been discriminated
against in violation of § 1982. It is very possible for a U.S. citizen to
have a family member who has overstayed a visa. In a split family situa-
tion, is a landlord obligated to verify the status of all tenants? This is
unclear, but likely to lead to more litigation.
While not as broad as § 1981 in terms of who is covered by the stat-
ute, § 1982 is still applicable to the types of anti-immigrant ordinances at
hand and provides a remedy for citizens who have been deprived of their
civil rights under the law. Additionally, as in actions commenced under
§ 1981, private property owners would be personally liable for their dis-
criminatory actions.
C. "English Only" Laws are Invalid Under the United States Constitu-
tion and Federal Civil Rights Laws
1. "English Only" Laws Are Unconstitutional Under the First
Amendment
Unfortunately, modem anti-immigrant ordinances such as the one
proposed by the City of Hazleton are not the first laws that have sought
to make English the "official" or only language that people can speak.
However, our federal courts have consistently held that such laws violate
both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment58 and the
First Amendment right to petition government and express views and
opinions.59
The "English Only" provisions of most of the proposed anti-
immigrant ordinances unconstitutionally infringe upon the First Amend-
ment by prohibiting individuals from speaking in any language other
than English.60 "English Only" laws are unconstitutional because such
laws make it virtually impossible for persons who do not speak English
well-legal and illegal immigrants alike-to communicate effectively
and to assert their fundamental constitutional rights. As the United States
Supreme Court held in Meyer v. Nebraska:
[T]he protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready un-
derstanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by
58. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923).
59. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985); United Mine Workers v. 111.
State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
60. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 (proposed Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0003.pdf, San Bernardino Illegal
Immigration Ordinance, supra note 2, §§ 6, 8.
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methods which conflict with the Constitution - a desirable end can-
not be promoted by prohibited means.
61
Additionally, "English Only" laws make our communities less safe
and secure because they erect barriers that prohibit persons who are not
proficient in English from communicating with the public at large. A
person who is limited-English proficient may wish to report a crime, or
to seek assistance from local government, or be in possession of informa-
tion that may benefit the community as a whole. However, "English
Only" laws would prohibit persons who cannot communicate in English
or who speak English but are more comfortable communicating in an-
other language from fully and freely articulating their ideas, opinions,
and concerns. Such a shortsighted policy deprives everyone in the com-
munity from reaping the benefits of the participation of individuals
whose first language may not be English, but who are nonetheless active,
valuable, contributing members of our society.
The ability to speak English should not be a prerequisite to full and
fair participation in American life. Such provisions not only unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon the rights of non-English speakers or those with
limited-English proficiency, but they also fail to take into consideration
the fact that immigrants can and do offer unique perspectives that should
not be silenced. The United States is a nation of immigrants, and it is in
the best interest of all of us-citizens and immigrants alike-to have
everyone's voice be heard.
2. "English Only" Laws Violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.', 62 Because the United States Supreme Court has
held that discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by an entity that receives federal funds also con-
stitutes a violation of Title VI, 63 it is likely that the municipalities enact-
ing "English Only" ordinances are in violation of Title VI if they deny
municipal services to non-English speaking residents.
The U.S. Department of Justice provides guidance to local commu-
nities-all of whom receive some level of federal funds-about comply-
61. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d).
63. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742 n.7 (6th Cir. 2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992); Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
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ing with the requirement to provide services without discrimination. 64
The Justice Department also sues65-thus involving more local costs and
burdens should a city adopt and implement an English-only ordinance.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LITIGATION AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES
THAT HAVE PASSED LOCAL ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT
ORDINANCES
A. Lozano v. Hazleton
66
Following the lawsuit filed by civil rights groups and law firms
challenging the Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act on October 30,
2006,67 Judge James M. Munley of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order on October 31, 2006.68 On December 15,
2006, Judge Munley granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order
and allowed some of the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously as Does.69
As of this writing, the case is in discovery, with trial set to begin on
March 12, 2007.70
B. Garrett v. Escondido
7t
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF), the ACLU of San Diego, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights
Project, People for the American Way, the Fair Housing Council of San
Diego, and several private-law firms filed a complaint against the City of
Escondido on November 3, 2006 in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California on behalf of landlords, tenants, and
community groups against the City of Escondido, California.72 On Oc-
tober 17, 2006, the Escondido City Council approved an ordinance that
made it illegal to rent property to "illegal aliens" in the City of Escon-
dido.73 The law was set to go into effect on November 17, 2006. 74
In response to the passage of this anti-immigrant ordinance, the coa-
lition maintained that the ordinance was in direct violation of federal
immigration law; that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction
64. Exec. Order No. 13166, 28 C.F.R. Part 39, reprinted at 65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (August 16,
2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/I 3166.htm.
65. See id.
66. 459 F. Supp. 2d 332 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
67. Lozano, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
68. Id. at 338.
69. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 239 F.R.D. 397 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
70. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 3:06cv1586, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13295, at *5 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 27, 2007).
71. 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
72. Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
73. Id. at 1047.
74. Order Re: Stipulated Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 1:25, Garret v. Escon-




to create and enforce immigration laws; and that the ordinance put land-
lords and other private citizens in the untenable position of acting as fed-
eral law enforcement agents.75 The coalition also alleged that the ordi-
nance violated the contract rights of landlords and tenants, as well as
federal fair housing and privacy laws, and disproportionately discrimi-
nated against Latino families.
76
On November 7, 2006, the coalition filed a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) against the City of Escondido, barring it from
enforcing the ordinance. 77 The Defendants filed their reply brief on No-
vember 13, 2006, and on November 16, 2006, Judge John Houston of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California in San
Diego heard oral arguments on the motion. 78 Immediately following oral
argument, Judge Houston granted Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order, and enjoined the City of Escondido from enforcing its
ordinance for 90-120 days, at which time the court would hear Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.79 In so doing, Judge Houston
strongly criticized the City of Escondido, saying he had serious concerns
about the constitutionality of the ordinance and the potential harm that
landlords and tenants would face if the city were allowed to proceed with
enforcement of the law.8°
On December 11, 2006, plaintiffs' counsel convened with defense
counsel for a settlement conference at their request. On December 12,
2006, the Escondido City Council agreed to stipulate to a permanent in-
junction barring the City of Escondido from enforcing its anti-immigrant
ordinance in perpetuity, and to pay the plaintiffs $90,000 in attorneys'
fees.8 The stipulation was filed with the court and signed by Judge
Houston on December 14, 2006, thereby ending the litigation against the
City of Escondido.82
C. Riverside Coalition v. Riverside
83
On October 18, 2006, the ACLU, The Puerto Rican Legal Defense
and Educational Fund (PRLDEF), People for the American Way, and
private-law firms filed suit against the city of Riverside, New Jersey in
75. See Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-57.
76. See id. at 1054.
77. Id. at 1048.
78. Id. at 1047-48.
79. Id. at 1060; see also Order Granting Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining
Order at 20:21-24, Garrett v. City of Escondido, No. 06CV2434 (S.D. Cal. 2006) [hereinafter Garrett
Order Granting TRO], available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0001-
0006.pdf
80. See Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1052; see also Garrett Order Granting TRO, supra note
79, at 11:25-19:24.
81. See Garrett Order, supra note 74, at 2:8-2:25.
82. Id.
83. Riverside Coal. v. Riverside, No. 1:06-cv-03842-RMB-AMD (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.,
filed Oct. 18, 2006), available at http:clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-000 1-0001 .pdf.
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the Superior Court of New Jersey challenging its anti-immigration ordi-
nance.84 The ordinance,85 which was approved by the Riverside City
Council on July 26, 2006 and revised on October 25, 2006, calls for fines
of up to $2,000 for anyone who knowingly hires or rents to illegal immi-
grants.86 In addition, employers may lose their business permits for up to
five years if they are deemed to have knowingly hired illegal immi-
grants. 87 As of this writing, there is a consent order suspending enforce-
ment of the Riverside Ordinance while a request by the plaintiffs is being
considered to have the case removed to federal court, where a similar
lawsuit has also been filed by a different group of advocates.88
D. Reynolds v. Valley Park
89
On July 17, 2006, the city council of Valley Park, Missouri, passed
Ordinance No. 1708, making it illegal to hire or attempt to hire "illegal
aliens," and making it illegal to rent property to undocumented persons
or to fund a day labor center that does not verify the legal residency of
the individuals seeking work there. 90 The Ordinance called for fines of
up to $500 for each violation and also contains an "English Only" provi-
sion. 91
On September 25, 2006, Saint Louis County Circuit Court Judge
Barbara W. Wallace granted Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Re-
straining Order, which was filed by MALDEF, the ACLU, and a coali-
tion of other non-profit and private law firms.92 Although the City of
Valley Park revised Ordinance No. 1708 on September 26, 2006, and
passed Ordinance No. 1715 in its place,93 the coalition filed an amended
Temporary Restraining Order on September 27, 2006, which was granted
by Circuit Judge Wallace the same day.94
84. Riverside, No. 1:06-CV-03842-RMB-AMD.
85. Riverside Twp., NJ, Ordinance 2006-26 (approved July 26, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0006.pdf.
86. Riverside Twp., NJ, Ordinance No. 2006-26 (amended Oct. 25, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0005.pdf.; see also Elizabeth Llorente,
NJ Town Has Illegal Immigrants Feeling Unwelcome, PRLDEF NEWS available at
http://www.prldef.org/Press/News%2Stories/RIVERSIDE%20-%20NJ%20town%20has%20illegal
%20immigrants%20feeling%2Ounwelcome.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
87. See id
88. Assembly of God Church v. Riverside, No. 1:06-cv-03842 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 15, 2006),
available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0002-0001.pdf.
89. Reynolds v. Valley Park, No. 4:06-cv-01487 (E.D. Mo. filed Sept. 22, 2006).
90. Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0001 .pdf.
91. Id. §§ 3.B, 4.A.
92. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 1-3, Valley Park,
No. 4:06-CV-01487 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/
chDocs/public/lM-MO-0001-0005.pdf.
93. Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1715 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://clearinghouse.
wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-MO-000 1 -0009.pdf.
94. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 1-3,




At the time of this writing, discovery had just closed and the court
was considering motions from both sides; trial is set for March 1, 2007.95
E. Vasquez v. Farmer's Branch
96
On November 13, 2006, the city of Farmer's Branch, Texas, passed
Ordinance No. 2892, which required property owners to verify that all
tenants living in apartments within the city of Farmer's Branch were
United States citizens or "eligible immigrants." 97  On December 26,
2006, MALDEF and the ACLU filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas challenging the ordi-
nance as unconstitutional under both state and federal law, and request-
ing both declaratory and injunctive relief.
98
On January 9, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an Application for Temporary
Restraining Order seeking to enjoin the City of Farmer's Branch from
enforcing its ordinance. 99 On January 22, 2007, the parties entered into a
stipulation whereby the City of Farmer's Branch agreed not to enforce its
ordinance. 00 However, on that same day, the Farmer's Branch City
Council passed another anti-immigrant ordinance, Ordinance No. 2903,
which is currently scheduled to take effect on May 22, 2007.101
On January 29, 2007, the Federation for American Immigration Re-
form, Inc. (FAIR) filed a Motion to Intervene as a Defendant, which is
currently under consideration by the court. 0 2 As of this writing, no trial
date has been set.
F. Stewart v. Cherokee County'
0 3
On December 5, 2006, the Board of Commissioners of Cherokee
County, Georgia, passed Ordinance No. 2006-003, which prohibited the
"harboring of illegal aliens" in Cherokee County, and was scheduled to
95. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment at 1-8, Valley Park, No. 4:06-
CV-01487 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-
MO-0001-0017.pdf (granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and declaring Ordi-
nances 1708 and 1715 void).
96. Vasquez v. Farmer's Branch, No. 3-07CV0061 (N.D. Tex. Jan, 10, 2007).
97. Farmer's Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.farmersbranch.info/Communication/Ordinance%2ONo%202892.html.
98. Complaint at 10-14, Farmer's Branch, No. 3-07CV0061 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2006),
available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-TX-001-0001 .pdf.
99. Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 1-3, Farmer's Branch, No. 3-
07CV0061 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/barrietosapp.pdf.
100. Stipulation and Order at 1-3, Farmer's Branch, No. 3-07CV0061 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18,
2007), available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-TX-0001-0005.pdf.
101. Farmer's Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2903 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/communication/proposed%200rdinance%202903.doc.;
Fairus.org, Fair Intervene's in Farmers Branch Effort to Resist Illegal Immigration,
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research mar07n105 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
102. See Fairus.org, Fair Intervene's in Farmers Branch Effort to Resist Illegal Immigration,
http://www.fairus.org/site/pageserver?pagename-reserachmarO7nl05 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
103. Stewart v. Cherokee County, No. 1:07-cv-00015 (N.D. Ga. filed Jan. 4, 2007), available
at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/1M-0001-0001 .pdf.
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go into effect on January 1, 2007.1°4 On January 4, 2007, MALDEF, the
ACLU, and private law firms filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia challenging Cherokee
County's ordinance. 1 5 That same day, the parties entered into a Consent
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction for Stay, which enjoined Cherokee County from
enforcing its anti-immigrant ordinance and stayed all proceedings "until
a final judgment is entered and appeal avenues pursued" in the Hazleton
and Valley Park litigation.
06
CONCLUSION
Anti-immigrant ordinances will not adequately address the issue of
illegal immigration but will instead invite litigation and create ill will in
the community as a whole. Such laws are divisive and unproductive, and
only promote discrimination against and scapegoating of immigrants.
Local attempts to enforce immigration law are unconstitutional and con-
flict with federal law. Municipalities should refrain from promoting hos-
tility among neighbors through the implementation of invalid and unen-
forceable initiatives.
The implementation of these initiatives will expose cities, towns,
and their residents to lawsuits by individuals who are unjustly denied
their constitutional rights on the basis of race and national origin, as well
as subject employers and property owners to substantial civil and crimi-
nal fines. The repercussions of local illegal immigration laws will have a
dramatic and disproportionately negative effect on employers, landlords,
and other citizens attempting to conduct their usual course of business,
and the price will ultimately be paid by the citizens and taxpayers of the
respective municipalities. Local governments should reject these types
of divisive ordinances and pledge instead to work with leaders from all
walks of life and communities to promote positive alternative policies.
104. County of Cherokee, Ga., Ordinance No. 2006-003 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at
http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/M-GA-0001-0003.pdf.
105. Complaint at 1-59, Cherokee County, No. 1:07-CV-00015 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2007), avail-
able at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-GA-0001-0001.pdf"
106. Consent Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Prelimi-
nary Injunction and Stay at 1-4, Cherokee County, No. 1:07-CV-00015 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2007),
available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-GA-0001-0002.pdf.
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Illegal immigration' has once again captured political discourse. In
fact, many believe that political candidates' stances on illegal immigra-
tion will play a major role in determining the 2008 presidential and con-
gressional elections. Divergent viewpoints in the illegal immigration
debate argue vigorously about the economic, social, and political effects
of undocumented immigrants. 1 But both sides seem to agree on one
premise: that the current federal immigration system is broken.
Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, that both state and local govern-
ments3 have attempted to supplement federal illegal immigration efforts.
Recently, many local governments have considered and/or adopted ordi-
nances aimed at addressing undocumented immigrants within their re-
spective boundaries.4 These laws have been met by fierce opposition,
with claims of unconstitutionality and preemption. Yet the local gov-
emnment foray into this public-policy arena raises an important theoreti-
cal and practical question about what role, if any, local governments
should play in regulating illegal immigration.
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the circumstances
facing the federal government in crafting and enforcing its immigration
laws and policies. Part II explores four primary types of local illegal
immigration laws-housing, employment, day laborer, and English-only
ordinances-and the constitutional and legal issues surrounding them.
Part III discusses local governments' ability or inability to enforce, or
refuse to enforce, federal immigration laws. Some cities seem to be neu-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School;
B.A., Loyola Marymount University. I am grateful to Professors Marisa Cianciarulo, Ernesto Her-
nandez, Scott Johns, and Janine Kim for their thoughts on this article; to Larissa Branes for her
research assistance; to Jack Hobaugh and the editors of the Denver University Law Review for invit-
ing me to participate in this Symposium and for their research and editing assistance; and to Chap-
man University School of Law for its financial support.
1. In this article, I use the term "illegal immigration" to refer to the phenomenon of persons
entering the United States illegally-as defined by our federal immigration laws-or who remain in
the country illegally after their permitted period of time to be lawfully present has expired.
2. In this article, I use the term "undocumented immigrant" to refer to a person who enters
the United States illegally-as defined by our federal immigration laws-or who remains in the
country illegally after his/her permitted period of time to be lawfully present has expired. Others
refer to such individuals as "illegal aliens," as do our federal immigrations laws.
3. In this article, I use the term local governments, cities, counties, and localities inter-
changeably and broadly to refer to local government entities.
4. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
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tral towards, if not supportive of, undocumented immigrants: these sanc-
tuary cities refuse to enforce federal immigration laws. Other cities ac-
tively seek to enforce federal immigration laws. However, both ap-
proaches face constitutional and legal hurdles. Part IV questions whether
the current constitutional and legal landscape where local governments
are preempted in the area of immigration regulation is wise or desirable.
By highlighting the values of federalism and localism, this section makes
the case for why local governments should be able to regulate in the im-
migration arena and supplement-but not conflict with-federal efforts.
I. BACKGROUND
Scholarly and political views on this imbalance and illegal immigra-
tion generally vary dramatically. Some claim that illegal immigration
and what is perceived as inadequate federal enforcement pose a threat to
national security and the current war on terror.5 Others argue that un-
documented immigrants cause many social and economic problems, such
as serving as a drain on social-service provisions at the federal, state, and
local level. 6 On the other side of the spectrum, some argue that undocu-
mented immigrants contribute more in taxes and economic stimulus than
they deplete in governmental resources.
Public-opinion polls demonstrate that a majority of Americans con-
sider illegal immigration to be a serious problem.8 The federal govern-
ment's inability to enforce immigration laws may help shape this percep-
tion. An estimated eight to twelve million undocumented immigrants
live in the United States, with hundreds of thousands more adding to that
number each year.9 This figure constitutes approximately four percent of
the United States population and is more than double the number of un-
documented immigrants in the country a decade ago. l0 The United
States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is
charged with enforcing our nation's immigration laws, including remov-
ing undocumented immigrants." However, while it has more than
5. See, e.g., Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law
Enforcement in the Realm oflmmigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323, 324-33 (2005).
6.' See, e.g., Laurel R. Boatright, Note, "Clear Eye for the State Guy": Clarifying Authority
and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement, 84 TEX.
L. REV. 1633, 1639-43 (2006).
7. See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal,
and Without Representation, 9 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2006).
8. See Joseph Chamie, Center for Migration Studies, Presentation at the Population Associa-
tion of America Annual Meeting: What About Illegal Aliens? 4-6 (Mar. 30, 2006), available at
http://paa2006.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionld=60186 (citing various public opinion
polls).
9. See Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on Ice: State and Local Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1063, 1065 n.15 (2006) (citing 151 CONG. REC.
S7852 (daily ed. June 30, 2005)).
10. See Chamie, supra note 8, at 2.
11. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 180 n.5 (2005).
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17,000 employees, ICE only has approximately 2,000 immigration en-
forcement agents. 2 Perhaps in response to this seemingly pervasive sen-
timent and the perceived inadequacies of the federal response to illegal
immigration, local governments-as discussed further below-have at-
tempted to fill this void through their own local initiatives. With more
than 800,000 state and local law enforcement officers nationwide, there
appears to be an untapped potential for further collaboration and coordi-
nation in immigration enforcement.1
3
II. LOCAL ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ORDINANCES
The first city to experiment with local illegal immigration laws was
the City of San Bernardino, California.14 In the spring of 2006, a group
called "Save Our State" proposed an illegal immigration ordinance and
requested that the San Bernardino City Council place the measure on the
ballot for the November 2006 election.' 5 The proposed "City of San
Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance" sought to regulate
the activities of day laborers; penalize businesses that employed un-
documented immigrants; prohibit renting property to undocumented im-
migrants; and mandate that all city business be conducted in English
only.' 6 The San Bernardino City Council voted 4-3 against adopting the
ordinance or placing it on the ballot for voter consideration. 17 In July
2006, the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, became the first locality to
adopt an illegal immigration ordinance when it adopted the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform Act Ordinance, which was modeled after the San Ber-
nardino ordinance.' 8 The Mayor of Hazleton, Lou Baletta, sponsored the
proposed ordinance, claiming that such a measure was necessary to ad-
12. See id. at 180.
13. See id. at 181.
14. See San Bernardino, Cal., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance §§ 4-8 (Sept. 2006)
[hereinafter San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance], available at http://www.campaignsite
builder.com/templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SitelD=843&PagelD= 12139&Trial=false.
15. See Chris Richard, Proposed Immigration Relief Act Ordinance Brings Turmoil,
RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May 8, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.saveourstate.org/vforums/archive/index.php/t-I 1066.html.
16. See San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 14, §§ 4-8.
17. See Booyeon Lee, Escondido to Look at Housing Ordinance: Illegal Immigrants Focus of
Proposal, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2006, at NI, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060813/newsI m 3imrent.html.
18. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, §§ 4-5 (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton
Ordinance 2006-18], available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-
18%20 Illegal%20Alien%201mmigration%2Reliet/o2OAct.pdf, see also Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance
2006-13 (proposed Sept. 2006) [hereinafter Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13], available at
http://www.smaIltowndefenders.con/090806/2006-13%20_Landlord%2OTenant%200rdinance.pdf
(prohibiting renting to undocumented immigrants); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (2006) [here-
inafter Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19], available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/
2006-19%20_Official%20English.pdf (requiring that all city business be conducted in English only,
with some limited exceptions).
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dress crime committed by undocumented immigrants in the City and the
economic drain illegal immigration had on City services.'
9
The trailblazing efforts by the cities of San Bernardino and Hazle-
ton spurred a flurry of local activity in the immigration realm. In fact,
during the past year, approximately one hundred cities or counties in
twenty-five states have adopted and/or considered ordinances aimed at
addressing illegal immigration within their respective boundaries.
20
There are four main types of these ordinances: employment, day laborer,
housing, and English-only.21 Some of them mimic federal laws, while
others go farther than federal immigration laws.
The first type of illegal immigration ordinances are the employment
ordinances. These laws seek to punish businesses that employ undocu-
mented immigrants. Some of these laws impose fines on such busi-
nesses,2 2 while others withhold businesses license from, and/or revoke
city contracts with, businesses that employ undocumented immigrants.23
Many of these employment ordinances impose an affirmative duty on
businesses within their respective jurisdiction to verify the lawful resi-
dency and/or immigration documentation of their employees.2 4
A second type of employment ordinances are the day laborer ordi-
nances. These laws do not prohibit employment of undocumented im-
migrants, but instead require those who hire day laborers to register with
the city and display a certificate in their car windows. Other cities have
sought to deal with day laborers directly by severely restricting the ac-
tivities and availability of day laborers within their boundaries.26
The housing ordinances may be the most controversial of the illegal
immigration ordinances. These measures prohibit landlords from renting
19. See Welcome to Small Town Defenders, http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/public/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
20. See Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, http://www.fairimmigration.org/leam/
immigration-rcform-and-immigrants/local-leve/database-of-ordinances.htm (last visited Apr. 9,
2007); see also Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, http://www.prldef.org/Civill
Latino%20Justice%20Campaign.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
21. Some cities have adopted and/or considered ordinances that incorporate all four of these
areas, as San Bemardino proposed. See, e.g., San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra
note 14, §§ 4-8. Other cities, such as Hazleton, have adopted and/or considered such measures
through several ordinances. See Hazleton Ordinance 2006-13, 2006-18, 2006-19, supra note 18; see
also Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, supra note 20 (noting the type of illegal immigra-
tion ordinance that each city proposed and/or adopted).
22. See, e.g., San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Ordinance, supra note 14, § 4.
23. See, e.g., Riverside Township, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16, § 4 (2006), available at
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Riverside%200rdin%2016%20&%2018%2OPassed%207-
06.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 2025-2006, § 3 (2006), available at
http://www.prldef.org/Civil/Documents/Suffolk%20County.pdf.
25. See, e.g., Vista, Cal., Ordinance 2006-9, § 5.90.030 (2006), available at
http://www.prldef.org/CivilUDocuments/Vista,%20CA%200rdinance.pdf.
26. See, e.g., John Doe No. I v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (noting how the Village limited where day laborers could congregate and launched a law
enforcement campaign to reduce the number of day laborers within the jurisdiction).
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to undocumented immigrants and impose severe penalties for doing so,
such as a $1,000 per day fine.27 Some of these housing ordinances even
go so far as to require landlords to verify the legal resident status of their
tenants-a very controversial aspect of these laws.28
Finally, there are the English-only ordinances. These laws establish
English as the official language of the city and require that all city de-
partments conduct business in English.29 Cities with these laws do pro-
vide for certain limited exceptions when language other than English
may be spoken by city employees when conducting official business.3 °
While these English-only ordinances may not appear to target illegal
immigration at first glance, they are intended-at least in part-to dis-
courage undocumented immigrants from availing themselves of social
services provided by the particular locality.
These recent local illegal immigration ordinances raise many consti-
tutional and legal questions. The United States Constitution designates
immigration as a federal prerogative, giving Congress the power "[t]o
establish a uniform rule of naturalization" for the country.31  Thus, most
courts considering challenges to these local laws have invalidated or en-
joined them pursuant to the Supremacy Clause 32 of the United States
Constitution.33 On one hand, these results are consistent with United
States Supreme Court precedent holding that the federal government has
exclusive powers over immigration matters, thus preempting state and
27. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-18, supra note 18, § 5 ("It is unlawful for any person
or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit,
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the
United States in violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly permitted by federal
law."); Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R, § 3 (2006), available at http://aclusandiego.org/
pdf/EscondidoOrdinancel 10306.pdf; Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance BL2006-1234 § 6.30.020 (2006),
available at http://www.nashville.gov/mc/ordinances/bl2006_1234.htm; Valley Park, Mo., Ordi-
nance 1708 § 3 (2006), available at http://www.prldef.org/CivilVDocuments/valley/20park%20
ordinance.pdf.
28. See Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-003, § 3, available at
http://www.cherokeega.com/departments/boc/Harboring%/ 201llegal%/o2OAliens /200rdinance.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19, supra note 18, § 3; Farmers Branch, Tex., Resolu-
tion 2006-130, § 2, available at http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/Communication/Resolution%
202006-130.html; Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-004 § 3 (2006), available at
http://www.cherokeega.com/departments/boc/English /20Language%/200rdinance.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19, supra note 18, § 4 (providing exceptions to teach
English to non-English speakers or to protect public health or safety, among others).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1,4.
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.").
33. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802U (Cir. Ct. St. Louis County,
Mo. Sept. 27, 2006) (granting and amending a temporary restraining order), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/imnimigrants/valleypark-amendedtro.pdf (enjoining the City from enforcing
its illegal immigration ordinance because of the likelihood that it is preempted by federal law);
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 3:06cvl 586, at 9-10 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2006) (granting a temporary
restraining order) (finding that it is reasonably likely that two of Hazleton's illegal immigration
ordinances violate the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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local regulation in the area.34 For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz,35 the
Supreme Court considered a Pennsylvania law that required aliens to
register with, and receive a registration card from, the State.3 6 The Court
struck down the law as preempted, stating that immigration regulation is
intertwined with international policy that is recognized as an exclusive
federal power.37
On the other hand, in Hines, the Supreme Court oddly left open the
door to state-and by extension, local government-regulation in the
immigration field by stating that "[a]ny concurrent state power that may
exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits. '38 Similarly, despite stating
that regulating immigration was an exclusively federal power, the Su-
preme Court in DeCanas v. Bica,39 held that a California labor law that
prohibited employers from hiring aliens not entitled to residence within
the United States was not preempted by federal immigration law.40 The
Court stated that "the fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does
not render it a regulation of immigration. 'Al In fact, the Court noted that
federal immigration laws and corresponding legislative history indicated
that Congress intended for states to regulate the employment of undocu-
mented immigrants.42 Accordingly, the Court found the law to be a valid
exercise of police power regarding employment issues in the state.43
Courts have also found that these local illegal immigration ordi-
nances may violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Moreover, the Fair Housing Act-which pro-
hibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, and other
characteristics-may also provide a valid basis for challenging the illegal
immigration housing ordinances.45 Nevertheless, as mentioned above,
most courts have found state and local laws aimed at addressing illegal
immigration to be preempted by federal law.46
34. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1976) (stating that regulating immigration is
an exclusive federal power).
35. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
36. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 59.
37. See id. at 66-67.
38. Id. at 68.
39. 424 U.S. 351.
40. Id. at 365.
41. Id. at 355.
42. ld. at 361.
43. Id. at 356-57.
44. See, e.g., Lozano, No. 3:06cv1586, at 9-10 (granting a temporary restraining order based
on the likelihood that the two of Hazleton's illegal immigration ordinances violate the Supremacy
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Viii. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 547 (finding equal protection
violations stemming from the Village's regulation of day laborers).
45. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 3601-19.
46. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Barrientos, No. 06-1726 (D. La. Jan. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/020107 /20Barrientos*/20
decision.pdf (ruling that the Louisiana statute prohibiting driving without lawful presence in the
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III. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION LAWS
Not all local governments have taken anti-illegal immigration ap-
proaches.47  In fact, many cities have passed sanctuary-or non-
cooperation-laws that designate their respective boundaries as safe-
havens for undocumented immigrants.4 8 By designating itself as a sanc-
tuary city, a locality adopts a policy that prevents its employees from
enforcing federal immigration laws or coordinating with immigration
enforcement. 49 While such local government policies have not been in-
validated to date, federal law provides some limitations to these sanctu-
ary laws.
Two federal laws adopted in 1996-the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") and the Welfare Reform
Act-prohibit local governments from preventing their employees from
voluntarily reporting the immigration status of an individual to federal
authorities. 50 These federal laws do not mandate that local governments
report undocumented immigrants to federal officials, but rather require
that cities do not restrict their employees from voluntarily reporting such
individuals to immigration agents.51
Recently, Congress has twice sought to provide disincentives for
cities to designate themselves as sanctuaries for undocumented immi-
grants. In 2003, and again in 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives
introduced the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act
("CLEAR Act"), 52 and the U.S. Senate considered the Homeland Secu-
rity Enhancement Act ("HSEA"). 53 Both bills emphasized that state and
local governments were entitled to support the federal government in
enforcing immigration laws. 54 The CLEAR Act proposed denying cer-
tain federal funds to state or local governments that "ha[ve] in effect a
statute, policy, or practice that prohibits law enforcement officers . . .
from assisting or cooperating with Federal immigration law enforce-
United States-the "driving while illegal" law-is "an impermissible attempt to regulate immigra-
tion and conflicts with federal immigration law").
47. For example, many cities have passed resolutions of support for bi-partisan, comprehen-
sive immigration reform. See Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, supra note 20. The City
of Boston, Massachusetts even passed a resolution supporting resident status for undocumented
immigrants currently in the United States. Id.
48. See id. (noting cities that have designated themselves as sanctuary cities).
49. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382-84 (2006).
50. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1644 (West 2007). Section 434 of the Welfare Reform Act provides
that: "[N]o State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from send-
ing to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the im-
migration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States. See id. Section 642 of IIRIRA
prohibits essentially the same. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1373.
51. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1644, 1373.
52. H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. (2005).
53. S. 1906, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1362, 109th Cong. (2005).
54. H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); S. 1362, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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ment. ' '55 However, Congress never passed either the CLEAR Act or the
HSEA.56
Other local governments have actively sought to enforce federal
immigration laws. Unsurprisingly, legal issues arise as to what types of
immigration laws cities may enforce-civil immigration laws (such as
being present in the United States without authorization) and/or criminal
immigration laws (like crossing the border without inspection).57 Courts
have consistently upheld state and local government enforcement of fed-
eral criminal immigration laws.58 However, there seems to be a circuit
split as to whether state and local governments may enforce federal civil
immigration laws.59
In Gonzalez v. City of Peoria,60 a group of Mexican-American citi-
zens challenged the City's policy of having its police officers arrest and
detain aliens suspected of illegally entering the United States, a federal
criminal immigration violation.61  The Ninth Circuit held for the City
based on the established precedent that states and local governments can
enforce federal criminal immigrations statutes. 62  However, the court
expressed doubt-in dicta-as to whether states and local governments
could enforce federal civil immigration statutes.63 The Ninth Circuit
posited that because Congress enacted a "pervasive regulatory scheme"
regarding immigrant entry, resident status, and deportation, it had re-
served exclusive federal control over civil immigration laws and thus
preempted state and local government efforts in that field.64
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, have held other-
wise. In Lynch v. Cannatella,65 the Fifth Circuit addressed whether fed-
eral law constituted the sole manner for detaining sixteen Jamaican stow-
aways who were held by the Port of New Orleans Harbor Police after
55. H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005).
56. The CLEAR Act was introduced again in the current session. See H.R. 842, 110th Cong.
(2007).
57. Huyen Phan, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 965, 976-77
(2004).
58. See Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cit. 1983); Lynch v. Cannatella,
810 F.2d 1363, 1371 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th
Cir. 1999); see also Pham, supra note 57, at 977-78 (detailing why local governments have been
allowed to enforce federal criminal immigration laws under traditional preemption analysis).
59. Scholars are similarly split on this topic as well. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1089-90 (2004) (argu-
ing that the breadth of federal civil immigration law demonstrates Congress' intent to fully occupy
the policy field and thus preempt state and local governments from enforcing such laws); Kobach,
supra note 11, at 199-219 (arguing that state and local governments have the inherent authority to
enforce federal civil immigration laws and that Congress has not preempted this policy field).
60. 722 F.2d 468.
61. Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 472-73.
62. Id. at 474-75.
63. Id. at 474-77.
64. Id.
65. 810 F.2d 1363.
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their discovery.66 The Fifth Circuit's conclusion was unequivocal and
validated the inherent authority of state and local governments to enforce
federal civil immigration laws: "No statute precludes other federal, state,
or local law enforcement agencies from taking other action to enforce
this nation's immigration laws.",67 In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez,
68
the Tenth Circuit considered an undocumented immigrant's claim that
his arrest by an Oklahoma police officer-based solely on his illegal
presence in the United States-was not permitted by federal law.69 The
Tenth Circuit rejected the appellant's argument finding a variety of fed-
eral statutes that demonstrated that Congress did not intend to preempt
state and local government enforcement of federal criminal and civil
immigration laws.7 °
The United States Department of Justice (the "DOJ") has also been
of two minds on this point. Prior to 2002, the DOJ's position was that
state and local governments could not enforce federal civil immigration
laws.71 However, in 2002, the DOJ reversed itself, stating that state and
local governments have inherent authority as sovereigns to enforce these
federal laws.72 Nevertheless, to hedge its bets-and to be proactive in
engaging state and local governments in coordinating with federal offi-
cials in immigration enforcement-the DOJ entered into memoranda of
understanding ("MOU") with states and cities to enforce federal civil
immigration laws.73
IV. PREEMPTION, FEDERALISM, AND THE LOCALIST'S CASE
Whether a local government adopts an illegal immigration ordi-
nance, designates itself a sanctuary city, or enforces federal civil immi-
gration laws, the issue of federal preemption looms large. Yet one has to
ask the question of whether such a stringent preemption position makes
sense and is desirable. The preemption doctrine stems from principles of
federalism. 74 Federalism is our intergovernmental system that allocates
and disperses power between higher and lower levels of government.75
66. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1367.
67. Id. at 1371.
68. 176 F.3d 1294.
69. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1295-97.
70. Id. at 1300.
71. See Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Rosenborough, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens (Feb.
5, 1996), available at www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopo I a.htm.
72. See Memorandum for the Att'y Gen. from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel on Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf (with DOJ redactions).
73. See Kobach, supra note 11, at 196-99 (detailing different MOUs entered into by the DOJ
and the legal basis for them). These MOUs also extended federal liability protections and immuni-
ties to local officials conducting warrantless investigations and detentions for federal civil immigra-
tion law violations. See id.
74. See Cmty. Commc'ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 61 (1982).
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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In light of this system, the United States Supreme Court has crafted a test
to determine if federal law preempts state and/or local law: express pre-
emption by Congress; field preemption if the federal statutory scheme is
so pervasive that it leaves no room for state or local supplementing; and
conflict preemption, where a state or local government permits some-
thing that federal law forbids or forbids something that federal law al-
lows. 7 6 Federalism is also intended to serve a number of different val-
ues-innovation, democracy, accountability, and checking too much
federal power.77 Local governments seem best suited to fulfill these val-
ues, both generally and specifically to immigration regulation and en-
forcement.
In reflecting on federalism, Justice Brandeis once famously stated
that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. 78 If the fifty states serve as such laboratories, then certainly the
tens of thousands of local governments nationwide offer enticing oppor-
tunities for experimentation and reform. Local governments have proven
to be incubators for innovative policies in a variety of areas: firearm
regulation, gay and lesbian rights, domestic partnership laws, campaign
finance reform, and living wage law.79 Therefore, local government ex-
perimentation in the immigration realm can lead to successes or failures
that can inform federal policy-making.
Local governments also advance the value of democracy by provid-
ing opportunities for public participation in their decision-making proc-
esses.80 The federal and state governments may have more resources at
their disposal and have control over a broader range of policies than local
governments, but these higher levels of government are too large and
inaccessible for meaningful civic engagement. Small governmental enti-
ties like cities thus invite a higher percentage of their respective constitu-
ency to deliberate directly over issues facing their communities because
people find it easier to meet, share their opinions, and share the results of
this dialogic process with their local elected officials. Therefore, local
governments are more in touch with their constituents and are thus able
to be more responsive to the needs of their communities-whether
friendly or hostile to undocumented immigrants. 8' This, of course, is
consistent with the Tenth Amendment, which charges state and local
76. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
77. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988).
78. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
79. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 254-55
(2004).
80. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1126-27 (1996).
81. See id. at 1123-24.
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governments with police power to regulate the health, safety, and general
welfare of its citizens.82 Correspondingly, because of the close proximity
to their local elected officials and administrators and the opportunity to
be engaged in local government decision-making, community stake-
holders can better oversee the work of their local governments and thus
hold them accountable. 83 This dynamic in local government furthers the
democratic and accountability ideals of federalism.
Accordingly, it seems odd that traditional theories of federalism
overlook local governments as facilitators of these federalism values
with their focus on a two-tiered system of federal and state governments.
Localists espouse a more modern view of federalism with local govern-
ments as quasi-sovereign governmental entities that constitute a third-
tier.84 The aforementioned emphasis on federal preemption of local gov-
ernment regulation and enforcement in the immigration field runs afoul
of this modern view because preemption thwarts local experimentation
and innovation in immigration reform. 85 It also precludes localities from
passing laws and enforcing federal civil immigration laws to further the
health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.8 6 Indeed, different
states and local governments are affected in drastically different man-
ners-both positively and negatively-by illegal immigration. 7  Local
governments should be able to respond accordingly, especially if the
federal government is not meeting those communities' needs.
This argument does not derive from an anti-illegal immigration po-
sition. In fact, calls for requiring local governments to enforce federal
immigration laws are similarly untenable for a localist because this
would constitute an unfunded mandate that undermines local autonomy
and violates the Tenth Amendment. It is important to recognize that
there are multiple motivating factors for why localities would adopt the
illegal immigration ordinances detailed above-some of them are no
doubt unsavory. But it is also plausible that cities have determined-
whether correctly or incorrectly-that illegal immigration negatively
affects their communities and that the federal government is failing in its
duties to enforce federal immigration laws in a manner that sufficiently
protects their constituents. If this is a factor, and we believe in the values
82. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (interpreting the
Tenth Amendment).
83. See Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered
Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & Soc. 5, 26 (2001).
84. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 15 (1981) ("A modern theory of federalism becomes
possible only when cities, states, and national governments are understood to differ in their essential
character."). See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Gov-
ernment Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (detailing the considerable autonomy that local govern-
ments enjoy).
85. See Boatright, supra note 6, at 1669-700.
86. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000).
87. See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1631-32, 1642-43 (1997).
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of federalism, then localities should have some recourse to address these
perceived problems-something that the current preemption regime does
not allow. 88 This does not mean the cities should be able to enact laws
that conflict with federal or state immigration laws. Rather, under a con-
current powers doctrine and a modem theory of federalism, local gov-
ernment efforts in the immigration realm should stand unless they make
legal something the federal government deems illegal or prohibit some-
thing that federal immigration laws permit. In fact, one could read many
of the local illegal immigration ordinances as making illegal through
local laws that which is already illegal under federal immigration law.
While this localist position may have some appeal, there is an un-
derstandable reticence for such local government regulation and en-
forcement in the immigration field. One concern is that these local ordi-
nances will have impacts that extend beyond the undocumented immi-
grants they target.89 United States citizens and legally admitted aliens
may have their civil rights violated by these ordinances. Local police
forces may engage in racial profiling and discrimination. These concerns
raise equal protection issues, which may wind up rendering some of
these local illegal immigration ordinances unconstitutional-and rightly
so. However, even if these ordinances did not raise Equal Protection or
Due Process concerns, they would be struck down under the current pre-
emption regime-thus precluding local government from supplementing
federal immigration policy.
There is also a concern that such ordinances are based on racial
fears and stereotypes, not evidence of a threat to the health, safety, and
welfare of the community.90 Moreover, local police forces may not be
trained in immigration issues, thus causing a problem with enforcement.
Further, an individual's immigration status can change in a short period
of time. There is also a lack of an assured database to determine an indi-
vidual's immigration status. These training issues pose challenges, but
none which are merely germane to local governments. Cities ought to
seek training-as evidenced by the MOUs with the DOJ-on immigra-
tion matters to be truly effective. However, even if they do not, that con-
cern is not a valid basis for broadly preempting local action in the immi-
gration field.
Others worry that local governments will divert valuable police time
and resources away from every-day enforcement functions. 9' Opponents
also claim that undocumented immigrants will not trust local police
forces and thus not come forward with critical information regarding
88. See id. at 1631-32.
89. Wishnie, supra note 59, at 1088.
90. See FAIR IMMIGRATION REFORM MOVEMENT, RECLAIMING OUR COMMUNITIES TOOLKIT
(2007), available at http://64.243.188.204/CCCFTP/Iocal.pdf
91. See Booth, supra note 9, at 1066 (noting arguments against local government enforcement
of federal immigration laws).
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crimes for fear of being deported.92 These may be valid criticisms, but
they are policy concerns that cities must grapple with in deciding how to
expend their resources and where to target their focus-both in terms of
regulation and enforcement. While it would be an unfortunate conse-
quence to have undocumented immigrants distrust police and not volun-
tarily offer information on crimes, it is merely a consideration a city must
weigh in deciding whether to adopt such illegal immigration positions.
Moreover, as mentioned above, if constituents are unhappy with cities'
decisions to divert police time and resources to illegal immigration en-
forcement and away from normal public safety work, community mem-
bers are more likely to be able to hold their local government account-
able because of their smaller sizes.
CONCLUSION
Cities provide opportunities to test out many of the claims made by
both sides of the illegal immigration debate. A locality could adopt these
illegal immigration ordinances and/or enforce federal criminal and civil
immigration laws to see if expelling undocumented immigrants from
their jurisdiction actually improved crime rates or stopped the perceived
depletion of government social service resources. 93 Or the local govern-
ment might find that such measures hurt the local economy through lost
tax dollars and workforce. In contrast, a city could designate itself a
sanctuary city to see if maintaining its undocumented immigrant popula-
tion helps maintain a strong local economy. The locality might instead
experience an influx of undocumented immigrants that may have some
unintended and undesirable consequences. Such possibilities to test the
rhetoric on both sides on a local level-and thus inform federal decision-
makers-through these innovative local efforts are currently largely pre-
cluded because of preemption. As we grapple as a nation with this
highly complex and divisive issue, we should not preempt and ignore
local governments, as they provide opportunities for new, supplemental
approaches to what is seen by both sides of the debate as a broken federal
immigration policy.
92. See Sessions & Hayden, supra note 5, at 338 (noting critics' claims of such a result).
93. Such a city would presumably coordinate with federal immigration agents to have un-
documented immigrants deported. Undocumented immigrants might also leave such a city to move








Immigration, especially illegal immigration, is a subject currently
generating intense controversy in American political and social dis-
course. To varying degrees, the subject has been controversial over the
past one-hundred-eighty years, beginning with attempts by New York
and Massachusetts to tax masters of ships who brought aliens into New
York and Boston Harbors.' The Chinese Cooley Taxes in California
were the first anti-immigration laws that were directed at a specific racial
or ethnic group. Since then, the object of public anti-immigrant ire has
been aimed, at different times, at the Irish, Italians, Germans, Eastern
Europeans, Asians, both Chinese and Japanese, and Mexicans.
Since 2000, legal immigrants have entered the United States at a
rate of nearly one million per year. Since the late 1990's, undocumented
immigration is thought to have equaled and may even have exceeded
2legal immigration. The federal government appears to receive a net gain
from the cost-benefit ratio arising out of dollars expended for services
provided to immigrants and taxes paid by immigrants including those
who are undocumented.3 Local governments may be suffering a net loss
t Marlin W. Burke is an attorney who has been practicing law since 1971. For five years he
was a prosecutor for the City of Lakewood, Colorado. After leaving that position, he entered private
practice where he enjoyed a civil litigation practice focusing on personal injury, civil rights and
employment law. He practiced before all Colorado trial and appellate courts, the Federal District
Court of Colorado and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. He interrupted his practice for a time to
serve as an Administrative Law Judge for the Colorado Department of Administrative Hearings
where he heard workers' compensation matters. He authored a work entitled "Disabilities, Civil
Rights and Workers' Compensation Law in Colorado," 1993, Colorado Legal Publishing Company,
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 93-070635. More recently his practice has focused on
immigration law and family law involving immigration and international laws. He lectures fre-
quently on immigration law for civic and legal professional organizations. He was the recipient of
the 2007 Colorado Adult Education and Colorado Department of Education Volunteer of the Year
Award for his many years of teaching of naturalization classes to new immigrants.
1. The first U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with immigration is Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S.
283 (1849). It involved head taxes imposed by the states of New York and Massachusetts on mas-
ters of ships bringing aliens into their ports. Id. at 392, 409. The Massachusetts law required the
ship's master to post a one-thousand-dollar bond, a very large sum at that time, if on inspection any
of the aliens were found to be lunatics or other undesirables. Id. at 409. The Court found that the
taxes violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 410.
2. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 6 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf, see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES' RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (1998), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98119.pdf.
3. See sources cited infra notes 64-72.
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in that equation, though it is far from certain that they are.4 Whether or
not local governments are in fact suffering a deficit in the equation, the
public perception is certainly that local services including schools, hospi-
tals, law enforcement, and social services budgets are being overtaxed by
immigration, particularly undocumented immigration. Other concerns
voiced by anti-immigration groups and individuals that get considerable
attention from the public are that immigrants are able to compete unfairly
for employment in the United States because large numbers of undocu-
mented laborers depress wages and fill jobs that would otherwise be held
by U.S. citizens. Though competent research studies do not support that
premise, it is nonetheless a widely accepted perception and was a favor-
ite mantra of many politicians during the 2006 election campaign.
Because the bulk of immigration, especially undocumented immi-
gration, is from Latin America, mostly Mexico, concern is expressed that
the racial, religious, and social makeup of the country is threatened.
Though there are unquestionably racist and xenophobic undertones in
that argument, the fact that it is frequently expressed, even in the halls of
Congress by prominent public figures, indicates that it is resonating with
the public.6 How much the fear is embedded in public emotion that
American, Northern European influenced culture may be diluted to its
4. See RICH JONES ET AL., THE BELL POLICY CTR., EFFECTS ON COLORADO AND THE
NATION: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 11 (2005), available at http://www.thebell.org/pdf/IMG-briefl2-
05.pdf (focusing on undocumented immigration); CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO THE STATE BUDGET AND
ECONOMY 20 (2006), available at http://www.cpa.state.tx.us/specialrpt/undocumented/
undocumented.pdf (same); see also JULIAN L. SIMON, IMMIGRATION: THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND
ECONOMIC FACTS (1995), http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/pr-immig.html (follow "Sum-
mary of Important Facts about Immigration") (focusing on both legal and undocumented immigra-
tion); IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., ECONOMIC GROWTH & IMMIGRATION: BRIDGING THE
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDE 15 (2005), available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/special report/2005_
bridging.pdf (same); VIVEK WADHWA ET AL., AMERICA'S NEW IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS 3
(2007), available at http://memp.pratt.duke.edu/downloads/americasnew immigrant_
entrepreneurs.pdf (discussing the impact of educated immigrants engaged in technological, scien-
tific, and entrepreneurial endeavors).
5. See RAKESH KOCHHAR, GROWTH IN THE FOREIGN-BORN WORKFORCE AND
EMPLOYMENT OF THE NATIVE BORN (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?
ReportlD=69; see also SIMON, supra note 3.
6. This is an argument expressed by Richard D. Lamm, former Governor of Colorado. See
RICHARD D. LAMM & GARY IMHOFF, The IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB: THE FRAGMENTING OF
AMERICA (1985). This argument is also promoted by FAIR (Federation for American Immigration
Reform), a well-financed and high-profile anti-immigration group. See Unlicensed to Kill, FAIR,
http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iicunlicensed (last visited Mar. 20, 2007). This
position is also supported by Rep. Steve King (R) from Iowa. See, e.g., Press Release from Rep.
Steve King (R) of Iowa: Press Release, Representative Steve King, Biting the Hand That Feeds You
(Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.kingforcongress.com/clippings/desk-immigration4-06.htm.
Rep. King was appointed ranking member of the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judicial
Committee in January of 2007. Press Release, Representative Steve King, King Named Member of
Immigration Subcommittee (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list
press/ia05 king/ PRImmigRankingMember01 1707.html. It is also a frequent comment from Rep.
Tom Tancredo (R) from Colorado, who has referred to it as the Balkanization of the nation. See,
e.g., Representative Tom Tancredo, Remarks at Miami Rotary Club (Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://tancredo.house.gov/Media/TancredoMiamiSpeech.pdf.
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detriment by cultures from other parts of the world has not been meas-
ured.
Another variation on the same theme is that the country cannot sup-
port the population increases that continued tolerance of immigration,
whether legal or undocumented, will bring. Increases in population, the
argument goes, will necessarily degrade the environment and quality of
life in America. 7 Fear for national and personal security is also inter-
twined into the immigration discussion.8 The 9/11 conspirators were all
foreign nationals who gained entry to the United States. To the embar-
rassment of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, Mo-
hamed Atta was posthumously granted an entry visa even after his noto-
riety was known to almost everyone in the country. 9
Analysis of reputable studies and of the public perceptions ex-
pressed in these arguments demonstrates how much fear is a part of the
equation. Morality is also a part of the mix. Immigrants, whether legal
or undocumented, are human beings, often with sympathetic stories.
Because many immigrants have lived and worked in the country for
many years, have contributed positively to our society, have families,
and have hopes and dreams that are hard for most of us to ignore, the
moral questions become both uncomfortable and inescapable.' 0
No one at any level of government or the general public denies that
the nation's immigration system is broken. The statement is so often
repeated it has become a mantra that raises neither surprise nor objection
when it is stated. The system is broken, in part, because it lacks a foun-
dation. The nation does not have a consistent, cohesive immigration
7. This too is an argument promoted by Richard D. Lamm. See LAMM & IMHOFF, supra
note 5. Lamm presented this argument in his campaign with the action group Defend Colorado Now
in an effort to amend the Colorado Constitution to restrict undocumented immigrants' access to
public benefits. See Myung Oak Kim, Lamm 's Words Draw Fire, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 27,
2006, at 5A; see also The Population-Environment Connection, FAIR, http://www.fairus.org/
site/PageServer?pagename=iieimmigrationissuecentersfd36 (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
8. The Farmers Branch, Texas municipal ordinance, placing restrictions on renting housing
to undocumented persons, actually cited security concerns arising out of the fact that the 9/11 terror-
ists were foreign nationals as a part of the justification for the passage of the ordinance. See e.g.,
Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2892 (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.ci.farmersbranch.tx.us/Communication/Ordinance%2ONo%202892.html; Farmers
Branch, Tex., Proposed Ordinance 2903 (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.ci.farmers-
branch.tx.us/Communication/Proposed%200rdinance%202903.doc.
9. See INS Blunders Prove Need for Major Shake-up, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, Mar. 26,
2002.
10. Archbishop Charles J. Chaput of Denver has spoken frequently and eloquently concerning
these issues throughout the year 2006 in many public appearances. See, e.g., Press Release,
Archbishop Charles J. Chaput, Statement by Archbishop Charles J. Chaput on the Arrests of Unau-
thorized Workers (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://www.justiceforimmigrants.org/files/+Chaput-
Arrests.pdf. The subject has also been addressed by Baptist and Jewish religious leaders. See, e.g.,
Eunice Moscoso, Religious Leaders Urge Compassion for Illegal Immigrants, THE OXFORD PRESS,
Sept. 27, 2006, available at http://www.oxfordpress.com/n/content/shared/news/stories/
2006/09/IMMIGRATION 27 COXW6482.html; Charles Hurt, Immigration Debate Gets Reli-
gious: Group's Deal May Please Neither Side, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, at AO1.
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policy. Because the nation has no immigration policy, it cannot have a
workable system to implement it. From the outset, immigration laws
have been a patchwork of mostly ad hoc restrictions crafted in response
to some perceived threat to the national economy, social fabric, or secu-
rity. The restrictions have often been racially motivated. Some of the
restrictions were later withdrawn, but that was done in a piecemeal man-
ner. This is not to say that efforts at devising a comprehensive immigra-
tion policy have not been attempted at various times. Attempts at major
reform were made in 1924, 1952, 1965, 1986, 1990, and 1996.11 Unfor-
tunately, rather than scraping the existing law and starting fresh with a
specific goal in mind, these efforts simply built on each other in ways
that were often inconsistent and conflicting, resulting in a nearly incom-
prehensible compilation of laws made even more complex by frequent
piecemeal changes. The resulting body of law falls far short of truly
defining a national immigration policy.
Neither Congress nor the Executive Branch have offered effective
leadership on the subject over the past several decades or articulated a
comprehensive policy of immigration or a system to implement such a
policy. State and local governments generally recognize that direct regu-
lation of immigration is reserved to Congress by the U.S. Constitution.
The result of the vacuum of leadership at a national level, however, is
that state and local governments have begun to move into the field by
obliquely regulating immigration. This is done by regulating areas ancil-
lary to immigration, such as by imposing identification requirements on
everyone, citizens and non-citizens alike. The intention here is to deny
the necessities of a comfortable existence to anyone unable to demon-
strate lawful presence in the United States. Some such local and state
legislation denies drivers licenses to the undocumented, prohibits em-
ployers from employing such persons, and prohibits landlords from rent-
ing to persons who cannot produce certain kinds of identification. 12 But,
the anti-immigrant furor does not stop with the undocumented. It
stretches even to legal immigrants. There are movements afoot to restrict
the right of U.S. citizen immigrants to sponsor their relatives for entry to
the country, which is referred to as "chain immigration" by anti-
immigration restrictionists, and to deny the automatic grant of citizenship
11. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE
OUTLINE AND REFERENCE TOOL 1-8 (2004).
12. By way of example, Colorado passed three such pieces of legislation, bills numbered
1023, 1017 and 1343 in its regular and special 2006 sessions. See Myung Oak Kim, New Era for
Colorado Owens Puts Pen to Tough Immigration Bills Aimed at Identifying Legal Citizens, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Aug. 1, 2006, at 5A. A variety of bills prohibiting landlords from renting housing to
undocumented migrants were passed in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Escondido,
California and Farmers Branch, Texas. See Another Town Gets Tough on Illegals,
WORLDNETDAILY.COM, Oct. 26, 2006, http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID
=52625. The State of Texas has several such bills pending before its legislature in 2007. See Ralph




to children born to undocumented immigrants in the United States, which
is otherwise guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution.13
Some have suggested that local governments should be allowed to
regulate areas ancillary to immigration in a manner that would discour-
age immigration because the federal government is overwhelmed by the
number of immigrants entering the United States and because the brunt
of the costs of immigration is born by local governments.1 4 However,
regulation of immigration and all of its aspects is and must be exclu-
sively a federal issue, and no state or local regulation of even ancillary
aspects of immigration can or should be permitted. National security and
economic and social policy issues surrounding this topic are so insepara-
ble that one cannot be fairly discussed without discussing the others.
The questions go to the very heart of the sovereignty of the nation and to
the constitutional imperatives granting Congress and the President the
right to regulate domestic and foreign commerce and foreign policy.
They go to the heart of constitutional concepts of equal protection and
liberty that are the foundation of American democracy and to the heart of
how we define a civil society within our borders.
I. DEFINING THE TERMS
The law defines terms related to immigration. There is also a great
amount of public discussion regarding terms that either have no meaning
in the law or are used indiscriminately without regard to important dis-
tinctions. Therefore, a definition of a few terms is necessary to clarify
this discussion. An "immigrant" in the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (the "INA") is anyone who comes into the United States with the
permission of the U.S. government and with the intent of remaining per-
manently in the United States. 15 A "non-immigrant" in the INA is any-
one who enters the United States with the consent of the United States
government but who enters with the intention of returning to his native
country. 16 There are two dozen visa categories to cover persons within
this definition. An undocumented alien is anyone who enters the United
States without permission to enter (i.e., without checking through a
check point) or who enters with permission but overstays the time he or
she was allowed to remain in the United States. Within this latter cate-
13. See Hurt, supra note 9, at AO; see also Chain Immigration, FAIR,
http://www.fairus.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=iicimmigrationissuecenters3e2a (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007).
14. See NumbersUSA, State and Local Immigration Action Center,
http://www.numbersusa.com/hottopic/ordinances.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15) (2006).
16. See id. § 1101(15). Neither "immigrant" nor "non-immigrant" is defined in so many
words in either the federal statute at title 8 of the U.S. Code or the regulations adopted to implement
the statues at 8 C.F.R. Rather, the definitions of these terms are derived from many pages of defini-
tions regarding what is an alien and under what circumstances an alien may admitted to the United
States.
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gory are also sub-categories of individuals who may have become per-
sona non grata17 because they violated the terms of their permission to
remain in the United States and also categories of individuals who en-
tered without authorization but who may become "legal" if they fit
within some very limited circumstances. The term "illegal alien" and the
term "illegal" used as a noun as opposed to an adjective as commonly
used in the popular lexicon are not defined in law. In the popular lexi-
con, these terms are imprecise and are indiscriminately used to describe a
variety of categories of individuals, sometimes even mixing categories.
For purposes of this discussion, immigrants are defined as the INA has
defined them, namely, persons who entered legally with the intention to
stay permanently. "Undocumented migrants" shall mean anybody who
either entered with no documents or stayed beyond the date specified in
their entry documents. There are other large categories of individuals,
such as temporary visa holders and persons who violated the terms of
their visas by committing criminal violations or working without au-
thorization, but these people are not subjects of this discussion. Here, we
are concerned with migrants who are "immigrants" and those migrants
who are undocumented and therefore, outside of the law regardless of
whether or not they intend to remain permanently in the United States.
Both of these categories of individuals will be covered within the subject
of "immigration."
II. STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES
California, because of its port cities and its border with Mexico has
long been concerned with immigration. It was there that the Cooley
Taxes were imposed on Chinese immigrants of the 1860's. The taxes
were an effort to discourage Chinese immigrants who had been imported
to work the mines and build railroads from establishing businesses in or
remaining in California. In the 1980's and 1990's, anti-Mexican senti-
ment reached a peak in California with the passage of a referendum
measure submitted to the state's voters, Proposition 187.18 It passed by a
margin of 59% to 41% of the popular vote.19 It intended to establish
cooperation between local and federal government employees to identify
and report persons without documents, to require state and local employ-
ees to verify the identity of persons with whom they came into contact,
and to deny state-funded health care, social services, and education to
undocumented migrants. 20 Proposition 187 was written in very sweeping
language. It was attacked in five separate lawsuits that were consoli-
17. Persona non grata means "fully unacceptable or unwelcome, especially to a foreign gov-
ernment." About.com, persona non grata, http://www.answers.com/topic/persona-non-grata (last
visited Mar. 20, 2007).
18. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).




dated into one federal district court case, League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. Wilson.21 Most, though not all, of the provisions of the
initiative were found to violate the U.S. Constitution.22
Not deterred by the decision in that case, however, more than
twenty states have within recent years passed legislation with similar
intent. In 2006, Colorado passed seventeen separate pieces of legislation
intended to identify undocumented migrants, to limit publicly-funded
services and benefits to them, and to require all persons regardless of
citizenship or immigration status to provide specified identification
documents to obtain drivers licenses and professional and business li-
censes. 23 Requirements are imposed by Colorado law on employers to
verify the immigration status of persons working for them.24 Peace offi-
cers, a broad range of persons in Colorado with law enforcement func-
tions, are required to report undocumented persons with whom they
come into contact to federal authorities.25
The State of Georgia passed legislation prohibiting employers in
Georgia from claiming tax exemptions for wages paid to undocumented
workers. 26 Following that lead, Colorado passed two pieces of legisla-
tion with similar purposes, one disqualifying employers who knowingly
employ undocumented migrants from exempting wages paid to them
from their state income taxes and another that requires employers to
withhold a percentage of the gross wages paid to their undocumented
workers for state income taxes.27 Both the Georgia and the Colorado
legislation would seem to give permission to employ undocumented
workers so long as the employer pays the required tax premium. It,
however, has been a violation of federal law to employ undocumented
workers since 1986.28 In addition, other pieces of legislation also passed
in 2006 in Colorado impose heavy consequences on employers who
knowingly employ undocumented workers; consequences that are differ-
ent from the federal penalties imposed for the same behavior.
Municipalities also began joining the restrictionist parade of attack
in 2006. Altoona, Pennsylvania, for example, even though it has no im-
migrant population, passed ordinances requiring landlords and employers
21. See id.
22. See id. at 786-87.
23. ANN MORSE ET AL., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRATION
POLICY (2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/61mmigEnactedLegis3.htm.
24. H.R. 1017, 65th Gen. Assemb., Ist Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 2006).
25. S. 90, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006). In Colorado HB 1023, RB 1343,
RB 1017, and SB 90 all passed in 2006. See MORSE ET AL., supra note 22.
26. See S. 529, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006).
27. See H.R. 1015, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 2006); H.R. 1017, 65th
Gen. Assemb., 1 st Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 2006).
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006).
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to verify the identities of their employees and tenants. 29 The town wants
to be prepared in the event any foreign nationals ever move into town.
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, which did at least have some undocumented
migrant population, passed a series of three ordinances. The first re-
quires the "occupants" of any "premises" to register proof of citizenship
with the City of Hazleton, to pay an occupancy tax, and to obtain a per-
mit from the city to occupy a property. 30 Additionally, every landlord
has to obtain a permit from the city to lease property.31 The second ordi-
nance requires city employees to investigate complaints of harboring
illegal aliens or employing unauthorized workers made by any city offi-
cial, resident, or business entity.32 This ordinance imposes fines and
penalties, including revocations of licenses allowing one to lease his or
her property and other prohibitions against anyone providing shelter or
"harboring" "illegal aliens" from collecting rent. It imposes suspensions
of business permits for employing "illegal aliens." The third ordinance
made English the official language of the City of Hazleton.33
Since mid-2006, sixty municipalities in twenty-one states have con-
sidered similar legislation. At least fifteen, including Escondido, Cali-
fornia and Farmers Branch, Texas, a suburb of Dallas, have passed it.
34
Arizona has long been known for its vocal restrictionist movements.
The state of Texas has a full palate of such restrictive legislative propos-
als on its agenda for the 2007 session.36 The proposals are designed to
prohibit undocumented migrants or anyone suspected of falling into that
category from working in the state or from receiving any public assis-
tance. Taneytown, Maryland and Pahrump, Nevada passed English as
official language ordinances in November, 2006. 37 Colorado has laws on
the books that make it impossible to get a drivers license or automobile
insurance without specified documentation.38 The movement of state
and local governmental entities toward regulation of immigration by
regulating the matters that make living within a community possible ap-
pears to be a freight train traveling on a downhill grade.
29. See Sean D. Hamill, Altoona, With No Immigrant Problem, Decides to Solve It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A34.
30. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (proposed Aug. 15, 2006).
31. See id.
32. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (proposed Sept. 12, 2006).
33. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (proposed Sept. 12, 2006).
34. Fair Immigration Reform Movement, Database of Local Immigration Ordinances,
http://www.fairimmigration.org/learn/immigration-reform-and-immigrants/local-leve/database-of-
ordinances.html [hereinafter Database of Local Immigration Ordinances].
35. See Mark K. Matthews, Arizona Lashes Out at Illegal Immigration, STATELINE.ORG, Aug.
31, 2005, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=l 36&languageld=l &content
Id-51473.
36. Miguel Bustillo, Texas May Pull Up the Welcome Mat, L.A. TiMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at Al.
37. Database of Local Immigration Ordinances, supra note 34.
38. See H.R. 1023, 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 2006); see also April
M. Washington, Red Tape Ensnares State's New ID Law, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sep. 25, 2006, avail-




III. MOTIVES BEHIND THE LEGISLATION
The officially-stated reasons for the passage of this kind of legisla-
tion and what is apparent from comments made by policy makers outside
of legislative chambers are quite different. Additionally, analysis of in-
formation available from reputable research organizations when placed
beside the legislation enacted reveals surprising contradictions.
The Mayor of the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania stated, "[I]llegal
immigrants are destroying the city. I don't want them here, period."3 9 He
claimed his "small town budget is buckling under the strain of illegal
immigrants" and "some people come to this country and refuse to learn
English, creating a language barrier for city employees. '4° He further
stated, "'illegal aliens' have contributed significantly to an increase in
the crime rate [and] other problems in Hazleton." 41 When pressed on the
matter, however, the Mayor has publicly admitted on several occasions
that the city has no statistics or any other evidence to support these
claims.42 He furthermore does not know if any illegal aliens work in the
city.43 Nonetheless, the preamble to the ordinances justifying the reasons
for passage state:
That unlawful employment, the harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling
units in the City of Hazleton, and crime committed by illegal aliens
harm the health, safety and welfare of authorized U.S. workers and
legal residents in the City of Hazleton. Illegal immigration leads to
higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal
residents to substandard quality of care, contributes to other burdens
on public services, increasing their cost and diminishing their avail-
ability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall quality of life.
44
In Colorado, during the summer of 2006, the state's governor called
a special legislative session to deal with a purported crisis in the state
caused by payment of public moneys to undocumented migrants through
programs designed to assist the poor. The governor claimed migrants
were placing a strain on medical services, law enforcement, county and
municipal jails, and other public services.45 The special session of the
legislature met and began considering proposed legislation by conducting
public hearings in which heads of various state government agencies and
39. Robert Tanner, Illegal Immigration Now a Local issue, TULSA WORLD, July 20, 2006, at
A12.
40. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and






45. See David Migoya, New Era on Immigration, DENV. POST, Aug. 1, 2006, at AO l; see also
Mark P. Couch, State Special Session Legislators in Dark on Immigrant Costs, DENV. POST, July 6,
2006, at AOl.
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departments were called to testify about the costs and stresses placed on
their agencies and departments by undocumented migrants.46 None
could cite any.47 Furthermore, none could point to any program in which
undocumented migrants were being paid welfare assistance benefits such
as Medicaid, food stamps, or other such benefits.48 After nearly a week
of hearings, the governor finally declared that the reason the legislature
was not finding evidence of such costs was because it was not asking the
right people.49 The legislature then went on to pass ten separate pieces of
legislation, all of which were signed by the governor.50 Only one of
those bills dealt with the expenditure of public funds on undocumented
migrants.5'
Feeling the pressure of the upcoming general election in November,
the legislature went well beyond the governor's call to pass legislation
prohibiting undocumented persons from collecting public assistance and
passed legislation dealing with a wide range of issues. Some of the bills
passed dealt with requiring employers to verify the identity of their la-
borers and penalizing employers for intentionally employing undocu-
mented laborers,52 something the Federal government has done since
1986. Others dealt with restricting business and professional licenses to
undocumented migrants.53 There were measures passed addressing
transportation of undocumented persons through the state and attempting
to address exploitation of undocumented labor.54 In fairness, it should be
said that part of the reason some heads of agencies and departments
could not demonstrate how much money might be spent on undocu-
mented migrants, especially in the areas of law enforcement and the
prison and jail systems, is that records have never been kept in such a
way as to identify the costs that might be specifically attributed to un-
documented migrants. Whatever the reason, however, there was no evi-
dence produced that undocumented migrants were putting a measurable
strain on public services. Nonetheless, the special session of the legisla-
ture called to deal with this phantom crisis passed a dozen laws to rem-
edy it.
The Colorado Legislature followed up by conducting hearings after
it convened in January of 2007 to determine how much money had been
spent enforcing these laws, since some had taken effect on August 1,
46. See Couch, supra note 45.
47. See id.
48. See Rebecca Boyle, Legislators Unclear on Impact of Illegals, GREELEY TRIB., July 6,
2006.
49. Id.
50. See David Migoya, supra note 45, at AO.
51. See id.
52. See id; Bruce Finley, Bosses Bypass Worker Status Website, DENV. POST, Mar. 28, 2006.
53. Migoya, supra note 45, at AO.
54. Mark P. Couch & Chris Frates, Parties at Odds on Immigration Bill, DENV. POST, July
10, 2006, at AO1.
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2006, and how much money had been saved by enforcing the laws."
The cost of enforcement was $2.03 million dollars in five months, but no
savings were identified. 56 The intended cumulative effect of the legisla-
tion when it was passed, however, was clearly to make it impossible for
undocumented migrants to live in Colorado and to force them to go
somewhere, anywhere else.
The reasons nearly always given to justify the passage of these
kinds of legislative enactments are the adverse economic impact of un-
documented migrants and the increase in the crime rate attributed to
them. Yet, reputable studies do not support either the underlying prem-
ise that there is a large expenditure of public funds that is not offset by
taxes withheld from the wages paid to undocumented laborers or that
immigrants commit more crime than any other demographic group. In
fact, there has been $463 billion paid into Social Security that is unas-
signed.57 This is money that has been paid by unknown persons who will
never be able to draw on it. It is thought that nearly all of this money
was paid into the system by undocumented migrants. 58 The sum is cur-
rently growing at a rate of more than six billion dollars per year. 59 That
sum, together with the interest it generates each year, is a very significant
boon to the Social Security system. Where governmental entities are
funded by sales tax on purchases of consumer goods, the regressive na-
ture of the tax itself assures that undocumented migrants pay at least their
fair share, if not more, of those taxes. In Texas, where the 2007 legisla-
tive agenda contains several legislative proposals directed at assuring
that public funds are not being expended to benefit undocumented mi-
grants, the State Comptroller just completed a report indicating that "the
absence of the estimated 1.4 million undocumented immigrants in Texas
in fiscal 2005 would have been a loss to our gross state product of $17.7
billion., 60 Also, the Comptroller's Office estimates that state revenues
collected from undocumented immigrants exceeded what the state spent
on services by $424.7 million.61 "While state revenues exceed expendi-
tures for undocumented immigrants, local governments and hospitals
experience the opposite, with the estimated difference being $928.9 mil-
lion for 2005. ' '62 What the Comptroller does not say is that the net loss,
considering both state and local revenues, is $524.2 million which, in a
55. Mark P. Couch, Colorado Immigration Law Falls Short of Goal, DENV. POST, Jan. 25,
2006, at AO1.
56. See id
57. JONES ET AL., supra note 4, at 12-13.
58. See id
59. See id. at 13.
60. STRAYHORN, supra note 4, at 3.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id
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state the size of Texas, is a rather small portion of local government
budgets in the state.63
The Bell Policy Institute ("Bell") did a similar study in Colorado
where it is estimated that there are approximately 200,000 to 250,000
undocumented migrants.64 Bell's conclusion was that "[u]nder most
scenarios, immigrants pay more in taxes to all levels of government than
they consume in services., 65 "However, there tends to be a net surplus at
the federal level and a net cost to states and localities." 66 Even that last
statement is open to question, however, if one looks fairly at all of the
data. Bell estimated that the cost of providing federally-mandated ser-
vices to undocumented migrants in Colorado by state and local govern-
ments is about $225 million.67 Taxes paid by undocumented migrants to
state and local governments are estimated to be somewhere between
$159 and $194 million.68 Bell acknowledges that it is nearly impossible
to know what the percentage of undocumented labor is paid "on the
books" as opposed to "under the table., 69 Bell adopted the assumption
that only fifty percent of undocumented workers are paid on the books.7°
This figure is taken from a figure given in an estimate made by the Cen-
ter for Immigrant Studies. 71 The Social Security Administration esti-
mates that seventy-five percent of undocumented laborers are paid "on
the books. 72 It is clear that in view of the difficulty of gathering hard
data, either figure is just a guess. If one even splits the difference be-
tween the Bell estimate and the Social Security Administration's esti-
mate of what percentage of undocumented laborers pay taxes, the short-
fall between the costs of services and benefits rendered and the amount
of revenues collected evaporates.
Do undocumented migrants depress wages of citizen and lawfully-
authorized laborers? Again, the public perception is that they do, a per-
ception fueled by public officials, journalists, and other opinion-makers
who often make this speculation. Yet, almost every one of the many
reputable studies conducted on this question concludes either that there is
almost no impact or that if there is impact, it is only among laborers with
less than a high-school education and virtually no skills.73 The category
63. See id.
64. JONES ET AL., supra note 4, at 1; ROBIN BAKER & RICH JONES, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES
PAID IN COLORADO BY UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 1 (June 30, 2006), available at
http://www.thebell.org/pdf/IMG/Brf3taxes.pdf.
65. JONES ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
66. Id.
67. BAKER & JONES, supra note 64, at 1.
68. Id.




73. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S.
LABOR MARKET 11 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter CBO, LABOR MARKET], available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/68xx/doc6853/11-10-Immigration.pdf (noting that two decades of
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of unskilled workers with less than a high-school education includes less
than six percent of the native-born labor population, and this percentage
is shrinking.74 This makes sense when one realizes that the part of the
labor market where undocumented migrants compete is in the low-skill
sector. Those studies that do find an adverse impact on domestic labor
conclude that competition by undocumented labor depresses wages in
75that sector by only one to two percent. Why then, is there an urgency
to pass legislation to protect the domestic labor market?
The effect of the spate of laws clamping down on undocumented la-
bor and employers was already felt in the fall of 2006. Complaints by
farmers in Colorado, the Pacific Northwest, and the U.S. Northeast were
not that they had to pay too much for labor to harvest their crops, but
rather that they could not find labor at all. When considering this infor-
mation along with the projections of the U.S. Department of Labor that
five of the ten fastest growing employment areas between now and 2014
are projected to be in the low-skill job sector,76 the disconnect between
the arguments made about job displacement and wage depression caused
by migrants and the realities of the job market become startling.77 Quite
clearly, what employers are saying is true. We cannot fill the labor de-
mand in this sector from our domestic labor pool.
The disconnect between the argument that "illegal aliens" contrib-
ute to high crime rates and carefully-gathered data is equally as great.
The crime rate among immigrants and undocumented migrants is about
the same or a little lower than it is in the population as a whole.78 The
recidivism rate for immigrants is lower than it is for the native-born.
79
growth of the foreign-born workforce in the United States has reduced average earnings of high
school dropouts by as little as nothing to only as much as ten percent); KOCHAR, supra note 4 (stat-
ing that "[n]o consistent pattern emerges to show that native-born workers suffered or benefited from
increased numbers of foreign-born workers"); Giovanni Peri, How Immigrants Effect California
Employment and Wages, CALIFORNIA COUNTS, Feb. 2007, available at http://www.ppic.org/
main/publication.asp?i=737; Written Testimony Before the Subcomm. for Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security and International Law of the H. Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 30, 2007) (state-
ment of Dan Siciliano, Executive Director, Program in Law, Economics, and Business, Stanford
Law School; Senior Research Fellow, Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law
Foundation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Siciliano070330.pdf
74. CBO, LABOR MARKET, supra note 73, at 16.
75. SIMON, supra note 4. The Congressional Budget Office issued a report analyzing the
approaches used to research this subject. The results are somewhat ambivalent, but there is no sig-
nificant evidence of job displacement, except perhaps in the very low-skill labor market where it
might be as low as 0.04 percent. See CBO, LABOR MARKET, supra note 73.
76. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS
2004-2014 tbl. 3d (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.t06.htm; Norman C.
Saunders, A Summary of BLS Projections to 2014, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Nov. 2005, at 3,
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/1I/art I full.pdf.
77. See CBO, LABOR MARKET, supra note 73, at 20.
78. CARL F. HOROWITZ, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, AN EXAMINATION OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND SERIOUS CRIME 5 (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.cis.org/
articles/200 1/crime/crime.pdf.
79. Id. at 11.
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The argument concerning the impact of immigration on the physical
environment, that is, that the country cannot sustain population increases
caused by immigration, defies not only our own history but population
demographics all over the world. In the past fifty years, the population
of the United States has grown. More dramatic is the fact that our popu-
lation has moved from rural areas into cities, making them substantially
denser. Yet, even within our memories, our physical environment is
substantially cleaner. There is no question that our air, water, and envi-
ronment in general are cleaner than they were in the first three quarters
of the last century. A look at the world at large tells us that many of the
world's poorest, most despoiled places have relatively low population
densities. How can these facts be true? Because the capacity of land to
carry population depends upon a variety of factors, including political
and economic stability, education, wise use of resources, wealth, tech-
nology, and political will. The least important of all the factors in this
equation is population density.
Developing and maintaining a sustainable environment entails a
highly complex balance of a very wide variety of factors including, but
not limited to: water availability and quality, national wealth, education,
disease management and eradication, governance, political stability, cul-
ture, food production, agricultural practices, overgrazing, soil erosion
and degradation, deforestation, desertification, resource management,
human, chemical and refuse waste disposal, control of carbon dioxide
emissions and other air quality issues including control of sulphur diox-
ide and fly ash, availability of technology, communications equipment
and the know how to use it, satellite surveillance, systems of land and
water ownership and allocation, sedimentation and erosion of coastal
areas.80 In 1970, two thirds of the world's population lived in rural, low
population density areas. Yet, an examination of these source materials
as well as many others available indicates that the planet has seen a gen-
eral and alarming degradation in the intervening time. There is no logic
to the idea that the United States can preserve its currently relatively de-
sirable environmental condition by walling itself off from the world's
population migrations and making itself a pristine island on a degraded
planet. Climate change, dirty air and rising water know no boundaries to
say nothing of the economic and geopolitical implications caused by
planetary degradation. At the same time that the world's poorest and
least dense places saw deterioration, richer and much more densely
populated areas saw dramatic environmental improvement. London and
Los Angeles once infamous for their dirty air tackled and much im-
80. See generally World Watch Institute, www.worldwatch.org (last visited Apr. 16, 2007);
HENNING STEINFELD ET AL., LIVESTOCK'S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS
(2006), available at http://www.virtualcentre.org/en/library/key_pub/longshad/A0701E00.pdf,
WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS, WATER A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY,




proved their air quality. Lake Erie was once considered dead. The
Cuyahoga River, one of the rivers feeding Erie was so polluted with pet-
rochemicals between 1936 and 1969 that the river actually caught fire
several times. While still not pristine, it is now a nearly healthy ecosys-
tem. 81 Lake Erie now boasts of being a fisherman's paradise.
Even a desert can support a burgeoning city if the other factors are
present. Some examples are Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Las Vegas.
Anybody familiar with the water wars of the American West knows that
the Imperial Valley of California as well as the cities of Los Angeles, Las
Vegas and Phoenix, all existing in the an arid, desert climate, live only
because of the water they pull from the Colorado River. The Colorado
carries the third largest volume of water of all the rivers in the United
States, exceeded only by the Mississippi and Columbia Rivers, but be-
cause of the demand of upstream users, it becomes almost a dry river bed
by the time it reaches its confluence with the Sea of Cortez in the Gulf of
California.82
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution speaks to the subject of
immigration in one very brief sentence: "Congress shall have the power
.. . to establish an uniform rule of naturalization . . . throughout the
United States .. ,83 Alexander Hamilton made clear in commenting on
the powers reserved to Congress in Federalist No. 32, that even though
Congress and the states may share some powers, Congress was granted
the power to make unifonn law with respect to immigration, and this
power "must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had the
power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM
RULE. 84 Federalist Papers 3, 4, 5, 42, and 80 discuss, at considerable
length, the necessity of reserving certain powers exclusively to the fed-
eral government and how state intervention in those areas is inherently
dangerous to the preservation of the Union.85 In Federalist No. 42, James
81. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Cuyahoga River Area of Concern,
http://epa.gov/glnpo/aoc/cuyahoga.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
82. See Jim Erickson, Fiercer Water Wars Seen for West, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 22, 2007,
available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drnn/cda/article_print/0, 1 983,DRMN 15
5369379 ARTICLE-DETAIL-PRINT,00.html; Randal C. Archibold & Kirk Johnson, No Longer
Waiting for Rain, An Arid West Takes Action, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at A 1.
83. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
84. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 32, The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the
General Powers of Taxation, THE DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 3, 1788, available at
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed32.htm.
85. John Jay, Federalist No. 3, The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from
Foreign Force and Influence, INDEPENDENT JOURNAL, available at
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed03.htm; John Jay, Federalist No. 4, The Same
Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, INDEPENDENT
JOURNAL, available at http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed04.htm; John Jay, Fed-
eralist No. 5, The Same Subject Continued Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence,
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL, available at http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed05.htm;
James Madison, Federalist No. 42, The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered,
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Madison discussed the mischief that had been caused under the Articles
of Confederation by the various states imposing differing requirements
for naturalization.
86
Hines v. Davidowitz87 dealt with factual circumstances somewhat
similar to those we are dealing with in our current legal and social envi-
ronment. In the 1930's, the country went through very hard economic
times. Communism became a fad for some of the public and was seen as
perhaps a better alternative to the nation's economic system which did
not seem to be working very well at the time. War was looming on the
horizon, and immigrants were seen by some as a competitive threat to the
domestic labor market. In reaction to the public fears of the time, a
number of local governments, including Pennsylvania, passed alien reg-
istration laws. 88 The Pennsylvania law was before the court in the Hines
case. 89 Justice Black delivered an elegantly-written opinion discussing a
wide range of constitutional considerations as they relate to this issue.90
Justice Black focused on the power reserved to Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch to make treaties and control foreign policy. 91 Article I, Sec-
tion 8 reserves to Congress the authority to regulate foreign and domestic
commerce and foreign affairs. Article II, Section 2 reserves to the Presi-
dent the power to make treaties. Finally, Article VI is the Supremacy
Clause.
That the supremacy of national power in the general field of foreign
affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and depor-
tation is made clear .... When the national government by treaty or
statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, privi-
leges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is
the supreme law of the land .... One of the most important and deli-
cate of all international relationships, recognized immemorially as a
responsibility of government, has to do with the protection of the just
rights of a country's own nationals when those nationals are in an-
other country . . . This country, like other nations, has entered into
numerous treaties of amity and commerce since its inception-
treaties entered into under express constitutional authority, and bind-
ing upon the states as well as the nation. Among those treaties have
been many which not only promised and guaranteed broad rights and
privileges to aliens sojourning in our own territory, but secured recip-
rocal promises and guarantees for our own citizens while in other
N.Y. PACKET, Jan. 22, 1788 [hereinafter Madison, Federalist No. 42], available at
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed42.htm; Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80,
The Powers of the Judiciary, MCLEANS, available at http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalist
papers/fed80.htm.
86. Madison, Federalist No. 42, supra note 85.
87. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
88. Hines, 312 U.S. at 56.
89. Id.
90. See id
91. See id. at 63-81.
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lands. And apart from treaty obligations, there has grown up in the
field of international relations a body of customs defining with more
or less certainty the duties owing by all nations to alien residents-
duties which our State Department has successfully insisted foreign
nations must recognize as to our nationals abroad. In general, both
treaties and international practices have been aimed at preventing in-
jurious discriminations against aliens .... Our Constitution and our
Civil Rights Act have guaranteed to aliens "the equal protection of
the laws (which) is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."
92
That immigration is exclusively a national issue has been reaffirmed
repeatedly since Hines. Nonetheless, the argument has continued to be
reasserted that while the ability of states to directly regulate immigration
is proscribed, regulating other areas that only peripherally affect immi-
gration are within the purview of states. Some fuel for the argument can
be found in court opinions at the turn of the twentieth century which ap-
proved discrimination between aliens and citizens. Justice Cardozo once
wrote:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary dis-
crimination, for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the re-
sources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of
the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimination may be. It is
not for that reason unlawful .... The state in determining what use
shall be made of its own moneys, may legitimately consult the wel-
fare of its own citizens rather than that of aliens. Whatever is a privi-
lege rather than a right, may be dependent upon citizenship. In its
war against poverty, the state is not required to dedicate its own re-
sources to citizens and aliens alike.
93
This doctrine was referred to as the "special public-interest doctrine."
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,94 however, cast doubt on
the "special public-interest doctrine" when that case examined such dis-
criminatory legislation under the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 5
Takahashi was a fisherman and a legal resident of the United States.96
California tried to limit fishing within it coastal waters to U.S. citizens.9 7
The court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "all persons
lawfully in the country shall abide in any state on an equality of legal
privileges with all citizens under non discriminatory laws.",98 Following
the same reasoning, the Court in Graham v. Richardson99 reviewed a
92. Id. at 62-69 (footnotes omitted).
93. People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 428-30 (N.Y. 1915).
94. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
95. See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 417-20.
96. Id. at 412.
97. Id. at 412-14.
98. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
99. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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Pennsylvania statute that restricted welfare benefits to citizens to the
exclusion of lawful permanent residents and an Arizona statute that re-
stricted such benefits to citizens and lawful permanent residents who had
resided in the state for a minimum of fifteen years. 100 The Court af-
firmed that the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment could not tolerate that sort of discrimination.
10 1
In 1940, Congress enacted the Smith Act, an alien and sedition act
making it unlawful to advocate violent overthrow of the government.1
0 2
Anti-communist hysteria was building at that point in time. Forty-two
states also enacted alien and sedition acts. 10 3 Some closely mirrored the
federal act and provided many protections against arbitrary enforcement
while others were quite the opposite. The Supreme Court held, in look-
ing at a Pennsylvania Alien and Sedition Act, that advocating the violent
overthrow of government is by its nature a matter of national concern
because it affects everybody in the country, not just those in a single
state. 104 Legislation regulating such conduct is necessarily a matter of
national concern and preempts the field. 0 5 However, the Court also said
that state legislation is not necessarily precluded in a field where state
regulation is usually accepted just because it touches upon an area pre-
empted by national interests. 0 6  The Court set out tests to determine
whether or not an area is preempted by federal law. 0 7 Preemption oc-
curs where: (1) the federal scheme of regulation is so pervasive that one
can reasonably conclude that Congress intended to occupy the field and
there is no way for the states to supplement it; (2) where the subject is so
dominated by federal interest that one must assume there is no room for
state laws on the same subject; or (3) the enforcement of a state act pre-
sents a serious danger of conflict between the state and the federal ad-
ministration of a program. 0 8 The notion that conflict between the ad-
ministration of state and federal laws can raise the issue of preemption
has evolved further. It is possible that the two laws may be actually con-
flicting.10 9 It can occur where it is virtually impossible to comply with
both statutes at the same time. In Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. de la
Cuesta, 11 there was conflict between state and federal regulations prom-ulgated in addition to the statutes themselves."' The Court held that
100. Graham, 403 U.S. at 367-68.
101. See id. at 382.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006).
103. CHARLES CORKER, THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF
COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 266-306 (1955).
104. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956) (citing Commonwealth v. Nelson, 104
A.2d 133, 142 (Pa. 1954)).
105. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 504-05.
106. See id. at 500.
107. See id. at 501-02.
108. Id. at 504-05.
109. See Rose v. Ark. State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (per curium).
110. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
111. Id. at 154-55.
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state regulations that conflict with federally promulgated rules require
the same preemption proscription as do conflicts between state and fed-
eral statutes." 2 Finally, preemption may be found where a state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of all of the purposes of
federal law.113
One case that dealt with the issue of whether a state can prohibit an
employer from knowingly employing aliens not entitled to lawful resi-
dence in the United States is DeCanas v. Bica.l" 4 In DeCanas, the Court
upheld the state regulation." 5 Justice Brennan commented that while
regulation of immigration is exclusively a federal power:
[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any
way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se
pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.
... [S]tanding alone, the fact that aliens are subject of a state statute
does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a
determination of who should or should not be admitted to the coun-
try, and the conditions under a legal entrant may remain.16
Justice Brennan goes on to say that there is no indication in the INA that
Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching
on aliens in general or the employment of illegal aliens in particular.
Nor can such intent be derived from the scope and detail of the INA.
The central concern of the INA is with the terms and conditions of
admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens law-
fully in the country. The comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for
regulation of immigration and naturalization, without more, cannot
be said to draw in the employment of illegal aliens as "plainly within
... (that) central aim of federal regulation." This conclusion is but-
tressed by the fact that comprehensiveness of legislation governing
entry and stay of aliens was to be expected in light of the nature and
complexity of the subject. As the Court said in another legislative
context: "Given the complexity of the matter addressed by Congress
.... ,a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appropriate,
completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive intent,"
117
It is questionable whether this part of Justice Brennan's opinion in
DeCanas is still good law. Because, in 1986, Congress created prohibi-
tions against employment of undocumented migrants and attached severe
112. See id. at 153-54.
113. See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31(1996); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,66
(1941).
114. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
115. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 365.
116. Id, at 355.
117. Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
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penalties against employers for doing so," 8 it is quite likely that if this
same challenge of this state statute were made today, the result might be
very different. Additionally, it would be surprising in view of the exten-
sive body of law (including statutory, regulatory, and case law) that now
exists defining who is removable from the United States. To do so
would ignore that vast body of law that has developed over the past cen-
tury. The rights given such persons, and the conditions of their removal,
that anyone could make a credible argument that the central concern of
the INA is limited to identifying the terms and conditions for the admis-
sion of only "lawful" immigrants to the United States while ignoring that
vast body of law concerning the removal of removable aliens. 19
In a related case not regarding immigration, Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,120 Justice Stevens succinctly restated the requirements of the
Supremacy Clause:
Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause "start[s]
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." Accordingly, '[t]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis."
Congress' intent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." In the absence of an
express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actu-
ally conflicts with federal law, or iffederal law so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field "'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it."""
Justice Stevens did not cite DeCanas among his citations supporting
his opinion in 1992 nor did he discuss that case. The opinion appears to
be a blend of precedent requiring that, for preemption to be found, Con-
gress must have clearly stated its intent to occupy the field and precedent
allowing consideration of the other criteria. Preemption will not just be
assumed because the regulations in the field are complex. An analysis of
the cases considering whether or not federal legislation preempts a par-
ticular state or local enactment reveals that courts take a methodical ap-
proach to analyzing the facts and applying these several tests.
122
Though the preambles to state and local legislation justifying the
enactment of such legislation are usually formulistic recitations framed
in terms of public health and safety, 123 the true purpose behind so much
118. See Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
119. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001).
120. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
121. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
122. See Nelson, 350 U.S. at 502-10.
123. See S. 2, Stats. 1993-94, 1st Ex. Sess., at c. 17 (Ca. 1999).
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local legislation is simply to drive undocumented migrants somewhere,
anywhere else, so long as it is not within the boundaries of the locality
enacting the legislation. This is an issue that needs to be visited. No one
knows, because no one has tried to track them, where undocumented
migrants go when faced with this kind of restrictive legislation. Logi-
cally, it is to anywhere that the legal and social climate is better. The
intent of those passing the legislation is that the undocumented will be
driven to their home countries. That intention, however, defies logic.
No one argues that the reason most migrants leave their homes to travel
to the United States, often at great personal risk and sacrifice, is because
they cannot provide for themselves and their families at home. Why
then, would anybody seriously think they would return to such a place?
How bad would the social and legal climate in the United States have to
become to reverse that migration?
In the 1930's, dust bowl days, large numbers of people made desti-
tute by prolonged drought left their farms on the Midwestern prairies for
California. Californians soon developed the same enmity towards those
migrants that they have toward Mexican migrants today. The state
passed a statute, 124 which provided: "Every person, firm or corporation,
or officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State
any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him to be
an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.9
1 25
In Edwards v. California,126 a man named Edwards went to Texas to
get his brother-in-law, Frank Duncan, to take him to California. Duncan
had only twenty dollars to his name in Texas. 127 By the time the two
reached California, he had spent it. 128 Upon reaching California, Duncan
lived with Edwards for ten days while he, Duncan, applied for public
assistance from the Farm Security Administration. 129 Duncan was un-
employed during the ten days that he lived with Edwards. 130 Edwards
was charged, convicted, and sentenced to six months in jail for violating
the statute.131
The constitutionality of the California statute was attacked under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution at Article I, Section 8.132
Justice Byers' opinion is instructive:
124. CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 2615 Stat. 1937, 1406 (1941), invalidated by Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 166 (1941).
125. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 165-66.
126. Id. at 160.




131. Id. at 165-66.
132. Id.
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The grave and perplexing social and economic dislocation which this
statute reflects is a matter of common knowledge and concern ....
We appreciate that the spectacle of large segments of our population
constantly on the move has given rise to urgent demands upon the in-
genuity of government .... The State asserts that the huge influx of
migrants into California in recent years has resulted in problems of
health, morals, and especially finance, the proportions of which are
staggering. It is not for us to say this is not true. We have repeatedly
and recently affirmed, and we now reaffirm, that we do not conceive
it our function to pass upon the "wisdom, need or appropriateness" of
the legislative efforts of States to solve such difficulties.
But this does not mean that there are no boundaries to the permissible
area of State legislative activity .... And none is more certain than
the prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to iso-
late itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the
transportation of persons and property across its borders. It is fre-
quently the case that a state might gain a momentary respite from the
pressure of events by the expedient of shutting its gates to the outside
world. But in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "The Constitution
was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less paro-
chial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division."
33
It makes no sense that cities or states should be able to export those
it considers to be an undesirable burden-whether they be the homeless
or the disadvantaged or undocumented migrants or anyone else consid-
ered undesirable-from their boundaries and unto the backs of their
neighbors. Whether a city or state attempts to isolate itself by excluding
imports of "problem" people into its boundaries or by exporting them out
of its boundaries, the evil of the resulting mischief is the same.
After viewing the histories of these cases, one is forced to conclude
that there really is nothing new or different in the facts or in the discus-
sion of the current concerns about undocumented migrants. It is true that
in most of the cases discussed, the people involved in the facts giving
rise to the controversies were U.S. citizens. In only one, DeCanas, were
the subjects of the local legislation undocumented migrants. Does the
fact that the laws are directed against the undocumented and not against
citizens or legally-present immigrants matter? In DeCanas, which dealt
with a California employment statute that punished employers for em-
ploying undocumented laborers, that issue was not raised. The Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution, however, provides that no state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property or deny to any per-
son equal protection of the law.' 34 Justice Stone's language in Hines v.
133. Id. at 166-67 (citation omitted).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Davidowitz signals the answer to our question. It is of importance, he
says, "that this [kind of] legislation deals with the rights, liberties, and
personal freedoms of human beings, and is in an entirely different cate-
gory from state tax statutes or ... laws regulating the labels on cans."'
' 35
Finally, it is often stated that as a nation we must tend to our cul-
tural heritage. It is a popular argument, often made in legislative cham-
bers from city councils and in the halls of Congress, and it even currently
goes unchallenged in the popular media. But, it is important to note that
this is not a new argument either. From Cooley Taxes, to the Chinese
Exclusion Act, to signs that said, "No dogs or Irish allowed," to Jim
Crow laws that segregated everything from drinking fountains to bath-
rooms and put Black people on the back of the bus, the argument has
been the same. (Black Americans are not usually mentioned in a discus-
sion about immigrants. However, it must be remembered that African
slaves were an immigrant population that was forcefully brought to our
shores and not allowed to assimilate into mainstream society. The story
of Jim Crow laws and the civil rights movement is just another chapter,
perhaps the most troubling one, in our very troubled immigration his-
tory.) The only thing that has changed over time is the identity of the
people at whom public ire is directed. The argument that "we must tend
to our cultural heritage" assumes some innate superiority of the culture
founded in the British Isles. It assumes, too, that the culture is so fragile
that it cannot absorb, adapt, and survive the pressures brought by expo-
sure to new cultures. It profoundly distrusts the lessons taught by two-
hundred years of our history and the genius of the American melting pot.
The argument is repugnant to the very concept upon which the nation
was built, that all persons are created equal under law and that, as the
Fourteenth Amendment states, not just citizens, but all persons are enti-
tled to equal protection of the law, which as Justice Stone said in Hines,
means the protection of equal law. It is clearly in the national interest
that local laws enacted in deference to that kind of public sentiment be
preempted, even if Congress has not occupied the field by enactments of
its own statute. Though, it must also be said that at this point in time it is
hard to imagine any field in which Congress has not legislated that would
affect immigrant and migrant populations.
CONCLUSION
It has been facetiously said that nothing is ever really new. In the
discussion of immigration, certainly, that statement is true. Contrary to
the myth we have constructed (and like to believe about ourselves) that
we are a welcoming nation, the truth is that the country has a very long,
uneasy history regarding its immigrants that goes back to the very first
immigration law passed by Congress in 1790 restricting immigration to
135. Hines, 312 U.S. at 68.
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free, white males. 136 The parochialism that pervaded public feeling about
the subject in the new states even before the Constitution was written
was discussed with concern by the founding fathers. As can be seen by
examining the facts of Supreme Court cases dealing with this subject
throughout our history, the arguments for isolating and resisting the in-
flux of new groups of people recycle each time another group immigrates
and seeks acceptance into the culture.
While these attitudes have been unchanging throughout our history,
another phenomenon is now afoot. It is indisputable that our native-born
population is now aging and its birth rate declining at the same time that
the world is becoming global, scientifically, technologically, and eco-
nomically. Our ability to compete with nations who have talent pools
many times the size of our own, India and China for example, depends
upon our ability to draw talent from other places in the world. That, in
turn, depends not only upon the educational and professional opportunity
we can offer but upon a well thought out immigration policy giving ac-
cess to what the nation can offer.
At the same time, maintaining a viable economic infrastructure re-
quires that we meet labor needs in the unskilled labor market since it
provides a critical part of the whole without which the rest cannot func-
tion. All reliable data indicates that not only is our native-born birth rate
declining while the demand for unskilled labor is expanding, but addi-
tionally, we train our children to aspire to a better professional and social
status than an unskilled labor market can give them.
137
The nexus of these trends makes absolutely clear the direction that
must be taken. This thesis has tried to point out that the debate about
immigration is not rational. At the state and local level it cannot realisti-
cally be expected to be rational. One cannot expect local officials deal-
ing with local issues and pressures to adopt national or global perspec-
tives in solving problems. That is not their job. They are, after all, local
officials, not Congresspersons. Those facts, of themselves, make the
most compelling argument that immigration is and must be a national
issue. But, it does not stop even there. The age of instant and global
communication in an integrated world places unprecedented demands on
diplomacy. It is impossible to offer friendship and good will to a people
abroad while treating them as unwanted at home. Justice Stone's com-
ments in Hines v. Davidowitz are more true today than they were even
when he wrote them.
136. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790), repealed by United States
Naturalization Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414 (1795).
137. See CBO, LABOR MARKET, supra note 73, at 3 tbl. 1, 6 tbl.2.
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It is argued that the main causes of the current wave of Mexican
immigration to the United States are rooted in the rapid economic devel-
opment of Mexico itself Development is causing the mass displacement
of rural workers. Also, key financial markets in Mexico are incomplete.
In the past, the combination of these forces promoted a "circular" pat-
tern of immigration in which workers remitted a large proportion of U.S.
earnings to Mexico, e.g., as means to smooth household consumption as
well as to acquire assets such as houses, higher educations, and other
consumer durables. Due to increased border enforcement, workers may
now be staying longer. However, these underlying forces connected with
Mexican economic development, which impels the current wave of immi-
gration, remain in place.
In turn, in the U.S. economy as a whole, the consequences of immi-
gration are small and diffuse. However, the distributional effects are not
negligible. The fiscal burdens associated with immigration tend to be
highly uneven across U.S. cities and states. Also, low-skill labor markets
may have been adversely impacted. Since immigration policy is a federal
responsibility under the U.S. Constitution, a case can be made that the
federal policy ought to redress these economic losses. It is argued, how-
ever, that efforts to expel undocumented workers are likely to be self-
defeating, because in Mexico such immigration to the United States pro-
vides an important source of developmentfinance.
INTRODUCTION
American economic history is, in part, a history of waves of immi-
gration. In the early nineteenth century, the United States experienced a
wave of immigration from Western Europe. Prior to the Civil War, the
country also allowed forced immigration due to slavery. In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, a second wave of immigration oc-
curred, this time primarily from Eastern Europe and Asia. Still later,
from the 1940s through the 1960s, a mass internal migration occurred, as
large numbers of rural Southerners migrated, due to the decline of the
sharecropping system, to the industrial cities of the North. The current
wave of immigration, primarily from Latin America and Asia, is histori-
t Assistant Professor, Economics Department, the University of Denver.
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cally unique, but so too were these earlier waves. The evolution of the
American labor force has, from the beginning, been heavily influenced
by such episodes, each one unique in its particulars.
These major waves of immigration, particularly from the second
wave of European immigration on, have tended to generate ethnic ten-
sions. Thus, in addition to referring to the movement of people from one
region to another, the term "immigration" stands as a morally charged
category of thought. Immigration policy deals with the boundaries, both
physical and cultural, between others and us. As such, immigration pol-
icy stands as a focal point of hopes and fears and as an important symbol,
which says something about the kind of society that we want to have.
Morally charged categories of thought are institutional in the spe-
cific sense that they involve the possibility of instituting (or realizing)
ideals, i.e., normative views regarding how things ought to be. On this
account, institutions possess causal potentiality in the actual run of
events. Public policies, for example, shape the course of events in ways
that are both intended and unintended.
Economists, no less than other people, maintain moral sentiments
regarding such normative questions. These sentiments may be con-
sciously acknowledged or they may be repressed. In any case, they un-
avoidably influence the questions asked and the perspectives taken.
However, the economist, qua social scientist, has no special compe-
tence in pronouncing upon moral questions. That is, the economist is
little if any more competent than others when it comes to determining
how things ought to be. For instance, should undocumented workers be
accorded full or partial rights of U.S. citizenship? At what point is it
right, and before what point is it wrong, for immigrants to be allowed to
make claims on public assistance? This latter is a question of just deserts,
i.e., it is essentially a moral question.
Restrictionists have one perspective on what is right and what is
wrong. Immigrant rights activists have another. How is the economist,
qua social scientist, to determine which side really is right? As suggested
above, in consulting or promoting his or her own moral sentiments, the
economist offers no special competence in distinction from his or her
fellow citizens (whether or not, or under what circumstances, those fel-
low citizens are willing to grant the economist a special license to pro-
nounce on moral questions is another matter). Without lapsing into homi-
letics at precisely the juncture when social science can least afford it,
how should the economist, qua social scientist, proceed where such mor-
ally charged institutional phenomena, such as immigration policies, are
concerned?
In principle, it is possible for the economist to take prevailing moral
sentiments, e.g., those of restrictionists and of immigrant rights activists
among others, as given phenomena. Such institutional phenomena then
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can be approached from the standpoint of cause and effect, e.g., on the
view that institutions interact, in a cumulative causal sequence, with the
flow of events.' In this way, the economist, reasoning in terms of actual
and potential causal sequence, can approach institutional phenomena
from a scientific standpoint, which is conflated little, if at all, with homi-
letics. The scientific method, on this account, is characterized by reason-
ing in terms of cause and effect, where widely held moral sentiments,
among other institutions, are both causes and consequences (whether
actual or potential) of the ongoing sequence of events.2
This methodological outlook structures the following discussion of
the economics of Mexican immigration to the United States. The analysis
is not intended as a moral theory that pronounces on what ultimately is
right or wrong in the domain of U.S. immigration policy. However, be-
ing an inquiry into causes and consequences, the discussion is intended
to be useful for policy analysis.
I. THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON LIKELY CAUSES OF MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
Mexico is a rapidly developing country with over a trillion-dollar
economy and per capita annual income (in 2004) that, at $10,100, 3 is
close behind nations such as Russia, whose per capita income is
$12, 100.4 In the wake of its rapid economic development, its fertility
rate has dropped dramatically, from 6.8 children per woman in 1970, to
2.2 children per woman in 2004.5 Between 1994 and 2004 its Gross
6Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent.
Among the thirty Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment member countries, Mexico's growth rate during this time period
1. See GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: AGENCY,
STRUCTURE AND DARWINISM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONALISM 140-41 (2004).
2. Causation cannot be observed directly. What we are capable of observing are event
sequences. Correlation, of course, is not causation. If x and y are causally related, it could be that x
causes y; that y causes x; that x and y are mutually causal; or that x and y are mutually caused by
some third causal force, z. Further, as econometricians and statisticians emphasize, the causal link-
age between x and y could involve complex temporal lags and could be conditional upon a whole
complex of causal conditions, any one of which, if overlooked, could conceal the true correlation of
x and y. Rarely, if ever, are we able to conduct definitive empirical tests "proving" causation.
Nevertheless, a mark of scientific as distinct from homiletic argument is the organization of analyses
in terms of causal sequence.
3. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD IN FIGURES -
2005 EDITION, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (2005), available at
http://ocde.p4.siteintemet.com/publications/doifiles/01 2005061T004.xls.
4. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: RUSSIA (2007),
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html.
5. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD FACTBOOK
2007: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS (2007), available at
http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/30200701 lpltOO-3.xls.
6. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD IN FIGURES -
2005 EDITION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PERFORMANCE (2005), available at
http://ocde.p4.siteintemet.com/publications/doifiles/012005061T005.xls.
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exceeded that of eleven other countries, including many developed coun-
tries such as France, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and others.7
Rapid economic development tends to generate a complex set of
consequences. First, the development of modem markets tends to raise
living standards generally, but it may also result in the displacement of
workers. Displacement then may be a key reason for immigration,
whether temporarily or permanently, to high-wage regions such as the
United States.
Second, as a nation develops rapidly, some key institutions, such as
markets for capital, mortgages, consumer credit, and insurance may re-
main imperfect and incomplete. For instance, in the absence of well-
developed markets for consumer and mortgage credit, immigration of
workers from more prosperous families (i.e., individuals who have not
been displaced from poor rural areas using traditional methods of pro-
duction) may emerge as an important means of financing acquisitions of
big ticket items, such as automobiles, higher educations, houses, and self
insurance (i.e., accumulated precautionary savings balances).
Third, while rapid economic development may generate significant
dislocation, the rise of generous systems of public support for the poor
tends to lag behind, appearing more commonly among relatively rich,
developed nations. In this context, some observers have suggested that
access to relatively generous social services in the United States may
provide an incentive for some individuals and families to immigrate. I
will discuss each of these putative causes in turn.
A. Displaced Workers
A common perception among Americans is that Mexico is an un-
derdeveloped or "third world" nation. This perception is simply wrong.
As noted just above, Mexico is an industrialized and rapidly developing
nation, with one of the largest urban regions in the world, namely Mex-
ico City.
Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico undoubt-
edly are an important causal factor in Mexican immigration. GDP per
capita in the United States is four times that of Mexico, 8 and, given the
greater income inequality and macroeconomic instability in Mexico, for
many low-skill workers the average income differential realized by im-
migrating to the United States may well be greater than four times.
7. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD IN FIGURES -
2005 EDITION, GDP GROWTH (2005), available at http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/
doifiles/012005061 G001 .xs.
8. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD IN FIGURES -
2005 EDITION, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, supra note 3.
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However, the significance of wage differentials is best grasped not
as phenomena strictly of resource allocation but rather as phenomena
connected with economic development and change. Douglas Massey
explains the matter this way:
[I]nternational migrants [e.g., to the U.S.] do not originate in the
world's poorest nations, but in those that are developing and growing
dynamically. Very few transcontinental migrants originate in Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, even though it is generally the poorest
region of the world. Given their poverty, most Africans lack the
means to finance international migration. Rather, today's global mi-
grants are much more likely to come from the rapidly developing and
relatively wealthy economies of Asia and Latin America than from
the marginalized regions of Africa. Because it is the structural trans-
formation accompanying development and the creation of markets
that promotes international migration, and not poverty per se, there is
no empirical relationship between per capita income and rate of emi-
gration. It is the initiation of economic development under market
mechanisms that causes mass migration to occur, not its absence.
9
In the case of Mexican immigration to the United States, wage dif-
ferentials then are only part of the picture. Historically, industrialization
and other structural changes in economies have resulted not only in ris-
ing productivity and standards of living, but also in the dislocation of
workers using traditional production methods, especially agriculture. 10
Evidence suggests that the dislocation of small-scale maize farmers,
exacerbated by the implementation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), may be a significant causal force behind Mexican
immigration to the United States:
The Mexican government unilaterally waived most of the import re-
strictions built into NAFTA's 15-year transition to full liberalization
in maize trade and failed to avail itself of other opportunities to pro-
tect or promote small-scale maize farming. As a result, corn imports
from the United States increased three-fold after NAFTA, prices
dropped by nearly half, and 2.5-3 million poor farmers in Mexico
have found themselves under increasing economic pressure ....
[Also] while the United States increased its support for agriculture -
roughly doubling its commodity support budget - Mexico's farm
programs declined dramatically ....
The socio-economic impact on rural Mexico has been dramatic ....
An estimated 1.5 million Mexican farmers have left farming since
9. Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions Underly-
ing U.S. Border-Enforcement Policy, 4 IMMIGR. POL'Y IN Focus 1, 4 (2005), available at
http://www.ailf.org/ipa/infocus/2005_fivemyths.pdf..
10. Douglas S. Massey & Kristin E. Espinosa, What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A
Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Analysis, 102 AM. J. OF Soc. 939, 969 (1997); Massey, supra note
9, at 3-4.
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NAFTA took effect in 1994, but the rural sector in general, and the
maize sector in particular, remain large and economically important.
Rural poverty remains intractable, and rural migration rates have
soared .... 11
The connection, suggested here, between Mexican immigration and
structural change in the Mexican economy is supported by remittance
data.12 One study found that "9 percent of men and 12 percent of women
residing in rural areas live in a remittance-receiving household relative to
3 percent and 4 percent of male and female urban dwellers, respec-
tively."' 13 Of course, remittances to both rural and urban areas could be
used either for consumption smoothing or for asset accumulation. How-
ever, as I discuss below, it seems likely that immigration due to dis-
placement is motivated by the need to maintain consumption levels and
possibly to self insure by accumulating precautionary savings balances.
It is interesting to note that American economic history itself offers
a recent example that illustrates the kind of displacement process de-
scribed here. During the 1950s, nearly 1.5 million African Americans
migrated from the rural South to the industrial cities of the North. 14 This
migration was initiated by the decline of the sharecropping system,
which had emerged after the Civil War. By the mid-twentieth century,
the mechanization of agriculture resulted in the decline of key commod-
ity prices. These declining agricultural prices facilitated the expansion of
the national market. However, they also hastened the decline of the
sharecropping system, resulting in the dislocation of Southern agricul-
tural workers. In effect, this dislocation was part and parcel of the expan-
sion of the market system.
In retrospect, however, it is now widely believed that the relative
decline of manufacturing in the United States began during this same
period, the 1950s, even as this South to North migration gained momen-
tum. From the 1950s onward (at least to the 1980s), the older manufac-
turing-based cities of the North began loosing jobs in manufacturing and,
over time, began gaining jobs in service, financial, and professional oc-
cupations.
These conjoint processes, i.e., the dislocation of Southern agricul-
tural workers together with the relative decline of the manufacturing sec-
tor, appear to have contributed to extremely high rates of unemployment
among African Americans. For instance, in the 1940s the unemployment
11. Timothy A. Wise, Policy Space for Mexican Maize: Protecting Agro-Biodiversity by
Promoting Rural Livelihoods 2 (Global Dev. and Envtl. Inst., Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007),
available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/07-01 MexicanMaize.pdf
12. See discussion infra Part II.E.
13. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Susan Pozo, Migration, Remittances, and Male and Female
Employment Patterns, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 222, 223 (2006).
14. BENJAMIN KLEINBERG, URBAN AMERICA IN TRANSFORMATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
URBAN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT 150 (1995).
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rate among blacks was about twenty percent higher than among whites.
By the mid-1950s, it was over 70 percent higher, and by the mid-1960s,
it was double.
15
This example drawn from American economic history exhibits
some important similarities with the current wave of Mexican immigra-
tion to the United States, notwithstanding the obvious differences in-
volved. Such mass migrations are associated, albeit in complex ways,
with industrialization and urban development. Mass migrations are
sometimes hastened by the worsening obsolescence of traditional tech-
niques of production, such as in agriculture. With the advance of indus-
trialization and the expansion of national and international markets, tradi-
tional techniques become increasingly maladapted and unable to survive
in the new competitive environment, e.g., in the face of intense competi-
tion on the basis of price.
The displacement of traditional workers ensues, of course, because
such workers, who formerly used traditional methods of production, are
unable to equip themselves with the newer, more modem industrial im-
plements. That is, the conditions of poverty and low levels of education
characteristic of traditional production systems do not tend to position
dislocated workers for easy transitions into the emerging industrial sys-
tem. Hence their dislocation rather than their assimilation as self em-
ployed entrepreneurs or as employees of industrial concerns.
Dislocated workers, particularly those with some access to means of
transportation, are relatively footloose. In this context, income differen-
tials between regions take on their full significance. As Massey points
out, immigration to the United States from the most underdeveloped
countries, i.e., from which the greatest income differentials exist, are
relatively miniscule, whereas immigration from Latin American and
Asian countries, which are rapidly developing, constitutes the bulk of
recent immigration to the United States. 16 This means that the correlation
between income differentials and immigration is a poor explanatory pre-
dictor. The causal significance of income differentials must be consid-
ered in conjunction with the complex dynamics of economic develop-
ment.
A second point illustrated by this example is that dislocated rural
workers may or may not have reliable information or sophisticated meth-
ods of calculating the payoffs associated with the prospects among which
they have to choose. Dislocated rural Southerners migrated North at a
time when manufacturing was beginning to decline. Had the ensuing
decline in manufacturing been foreseen by the migrant workers, they
would have had little or no incentive to migrate to the North. However,
15. Id.
16. Massey, supra note 9, at 4.
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such structural changes are unforeseeable, and, at any rate, word-of-
mouth information, which is available to dislocated rural workers, is
likely to be imperfect to begin with. That is, the information that dislo-
cated rural workers possess regarding labor and housing market condi-
tions in geographically distant locations is likely to be fairly imperfect.
The role of social networks and the "beaten path" effect are impor-
tant causal explanations here, i.e., where the ability to engage in rational
calculation of net benefits is tenuous. Like everyone else, displaced rural
workers are likely to consider what other similarly placed persons are
doing or have done in the recent past. That is, if others are known to have
prospered by migrating to a particular destination, that solution to the
problem of dislocation is likely to be emulated by others. Once a beaten
path is established and reinforced by the growth of a social network in
the new location, the process of migration becomes somewhat self-
reinforcing, even if positive net benefits in the new location are some-
what uncertain. Contacts in the new location may help the migrant to
find housing and employment among other things. Sociologists refer to
such communities as "ethnic enclaves." Beyond this, some cities and
states have emerged as "gateway" locations or points of entry, where a
disproportionate number of migrants tend to settle.17
B. Incomplete Financial Markets
Standard explanations of immigration in terms of factor price
equalization do not easily account for the phenomenon of return migra-
tion.18 When workers migrate to the United States due to wage differen-
tials, if they return to their countries of origin before the wage differen-
tial disappears (or before a reverse differential appears), then standard
economic theory, based on the presumed tendency towards factor price
equalization, would suggest that the initial attempt at immigration failed.
That is, the immigrant worker failed to secure employment in the receiv-
17. Gordon H. Hanson, Why Does Immigration Divide America? Public Finance and Politi-
cal Opposition to Open Borders, 2005 INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 1, 8 (2005).
18. The factor price equalization theorem is a key result of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which
is a standard model from the field of international trade theory. In a nutshell, the idea is that if the
same technology is available in two countries, as they move towards free trade with each other,
output prices will equalize and this will bring about the equalization of factor prices, such as wages
to labor and returns to capital. This result assumes that the two economies are competitive. Under
the assumptions of competition, each resource is paid its marginal product. The productivity of a
resource, such as labor, depends upon the amounts of other resources used relative to it. For exam-
ple, the wage to labor, which equals its marginal product, depends upon the amount of capital em-
ployed relative to the amount of labor (expressed as the capital-to-labor ratio). If the wage is high in
one geographic region and low in another, then labor will migrate from the low wage to the high
wage region. This reduces the supply of labor in the former and increases it in the latter. The mar-
ginal productivity of labor then rises in the low wage region (thereby raising its wage), whereas the
marginal productivity falls in the high wage region (thereby lowering its wage). In the absence of
significant relocation costs, the migration process will continue (according to this model) until factor
prices, such as wages to labor, are equalized across the trading regions. A similar argument applies
to capital migration. Moreover, the factor price equalization theorem implies that factor price differ-
entials are the main determinants of migration patterns.
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ing country. Return migration, which is not a "failure" in this sense, then
appears as something of an empirical anomaly vis-A-vis standard migra-
tion theory.' 9
In contrast, as discussed above, more recent causal theory postulates
that workers sometimes migrate temporarily in order to cope with eco-
nomic problems faced by their family members who remain in the coun-
try of origin.20 This theory predicts that such immigrant workers will
remit a high proportion of their earnings during their period of immigra-
tion and then return to the country of origin in order to reunite with their
families. As noted above, so doing might help some families cope with
an episode of displacement, especially when the region from which the
immigrant comes is experiencing a high rate of unemployment.
Some theorists have identified a second reason for temporary immi-
gration. Due to incomplete markets for capital, consumer credit, mort-
gage credit, and insurance, some workers who are not necessarily dis-
placed might temporarily immigrate to the United States as a means of
accumulating assets, such as business equipment, consumer durable
goods, higher educations, housing, and self insurance.2' In contrast, such
saving would not be necessary, or at least not to the same extent, if more
complete financial markets existed in rapidly developing countries such
as Mexico. 2
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the majority of Mexican
immigration to the United States is, or at least was, roughly "circular."
That is, evidence suggests that, for undocumented workers, the probabil-
ity of return migration to Mexico has been about one in three. This sug-
gests that about 70 percent of immigrants entering the United States in
any given year have returned to Mexico within five years.2 3 This finding
may or may not continue to hold true, however, since increased border
enforcement has made it more difficult to get back into the States follow-
ing a return trip home. Workers who would prefer to maintain a circular
pattern may now stay and/or bring their families in order to avoid getting
shut out.
At any rate, as I discuss below, remittances to Mexico, now around
$20 billion, 24 are one of its largest sources of foreign exchange and are a
19. Massey, supra note 9, at 7-8.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Cynthia Bansak & Susan Pozo, On the Remitting Patterns of
Immigrants: Evidence from Mexican Survey Data, 90 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON.
REv. 37, 39 (2005).
22. See Massey, supra note 9, at 10.
23. Id. at9.
24. CONG. BUDGET OFF., CONG. OF THE U.S., REMITTANCES: INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS BY
MIGRANTS 2-4 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/63xx/doc6366/05-19-
Remittances.pdf; Alfredo Corchado, Payments to Mexico Skyrocket Emigrants' Remittances Tripled
in 5 years: Rate Troubles Analysts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2005, at 22A.
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major source of development finance. Given the size and rapid growth
of remittances to Mexico, it seems likely that circular migration is used,
in part at least, as a means to finance acquisition of assets.
In support of this hypothesis, one study found that among undocu-
mented workers, the probability of owning a home in Mexico that was
purchased with U.S. earnings rises dramatically as a worker's cumulative
work experience in the U.S. increases to ten years or more. The likeli-
hood for workers with one year or less cumulative work experience in
the United States was 6.3 percent, whereas for those with ten years or
more cumulative experience it was 63.3 percent, a tenfold increase!
26
This finding, together with what is known about circular migration,
suggests that undocumented work in the United States is a means of fi-
nancing, among other things, home purchases in Mexico. It seems highly
likely, of course, that some immigrants finance other consumer durable
purchases, such as automobiles and higher educations, this way as well.
Thus, as I discuss below, such purchases involve investments in material
and human capital, which contribute importantly to economic develop-
ment in Mexico and, of course, help to bridge the development gap be-
tween the United States and Mexico.
C. Access to Public Benefits in the United States
Another common opinion among Americans is the belief that the
United States is a "welfare magnet," which attracts immigrants seeking
to acquire access to generous public benefits. The economist Milton
Friedman, who argued for a libertarian position, holds that open immi-
gration would be optimal economically if it were not for the welfare
state. As he puts it, "It's just obvious that you cannot have free immigra-
tion and a welfare state.,
27
Interestingly, there is a liberal version of the same argument. For-
mer Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm argues that:
Social and redistributive programs require borders. It is fine to think
of yourself as a citizen of the world, but we solve most problems in a
national context and therefore we owe a greater moral duty to our fel-
low Americans than we do to non-citizens. Liberals must defend bor-
ders or they will lose all the social programs that they care about! No
social program can survive without geographic limits and defined
beneficiaries.
28
25. Roberto Coronado, Worker's Remittances to Mexico, BUSINESS FRONTIER (2004), avail-
able at http://www.dallasfed.org/researchibusfront/bus040l.html.
26. Massey, supra note 9, at 6.
27. Peter Brimelow, Milton Friedman, Soothsayer, 2 HOOVER DIGEST (1998), available at
http://www.vdare.com/pb/060914_friedman.htm; Hanson, supra note 17, at 64.
28. Richard D. Lamm, Liberals Beware: There is a High Cost to 'Cheap' Labor, DEFEND
COLORADO Now (2007), http://www.defendcoloradonow.org/perspective/art-liberalsbeware.html.
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There is no doubt that immigrants, both legal and illegal, use public
services, which cost taxpayer dollars (including tax dollars paid by im-
migrants themselves). There is some dispute, however, regarding how
the benefits from immigration, called the immigration surplus, stack up
against the costs, called the fiscal burden. Notwithstanding this dispute,
however, there seems to be growing evidence that there is a fiscal burden
and that it is not insignificant.
A subtle but important point should be noted here. This evidence of
fiscal burden, including its increasing trend in recent years, does not es-
tablish the existence of the causal effect that is sometimes referred to as
the "welfare magnet," which putatively draws immigrants to the United
States. That is, use of public services by immigrants does not establish
that the prospect of receiving public services caused their immigration.
According to researchers at the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, "[t]here is no reputable evidence that prospective immi-
grants are drawn to the U.S. because of its public assistance programs. 29
The argument that public services cause immigration suffers from the
same conceptual problem discussed above regarding factor price equali-
zation. The greatest disparities in public services are likely exist between
the very poorest countries and the very richest countries, since the former
can afford few public services, whereas the latter are among the most
generous welfare states. Thus if the latter are hypothesized as "welfare
magnets," then, here again, the greatest flows of immigration would be
predicted to be from the poorest countries to the richest countries. How-
ever, as discussed above, waves of mass migration do not tend to be from
the poorest to the richest countries but rather from the rapidly developing
to the richest countries.
A corollary objection concerns the fact that states vary widely in
terms of the generosity of their social services to the poor. If states were
welfare magnets, then states like Texas, which rank very low, both in
terms of overall generosity of benefits and in terms of accessibility of
benefits to immigrants,3 ° would attract little or no immigration. Yet, as it
is well known, Texas is a major gateway state.
Thus, there is little or no evidence to suggest that the United States
is a "welfare magnet." While that characterization might apply to other
aspects of migration, such as migration of low-income people within the
United States, it does not appear to be a significant motivation underpin-
ning the mass migration of workers from Mexico to the United States.
While immigrants end up using public services, by and large they do not
immigrate in order to do so. Once immigrants (particularly those natural-
29. Immigration-usa.eom, Immigrants and Welfare, http://www.immigration-
usa.com/immigrants and welfare.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
30. Hanson, supra note 17, at 8.
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ized) arrive, they may well have an incentive to apply for public services.
However, that is different from saying that accessing such services is a
major motivation to immigrate in the first place. Moreover the validity of
the claim that the United States is a "welfare magnet" cannot be estab-
lished merely by pointing out that immigrants use public services or even
that they do so disproportionately compared to natives.3 '
II. THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
Existing literature on the effects of Mexican immigration to the
United States tends to focus on distributional effects, such as labor mar-
ket effects and fiscal burdens. Evidence also suggests that political opin-
ions regarding immigration are impacted, albeit in complex ways, by
immigration itself and its consequences. The following sections discuss
these consequences of immigration. I also discuss a relatively neglected
aspect of Mexican immigration, namely its implications for economic
development in Mexico. Mexican immigrants, not unlike others, remit a
high proportion of their U.S. earnings to the country from which they
immigrated, presumably where family members remain.32 It is not widely
recognized, however, that these remittances to Mexico potentially impact
its economic development.
A. Labor Market Consequences of Mexican Immigration
Since the 1990s, Mexico has been the main source country for U.S.
immigration, accounting for over one third of all immigrants.33 Two-
thirds of recent Mexican immigrants have not attained the equivalent of a
high school education.34 Evidence suggests that second generation Mexi-
can immigrants achieve about forty percent higher educational attain-
ment than their parents. 35 However, educational attainment appears to lag
even in the third and later generations.
36
Based on 2003 data, Hanson reports that about one third of all im-
migrants twenty-five years or older have less than a high school educa-
tion, compared with thirteen percent of U.S. workers in the same age
group. Yet immigrants are as likely as natives to have a college degree
(about twenty-seven percent for both groups), and proportionally more
immigrants than natives have advanced degrees. However, immigrants
31. Stated more formally, the fact that immigrants use social services is necessary but not
sufficient to establish the claim that immigrants are motivated, even in part, to immigrate in order to
access those services. The more naive arguments appear to jump from statistics showing immigrants'
disproportionate use of social services to the claim, which does not necessarily follow, that the
United States is a welfare magnet.
32. Hanson, supra note 17, at 67-68.
33. Id. at 25.
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are underrepresented in categories of moderate educational attainment
(i.e., relative to U.S. norms). For instance, sixty percent of natives but
only forty-one percent of immigrants had a high school diploma or some
college. 7
Thus the skill distribution of immigrants, as compared to natives, is
heavily weighted in low-skill and high-skill categories. The current wave
of immigration is changing not only the ethnic but also the skill composi-
tion of the American labor force. Hanson suggests that, compared to ear-
lier European immigration, this change reflects the underlying shift in
immigration to source countries in Asia and Latin America, where edu-
cational attainment generally is much lower than in the United States.3 8
The influx of high skill workers, particularly during the booming
1990s, has been due, in part, to shortages of high skill labor. For exam-
ple, most workers entering the United States with H l B visas work in the
electronic and software industries. 39 In contrast, seventy percent of im-
migrants who lack a high school education end up in low-paying manual
labor positions, e.g., in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing.40
Thus the current wave of immigration to the United States is dis-
proportionately made up of high skill and low skill workers. These skill
profiles do not match those of the average American worker. Particularly
regarding the low-skill segment, where labor surpluses are more common
than labor shortages, economists have tried to measure the effects of im-
migration on labor market outcomes.
Early research on the labor market effects of immigration exploited
the fact that immigrants tend to cluster disproportionately in "gateway"
cities and states.41 That is, one can compare labor market conditions,
such as wages rates within a given skill category, to see if (controlling as
much as possible for other factors) spatial regions with higher propor-
tions of immigrants have, on average, lower wages. Most studies found
little or no effect.
42
More recently, however, these studies have been criticized. 43 If
low-skill native workers are mobile, then any downward pressure on
wages (due to immigration) would be dispersed rather than concentrated
in areas where immigrants tend to settle. That is, any downward pressure
on wages would tend to displace some native workers, who would mi-
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 25.
39. Id. at 20.
40. Id. at 27.
41. George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the
Impact ofImmigration on the Labor Market, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1335, 1337 (2003) (extending a discus-
sion about immigrants clustering to "gateway" cities and states).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1335-36, 1338.
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grate to surrounding regions. This dispersion of native workers would
offset the downward pressure on wages in local areas experiencing high
rates of immigration. In that case, the depressing effect on low-skill
wages would be diffused across multiple regions and would not necessar-
ily result in relatively low wages in gateway regions.
On the basis of this theory, some analysts have argued that the na-
tional labor market is the appropriate unit of analysis. One study, for
example, found that during the twenty years from 1980 to 2000, immi-
gration lowered wages for native high school dropouts by about nine
percent; by three percent for native high school graduates; and by a neg-
ligible amount for natives with some college or with a college degree.
44
Researchers at the National Research Council (NRC) summarize the
labor market effect of immigration this way:
The evidence leads us to conclude that immigration has only a' small
adverse impact on the wage and employment opportunities of com-
peting native-born groups. This effect appears not to be concentrated
in the local areas where immigrants live; much of it is probably dis-
persed across the United States as competing native workers migrate
out of the areas to which immigrants move.45
This analysis suggests, of course, that even if immigration has a
negative effect on low-skill (or other) labor markets, these effects would
not necessarily be seen at the local level, e.g., in cities or states where
immigrants are concentrated.
A similar argument can be made regarding the price level effects of
immigration. That is, if immigrants depress low-skill wages, the related
cost reductions may or may not be captured as higher profits. They might
otherwise be passed on to consumers in the form of lower output prices,
in which case the benefits of lower prices would, with some exceptions,
be dispersed across national or international markets.
In contrast, policy analysts sometimes assume that the low-wage
benefits from immigration accrue to the owners and managers of a small
number of firms, who proceed to fire higher-paid American workers in
order to reap higher profits. However, the extent to which this occurs is
likely to depend upon the degree of direct and indirect competition faced
by firms. That is, firms may face direct competition from other firms in
the same market. Or they may face indirect competition from substitutes.
Competition from substitute commodities may involve close substitutes,
such as competition among differentiated restaurants, or it may involve
more remote substitutes, such as competition between, say, expenditures
44. See id. at 1368; see also Hanson, supra note 17, at 26-27.
45. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 230 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
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on food versus expenditures on clothing, where what is involved is a
general competition for the consumer's dollar. Moreover to the extent
that firms feel such competitive pressures, they will tend to pass through
low wages in the form of low prices.
When low wages yield low prices, the geographic distribution of
such price level effects is likely to be a complicated matter. In some sec-
tors, such as agriculture and manufacturing, the price level effect, if any,
is likely to be highly diffuse, since markets are national or international.
In other sectors, such as various household and business services, any
price level effect would be (roughly) coterminous with the region in
which the immigrant population resides. With respect to the former, the
benefits of immigration are spatially diffuse, whereas the costs are highly
concentrated. With respect to the latter, the benefits and costs are con-
centrated in the same regions. This empirical problem is an important
area where it would be useful to have additional research.
B. Municipal Finance Consequences of Mexican Immigration
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (Welfare Reform Act)46 made it more difficult for immi-
grants to qualify for welfare. Congress rolled the earlier open-ended
welfare entitlement program, called Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), into a block grant referred to as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF). The states were given substantial discretion
over the design and implementation of their programs, including whether
or not to provide TANF and Medicaid, among other benefits, to legal
immigrants who arrived before 1996. 47 The states are not supposed to use
federal funds to aid documented immigrants who are not yet citizens.
Documented immigrants must wait until after five years of residency to
apply for citizenship. 48 This imposes a de facto waiting period of five
years before new immigrants can qualify for public assistance. It also
increases the incentive to naturalize. Consistent with this implication,
Borjas found that naturalization increased following welfare reform,
49
particularly in states such as California where public assistance is rela-
50tively generous.
46. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Welfare
Reform Act of 1996), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
47. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 402.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006).
49. See Hanson, supra note 17, at 34 (citation omitted).
50. See id. This point does not necessarily contradict the earlier argument against the claim
that the United States is a "welfare magnet." By and large, workers from Mexico appear to come to
work temporarily and then return home. Among low-skill, low-income workers that stay, however,
there are incentives to qualify for public assistance, whether or not so doing was the original motive
to immigrate. See generally George Bojas, The Welfare Magnet: For More and More Immigrants,
America is Becoming the Land of Welfare Opportunities, NAT'L REV., Mar. 11, 1996 (explaining
immigrant participation in welfare programs).
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The states can, however, use their own state funds to finance substi-
tute programs that benefit non-citizen immigrants. This arrangement
gives the states a fair amount of discretion over whether or not to provide
aid to immigrants. For example, Texas and California have chosen to
provide some health services to undocumented immigrants. Some ob-
servers believe that the motivation is to reduce health care costs, which
would be higher if aid were limited strictly to emergency room ser-
vices.5
During the late 1990s, following welfare reform, the percentage of
immigrants using public assistance fell much faster than the percentage
of natives using it.52 This effect evidently was due to these new restric-
tions. However, the recession in the early 2000s led to increased use of
Medicaid by immigrants. This usage returned the proportion of immi-
grants using public assistance, relative to the proportion of native usage,
to the earlier differential between immigrants and natives.53
Overall, existing evidence suggests that immigrants are more likely
than others to make use of social services, including welfare. 54 As I dis-
cuss below, there appear to be two key reasons for this. First, as noted
above, about one third of immigrant workers, and two thirds of recent
Mexican immigrants, have less than a high school education. Second,
immigrant families tend to be larger than native families, which means
that educating their children is more expensive (both because of larger
numbers and due to the need to provide multi-lingual educational ser-
vices).
As I noted earlier, during the later part of the twentieth century (not
unlike earlier periods), immigrants to the United States tended to enter
via certain gateway cities and states, and a disproportionate number
ended up staying in those regions permanently. For instance, as of 2003,
nearly seventy percent of the immigrant population lived in six states,
California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. By com-
parison, these states contain forty percent of the general population.
Similarly, nearly seventy percent of the population of undocumented
workers is believed to reside in these six gateway states (with thirty-two
percent in California alone). Similar concentrations occur at the levels of
metropolitan areas and cities.
55
However, these migration patterns began to change during the
1990s. In recent years, the fastest growing immigrant populations have
been in the Southeast, including Georgia and North Carolina, the West-
51. Hanson, supra note 17, at 34 n.37.
52. See id. at 87 tbl.4.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 7; Donald Rice, Defend Colorado Now, A Compendium of Illegal Immigration Data
4 (2006), available at http://www.defendcoloradonow.com/studies/cost studydr_2006mar28.pdf.
55. Hanson, supra note 17, at 28-29.
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ern Mountain states, including Arizona, Colorado, and Nevada, and the
Great Plains, including Nebraska and Kansas.56
Given the spatial concentration of immigrant populations, both
documented and undocumented, the distribution of municipal costs asso-
ciated with immigrant populations differs widely across spatial regions
such as cities, metropolitan regions, and states. In addition, there are sig-
nificant differences among states regarding: (a) the relative generosity of
their public services, (b) the progressivity of their tax systems, and (c)
the accessibility to immigrants of their social services.57 All combined,
these different factors generate significant spatial differences in fiscal
burdens associated with immigration.
For instance, some states, such as California, have relatively gener-
ous social services for the poor and relatively progressive tax structures.
Other states, such as Texas, have relatively meager social services and
regressive tax structures. Yet other states, such as Illinois, California, and
others, exercise discretion in making their public benefits accessible to
immigrants.5 8 For all of these reasons, the fiscal burden (or cost of public
services connected with immigrants minus tax revenues collected from
immigrants) varies widely among states. Similarly, the distribution of the
fiscal burdens among income classes within a state is likely to vary as
well.
Preliminary evidence supports this conclusion. A recent study by
the NRC compared the fiscal impacts of immigration in California and
New Jersey.59 The immigrant population in California has lower educa-
tional attainment as compared to New Jersey: in 2002, the proportion of
immigrants who had not completed high school was thirty-seven percent
in California and twenty-two percent in New Jersey. 60 Data from 1989-
90 suggest that in New Jersey the fiscal transfer due to immigration was
0.4 percent of average native household income, or $232 per native
61household. In contrast, in California, the fiscal transfer was two percentof average native household income, or $1178 per native household.62
According to the NRC study, two key factors were responsible for
these fiscal transfers. First, immigrants in the two states had larger fami-
lies, on average, compared to native households. 63 Second, because im-
migrants in the two states on average have lower educational attainment
56. Id. at 28.
57. Id. at 8-9.
58. Id. at 8.
59. NAT'L REs. COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 289-92.
60. Hanson, supra note 17, at 40.
61. NAT'L REs. COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 292.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 272-73 tbl. 6.1.
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than the native population, they earn less, have a higher probability of
accessing public services, and yet pay less in taxes.
64
C. The Impact of Immigration on Public Opinion
Evidence suggests that public opinions regarding immigration vary
both spatially and educationally. Workers with lower educations are
more likely than those with higher educations to support restrictionist
policies; among higher educated workers, those who reside in high im-
migration states with relatively generous public services and progressive
tax codes are more likely to support such policies.65 These findings sug-
gest that immigration not only has economic consequences, e.g., in labor
markets and in public finance, but also these economic impacts may, in
turn, influence the development of public opinions regarding immigra-
tion policy.
There is room for further discussion, however, regarding the inter-
pretation of these interesting findings. One rather obvious interpretation
is that people know how immigration impacts their economic interests,
and their policy preferences are endogenous to those impacts, among
other things. Thus low-wage workers tend to prefer restrictionist policies
because they are negatively impacted by immigration, and high-wage
workers, in states where the fiscal burden from immigration is large, tend
to favor restrictionist policies because their taxes are higher as a result of
immigration.
This line of interpretation leaves out an important factor: When
people calculate their self-interests (assuming that they do so), how do
they know the extent to which they have been negatively impacted by
immigration? To state the obvious, expert economists may disagree
among themselves regarding the impact of immigration on labor markets
and municipal finances. How is the ordinary worker supposed to calcu-
late the putative negative impact of immigration on his or her wages or
taxes? It seems almost absurd to assume that workers somehow know the
"true" impact of immigration (assuming that there is an indisputable
"true" effect). Impressions are likely to be vague at best, since even the
experts may disagree on the correct figures, and, at any rate, most people
are not experts.
It remains to say, therefore, how it is that policy preferences actu-
ally are formed. For example, if low-wage workers favor restrictionist
64. Drawing upon data from the NRC, Donald Rice points out that:
A dropout creates a fiscal burden of $115,000 during his lifetime, while a high school
graduate creates a $40,000 burden. An immigrant with more than a high school degree
has a positive fiscal effect of $135,500. Combining the fiscal burden and positive fiscal
effects results in a $3,872 fiscal burden for the average immigrant. (All #s are net present
value, i.e., over a lifetime).
Rice, supra note 54, at 3. But cf NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 45, at 275.
65. Hanson, supra note 17, at 59-60.
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policies even though they have little or no way of knowing the "true"
effect of immigration, then they must have some more immediate way of
forming their perceptions. In lieu of scientific, undisputed information, it
seems likely that most people would base their preferences on percep-
tions that are heavily influenced by generalizations passed along by oth-
ers or by negative feelings connected with the labor market and other
interactions. This is an area where it would be useful to have further em-
pirical research.
D. Fiscal Impact of Citizen Immigrants Versus Undocumented Workers
It seems likely that use of social services differs between citizen
immigrants and undocumented immigrants. To be sure, the latter may
impose costs in the areas of K-12 education, emergency room services,
and incarceration costs. However, they are perhaps less likely than citi-
zen immigrants to access such services. According to Douglas Massey:
Studies that focus specifically on undocumented immigrants suggest
they use public services at rates far below those of legal immigrants.
A 1987 study, for example, found that just 2 percent of illegal Mexi-
can immigrants had ever received welfare or Social Security pay-
ments and just 3 percent had ever accepted food stamps.
66
During roughly this same time period, the percentage of native-born
and of (all) immigrants receiving welfare was much higher. In 1994, 3.9
percent of natives and 8.1 percent of immigrants received welfare, i.e.,
AFDC. Similarly, during that year 8.4 percent of natives and 13.7 per-
cent of (all) immigrants received food stamps.67
These findings suggest that the fiscal burden of immigration is due
little, if at all, to illegal immigration. For example, in contrast with this
relatively small use of social services by undocumented workers, most
pay taxes:
It is a common misperception that illegal immigrants do not make
contributions to tax revenues. Illegal immigrants pay sales taxes on
their consumption purchases and property taxes on their dwellings
they own or rent. In addition, many illegal immigrants contribute to
Social Security and to federal income taxes. Since IRCA [the Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act] in 1986, U.S. law requires that em-
ployers ask employees to provide proof of their employment eligibil-
ity. In response, many illegal immigrants present employers with
fake Social Security cards that have invalid Social Security numbers.
Most employers appear to treat illegal-immigrant employees as legal
workers, withholding federal payroll taxes and income taxes from
their paychecks. When paying payroll taxes on these workers, em-
66. Massey, supra note 9, at 7.
67. Hanson, supra note 17, at 87 tbl. 4.
1117
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ployers end up making contributions to invalid Social Security ac-
counts.
68
For instance, according to the Council of Economic Advisors, when
contributions to Social Security are made using invalid social security
numbers, the Social Security Administration holds those contributions in
an "Earnings Suspense" file. In the late 1980s, following the implemen-
tation of IRCA, such annual contributions skyrocketed, from $7 billion in
1986 to $49 billion in 2000. As of 2002, nearly half a trillion dollars had
been contributed.69 Moreover since these contributions to Social Security
will never be offset by entitlement claims from their contributors, the
value of these contributions will continue to compound indefinitely.
E. The Economic Consequences of Remittances
Economic development theorists have argued that development can
have "spread" and "backwash" effects.7° Spread effects occur when a
developing region stimulates development in another economically con-
nected region.71 Backwash effects occur when a developing region drains
resources away from another economically connected region.72
Contemporary patterns of migration from Mexico to the United
States suggest development themes that are related but more complex.
Rapidly developing regions may release dislocated labor, which mi-
grates, whether temporarily or permanently, to a developed region. As
discussed earlier, circular migration then may become a key mechanism
both for financing current consumption and for acquiring durable assets
in the home country, such as business capital, higher education, automo-
biles, and housing. In this context, international remittances appear to
have important consequences in terms of further economic development
in developing countries (such as Mexico), from which a wave of migra-
tion to a developed country (such as the United States) initiates.
In 2003, remittances to Latin America exceeded $30 billion.73
About one third of this amount went to Mexico. For instance, in the pre-
vious year, 2002, Mexico received $9.8 billion in remittances. This was
the country's third largest source of foreign exchange, surpassed only by
the maquiladoras (manufacturing facilities, especially in the North) and
by its oil business.74 Remittances to Mexico have since then skyrocketed
68. Id. at 23.
69. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 108 (2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
eop/2005/2005_erp.pdf.
70. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule of Law,
and China's Future, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 229, 250 (2005).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS. supra note 69, at 109.
74. Coronado, supra note 25.
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to nearly $20 billion.75 Moreover, total remittances (to all nations) now
exceed economic development aid provided by the U.S. government to
developing countries.76 According to the Congressional Budget Office:
In recent years, some observers have cited the potential for remit-
tances to complement or even replace direct investment and foreign
aid as a source of development finance. They argue that remittance
flows are, in effect, a form of aid: rather than sending aid to a devel-
oping country, a developed country can allow migrants from that
country to work and send money home. Those observers also point
out that remittances do not directly burden a host country's taxpayers
in the same way that tax-financed official aid does; that they are less
costly to get to the people who need them, compared with aid that
passes through the sending and receiving countries' bureaucracies;
and they have tended to be more stable during business cycles than
investment or aid.77
As discussed above, however, others have emphasized that immi-
gration depresses the wages of those who compete with immigrants in
labor markets. To some extent, these impacted workers disproportion-
ately bear the burden of such development aid. Of course, as I discuss
below, if there is considerable concern for the economic well being of
such low-wage workers, then it is always possible to expand income
support policies for these low-skill natives.
Beyond this, it is often argued that remittances are a drain on the lo-
cal economies from which they originate. For instance, in 2004, over
seventy percent of all remittances from the United States originated from
just six states, California (32 percent), New York (11.9 percent), Texas
(10.6 percent), Florida (8.2 percent), Illinois (5.1 percent), and New Jer-
sey (4.6 percent).78
However, the problem of leakages from local economies is a com-
plex matter. It is true that some businesses supply only the local market.
By and large, however, modern markets are national or international in
scope, so employment and investment decisions are not much impacted
by demand conditions in the local market in which employment and in-
vestment take place. This is an important consequence of globalization.
Moreover, from the standpoint of the national economy, remittances are
a relatively miniscule drain on aggregate demand. The Congressional
75. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 24, at 2-3; Alfredo Corchado, Emigrants' Remittances
Tripled in 5 Years; Rate Troubles Analysts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2005. These esti-
mates, which are reported by the Mexican government, are substantially higher than estimates by the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, which estimates remittances to Mexico at $6.4 billion in 2002
and $7 billion in 2003. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 24, at 2-3 for a discussion of the dis-
crepancy.
76. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 24, at 4.
77. Id. (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 5 tbl. 2. In 2004, 1.8 percent of all remittances came from Colorado, for a total of
$544 million. Id.
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Budget Office estimates that all remittances from the U.S. amount to 0.2
percent of GDP, which compared with other demand factors is negligi-
ble.
7 9
However, for some states, this percentage appears to be much
higher. For instance, 2004 remittances from California, far and away the
largest source of remittances, were $9.61 billion, which is roughly 6 per-
cent of the state's gross domestic product, formerly called "gross state
product., 80 This "leakage" from the California economy could have a
negative demand side impact upon local businesses that produce for the
local market. Here, as with other consequences of immigration, the effect
on the national economy is small, but the distributional effects across
space and other dimensions may be quite significant.
CONCLUSION
As compared with other factors, immigration has a minor impact on
the U.S. economy as a whole.8' However, its distributional consequences
appear to be fairly significant. Over time, wages in the low-skill segment
of the labor market may have been depressed, thereby widening income
inequality in the United States. Also the fiscal burden associated with
immigration appears to vary widely from one state to another.
The causes of immigration, on the other hand, are closely connected
with Mexico's rapid economic development. Circular immigration has
been an important response to the displacement of workers, especially in
rural areas, and to incomplete markets for capital, consumer credit, mort-
gages, and insurance. Taken within the context of these developmental
forces in Mexico, the U.S.-Mexico wage differential combined with the
beaten path effect constitute important incentives to immigrate.
79. Id. at 2.
80. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 24, at 5 tbl. 2; see U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY STATE
(2007), available at http://www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm#gsp.
81. See Hanson, supra note 17, at 40. Hanson suggests that, in the short run, the immigration
surplus is about 0.12 percent of GDP, whereas the fiscal burden is probably around .20 to .25 percent
of GDP, for a net cost in the neighborhood of .10 percent of GDP. See id. at 42-43. Clearly, this is a
very small aggregate impact. Estimates of long run effects require stronger assumptions and, there-
fore, are relatively more speculative.
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The United States has a long and rich history of protecting individu-
als fleeing persecution. The country was founded as a haven from reli-
gious persecution, and became home to Quakers, Puritans, Catholics,
Huguenots and other religious denominations unwelcome in England and
other parts of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.' This
tradition has survived several periods of intense xenophobia, racially-
based exclusionary policies, national security threats, and war.
The United States currently offers protection to individuals and
families fleeing persecution through two programs: the overseas refugee
resettlement program and the asylum system. The refugee resettlement
program is available for refugees residing outside the United States; the
asylum system is for those who apply for refugee protection on U.S. soil.
The most recent assault on the U.S. tradition and obligation to provide
protection to those fleeing persecution has affected both of these pro-
grams.
When recalling the United States' first major anti-terrorism effort in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the October 7, 2001 inva-
sion of Afghanistan is in the foremost action in the nation's collective
memory. Even before invading Afghanistan, however, the U.S. govern-
ment had begun implementing anti-terrorism measures in another arena:
the refugee resettlement program. Approximately two weeks after the
attacks, the federal government imposed a moratorium on refugee admis-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. This Article is adapted
from two prior articles, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for Female and Child Refugees
Trapped in a Post-9/1l World, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 459 (2005) and Terrorism and Asylum
Seekers: Why the Real ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101 (2006). Thanks to the
Denver University Law Review, particularly Symposium Editor Jack Hobaugh, for inviting me to
participate in their 2007 Symposium, "Immigration: Both Sides of the Fence." Thanks also to my
colleague at Chapman University School of Law, Professor Matthew Parlow, for facilitating and
encouraging my participation in this Symposium; to Clinton Rusich for assistance rehearsing my
symposium presentation; and to my outstanding and supportive research assistant Neda Sargordan.
1. See WILLIAM CARLSON SMITH, AMERICANS IN THE MAKING: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
THE ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANTS 4-5 (1939) (noting that the United States was "vaunted as a land
not only of economic opportunity but also of religious freedom .... "); see also International Reli-
gious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6401(a)(1) (West 2007) (noting that "[m]any of our
Nation's founders fled religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of
religious freedom"). See generally ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 94-95 (1990).
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sions, stranding thousands of refugees and creating a backlog from which
the refugee resettlement program still has not recovered.2
Considered in a vacuum, the fact that the United States might
choose to target U.S.-bound refugee populations for its anti-terrorism
measures may not seem terribly surprising. However, additional facts
call into question the wisdom and efficacy of imposing a refugee reset-
tlement moratorium: first, none of the nineteen September 11 hijackers
were refugees; and second, the mechanism through which several of the
September 11 hijackers actually were able to enter the United States,
known as Visa Express, continued to operate for almost a year after the
attacks.
3
Likewise, the asylum system, which also had not been utilized by
any of the September 11 hijackers, did not escape retribution. On May
11, 2005, Congress passed the Real ID Act, 4 which included a section
entitled "Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Relief from Removal,
5
that purported to reform the asylum system. Again, at first glance, par-
ticularly if one is persuaded by the title of the section, such legislation
seems prudent and perhaps even urgently necessary. A careful perusal of
the asylum section of the Real ID Act, however, reveals that the legisla-
2. See DAVID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM: REFORMS
FOR A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 153 (2004) available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf [hereinafter MARTIN, REFORMS]:
All refugee movements had been suspended in the immediate aftermath of the September
11 attacks, a halt that lasted approximately two months. In the meantime, the new secu-
rity and anti-fraud steps that were introduced beginning in November 2001 were applied
not just to the consideration of new refugee applicants but also to any refugees who had
not yet traveled. Given the confusion and enormous backlogs resulting from problems at
many steps of the process, many thousands of refugees who thought they had been ap-
proved and were ready to fly to the United States languished for months or years without
a final decision on their cases.
Id. The new security screening procedures introduced after September 1I led to "many months of
confusion, inefficiency, and delays .. " Id. at 154.
All P-3 cases that had not yet traveled to the United States as of September 11, 2001,
were subjected to the new verification process. This meant that a significant number of
persons who thought that they had been approved for admission saw their cases reopened
and their approvals suspended. Notifications of discrepancies were sometimes delayed, as
were notifications of final revocation of admission approval. Therefore many refugees
who thought they had been fully approved for resettlement in the United States found
themselves in limbo for months, and a great many for years.
Id. at 86; see also Ralston H. Deffenbaugh, Jr., President, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Ser-
vice, Continuing Crisis in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, Jan. 2002, available at
http://www.lirs.org/news/PresDesk/RD20020l .htm.
3. See George Gedda, Official Inquiry Ordered for All Visa-Issuing Foreign Posts,
ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, July 17, 2002, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/717317/posts (reporting that 64% of 36,028 visas issued to Saudis between June 1, 2001
through Sept. 10, 2001 - 64% through Visa Express, only 3% of 64% interviewed; Senator Chuck
Grassley and Rep. Dave Weldon said that 3 out of 15 hijackers obtained visa through Visa Express);
Ben Barber, Visa Express Discontinued in Saudi Arabia; State Bows to Critics on Hill, WASH.
TIMES, July 20, 2002, at 1 (shut down Visa Express on July 20).
4. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief(Real ID Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005).
5. Id. § 101.
2007] COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM
tion does nothing more than clumsily codify existing asylum case law.
The vague and awkwardly worded provisions of the Real ID Act thereby
increase the likelihood that bona fide asylum claims will fail while doing
little or nothing to prevent fraudulent claims from succeeding.
This Article critiques the anti-terrorism measures of the United
States that directly target refugees and asylum-seekers. Part I briefly
discusses the history of refugee protection in the United States. Parts II
and III describe the processes and security measures which all applicants
for refugee and asylee status must undergo in order to gain protection
from the United States. Parts II and III also explain the inefficacy and
counter-productivity of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism measures
targeting refugees and asylum seekers, and conclude that those measures
were counterproductive and counterintuitive.
I. HISTORY OF U.S. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAW: 1939-1980
The United States' long history of providing protection to those
fleeing persecution abroad has been tempered by periodic xenophobia,
political bias, and lack of uniformity. Although the tradition of refugee
protection predates the official birth of the nation, statutory refugee pro-
tection in the form of asylum and the overseas refugee resettlement pro-
gram did not exist prior to 1980. Even with a statute in place, the admis-
sion of refugees and adjudication of asylum claims have not always op-
erated smoothly, and both forms of protection have remained in constant
flux.
A. Pre-World War 1I." The S.S. St. Louis
Prior to onset of the Cold War, the United States did not have laws
specifically permitting refugee admissions. Immigration occurred pri-
marily through a nationality-based quota system; when the allotted num-
ber of visas ran out for a particular country or region, applicants had to
wait until a visa became available in order to immigrate. 6 The first inti-
mation that this system was inadequate surfaced shortly before World
War II began, when Nazi persecution was compelling many Jews and
other minorities to flee Europe.
On June 6, 1939, the S.S. St. Louis, a German transatlantic liner
carrying more than 900 European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution, peti-
tioned the United States for permission to enter its territory. By this
6. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 159-60 (repealed 1952).
7. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St. Louis," in HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&Moduleld=10005267
(last visited Apr. 8, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St.
Louis']. The refugees were originally en route to Cuba, but the Cuban government revoked their
landing passes and denied them entry. Id.; see also U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime
Fate of the Passengers of the "St. Louis," in HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
http://wwwl .ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang--en&Moduleld= 10005431 (last visited Apr. 8, 2007)
[hereinafter U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime Fate of the Passengers of the "St. Louis ']
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time, the German-Austrian quota for U.S. immigration had not only been
filled but had a waiting list of several years.8 Entry to the United States
would have required an executive order from President Roosevelt, who
declined to issue one.
9
While the St. Louis made its way back to Europe, Jewish organiza-
tions secured admission for most of the refugees to western European
countries. The passengers arrived in Antwerp, Belgium after five weeks
at sea. They settled in Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Nether-
lands to await their turn to enter the United States through the back-
logged quota system. Approximately four months later, World War II
broke out. Eventually, all of the countries to which the St. Louis passen-
gers were sent, with the exception of Great Britain, came under Nazi
control. "Thus, in the end, the former 'St. Louis' passengers underwent
experiences similar to those of other Jews in Nazi-occupied western
Europe. The Germans murdered many of them in the killing centers and
the concentration camps. Others went into hiding or survived years of
forced labor." 10
B. Post- World War 1I: The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees
In the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities of World War II, refugee pro-
tection gained prominence in the international community. The United
Nations General Assembly promulgated the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees in 195111 to provide protection to refugees displaced
as a result of World War II. In 1967, the United Nations updated the
1951 Convention with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
1 2
to address a refugee flow that had arisen out of incidents other than
World War 11.13
In 1968, the United States signed and ratified the 1967 Protocol.
14
In acceding to the 1967 Protocol, the United States agreed to grant pro-
tection to persons who meet the international legal definition of a refu-
gee:
(describing the various fates of the passengers returned to Germany, many of whom were placed in
internment camps, transported to Nazi death camps, or forced to live in hiding for the remainder of
the war).
8. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St. Louis, " supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime Fate of the Passengers of the "St. Louis,"
supra note 7. It is estimated that 250 of the St. Louis passengers died in the Holocaust. See U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St. Louis, " supra note 7.
11. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force July 28, 1951) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
12. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
13. See id., Preamble (stating that because the scope of the 1951 Convention is limited to
persons who became refugees as a result of incidents prior to 1951, the Convention should be broad-
ened to address refugee populations that have emerged after 1951).
14. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 12, at 1.
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Any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her]
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not hav-
ing a nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
15
Prior to signing the Protocol, the United States' policy on granting
refugee status reflected its Cold War political concerns. The Immigra-
tion Act of 195216 and the 1965 amendments to the Immigration Act
17
allowed only refugees from either communist countries or countries in
the Middle East to qualify for asylum. 18 Asylum seekers who did fall
within these narrow parameters still had to demonstrate a "clear probabil-
ity" of persecution (a higher standard than the "reasonable possibility"
standard that exists today) before being accepted as refugees.' 9 They
were also subject to strict numerical limitations.2°
The United States' assent to the Protocol did not have a significant
effect on asylum processing. The United States relied on the portion of
the 1952 Act that authorized the Attorney General "to withhold the de-
portation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in
his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to
be necessary for such reasons. ,2 1 From 1968 to 1980, the United States
continued to enforce the narrow parameters, low ceiling on approvals,
15. See id, art. 1, 2 (adopting the 1951 Convention's definition of "refugee" with modifica-
tions to eliminate the 1951 Convention's exclusive application to World War II refugees); see also
1951 Convention supra note 11, art. 1, A(2) (defining a "refugee").
16. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7), re-
pealed by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 108 (1980) [hereinafter INA].
17. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911, 913 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Amendments].
18. Id. at 913. The general area of the Middle East included western Libya, northern Turkey,
eastern Pakistan, southern Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Id.
19. See Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1976) (sustaining denial of asylum
where applicants failed to demonstrate a "clear probability" of persecution); Pierre v. U.S., 547 F.2d
1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the burden was on the asylum seeker to show that she was a
refugee by a "clear probability" standard of proof); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that in order to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, an asylum applicant must
demonstrate a "clear probability" of persecution).
20. See INA § 201(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1503 (West 2007)) (setting
an annual refugee quota based on nationality); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67
Stat. 400 § l(a) (1953), amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (mak-
ing available 209,000 refugee visas exempt from the 1952 nationality based quota); see also Deb-
orah E. Anker & Michael J. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act
of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13-14 (1981) (remarking that Congress' exceptions to immigra-
tion policy were strictly responses to Soviet expansionism, and should not be viewed as humanitar-
ian commitments).
21. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V. 1970) (now INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1231 (b)(3) (West 2007)).
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and strict burden of proof mandated by the 1952 Act and the courts. 22 It
was not until 1980 that Congress passed legislation implementing the
United States' obligations under the 1967 Protocol by codifying the 1951
Convention definition of a refugee and establishing a legal right to apply
for asylum.
C. The Refugee Act of 1980
In 1980, Congress for the first time passed a law specifically ad-
dressing refugees and asylum seekers: the Refugee Act of 1980.23 In
enacting the Refugee Act, Congress sought to give "statutory meaning to
our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.
24
The Refugee Act removed the geographical and political limitations from
the asylum process, 25 explicitly adopted the Protocol's definition of a
"refugee, 26 formulated a legal right to seek asylum in the United
States, 27 and lifted the numerical caps on yearly grants of asylum. 28 In
addition, the Refugee Act mandated that the Attorney General establish
procedures for asylum processing.29
22. KAREN MUSALO, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 64 (1997); see
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 429-30 (1984) (articulating the standard for eligibility for with-
holding of removal).
23. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C.A. §§ 1157-1159 (West 2007) [hereinafter Refugee Act].
24. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141.
25. The Refugee Act repealed INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7), which had reserved
refugee protection primarily for individuals fleeing Communist and certain Middle Eastern coun-
tries.
26. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2007). The INA defines a
refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and who is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
See id.
27. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) (West 2007) (authorizing "[a]ny alien who
is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States" to apply for asylum).
The Refugee Act provided a new discretionary form of relief for asylum seekers. Relief under
section 243(h) of the INA, which provided for mandatory withholding of removal, remained avail-
able for refugees who did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion or who were statutorily
barred from qualifying for asylum. See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. 1231 (b)(3)(A) (West 2007)
(prohibiting the removal of certain noncitizens who face persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). The Supreme Court in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1987), differentiated between the burden of proof
for those seeking asylum and those seeking withholding, holding that asylum seekers must prove a
reasonable possibility of persecution, whereas individuals seeking withholding must still meet the
pre-Refugee Act standard of "clear probability." See id. at 430.
28. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2007) (authorizing the Attor-
ney General to grant asylum to an alien who meets the definition of refugee, without any numerical
restrictions).
29. INA § 208(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(1) (West 2007). The Attorney General issued
regulations in 1990 that created a professional corps of asylum officers; vested initial jurisdiction of
affirmative asylum claims with the Office of Refugees, Asylum and Parole; established filing proce-
dures for applications for asylum; established interview procedures; set forth eligibility require-
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The passage of the Refugee Act ushered in a new era of refugee
protection. The Supreme Court recognized the implications of the Refu-
gee Act in the ground-breaking case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,30 which
articulated a new, lower standard of proof for asylum eligibility, differen-
tiating it from that of withholding of removal. 31 In 1990, reacting to al-
legations of persistent geopolitical bias within the asylum system,32 the
INS promulgated new regulations for the prompt and politically neutral
adjudication of asylum claims.33 Finally, in response to allegations that
the asylum system was becoming a haven for terrorists and others seek-
ing to abuse the U.S. immigration system, Congress passed immigration
reform legislation in 1996, discussed in detail in Section III.A.2, infra,
that made significant changes to the asylum system.34
Despite the developments and reforms of the 1990s, and the inhos-
pitality of both systems to individuals seeking to abuse the U.S. immigra-
tion system, both the overseas refugee resettlement program and the asy-
lum system have been targets of counterterrorism policies and legisla-
tion.
II. OVERSEAS REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM
The U.S. refugee resettlement program is likely the least hospitable
avenue for entering the United States for an individual seeking to carry
out terrorism. Only 70,000 refugees per year out of thirteen million
refugees worldwide are selected to resettle in the United States. Selec-
tion is based on a complex priority system and often dependent on one's
membership in a group of individuals identified by the U.S. government
as particularly at risk due to their religion, ethnicity, tribe, and/or other
factors. Many refugees live for years in dirty, violent, disease-ridden
camps, with no guarantee of resettling elsewhere.
A. The Refugee Resettlement Process Pre-September 11
In order to resettle in the United States, applicants must (1) meet the
definition of a refugee, 35 (2) be among those refugees whom the Presi-
ments; and established procedures for granting derivative status to immediate family members. See
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2007).
30. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
31. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-33.
32. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS
UNCERTAIN 22 (1987) (reporting discrepancies among asylum seekers claiming similar levels and
forms of persecution, with applicants from countries with regimes the United States opposed, such as
Iran, having much higher approval rates than applicants from countries with U.S.-supported regimes,
such as El Salvador).
33. Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (Immigration
and Naturalization Service July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, 253).
34. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
35. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2007); see also supra note
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36dent determines to be of special humanitarian concern, (3) be otherwise
admissible under U.S. law, 37 and (4) not be "firmly resettled" 38 in another
country.39 Once an individual is selected for resettlement, he or she must
undergo a rigorous screening process administrated by the Bureau of
Populations, Refugees and Migration ("PRM") of the Department of
State in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security4° and the
Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR") of the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") for resettlement processing.4'
Upon receiving a referral from the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees or a non-governmental organization, applicants for
resettlement in the United States must proceed through several more lev-
els of adjudication. First, the U.S. Department of State evaluates the
cases based on the applicants' situation in the country of first asylum, the
conditions from which they have fled, U.S. national interest, and other
humanitarian considerations.4 a Second, applicants who appear to have
suffered persecution or to have a well-founded fear of future persecu-
tion,43 and who otherwise fall within the United States' resettlement pri-
orities must then meet with a U.S. immigration official to determine
whether they qualify for admission as a refugee. 4 Once the immigration
36. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 157(a)(3) ("Admissions under this subsection shall be allocated among
refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States in accordance with a determination by
the President after appropriate consultation.").
37. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (classifying groups of aliens ineligible for visas or
admission).
38. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.15
(2007) (providing guidance on determining whether an applicant for asylum was firmly resettled in
another country).
39. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK:
COUNTRY CHAPTERS: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3c5e5a764.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAP-
TERS: USA] (describing resettlement policies and procedures in United States).
40. Formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). See Dep't of Homeland
Security, History: Who Became Part of the Department?, Sep. 13, 2006,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm.
41. See UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAPTERS: USA, supra note 39, at 1 (noting four key criteria for
refugee admission in United States).
42. See id. at 4 (noting procedures which the United States uses to determine whether to
accept refugees).
43. See Matter of Mogharabbi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that an indi-
vidual's fear of persecution is well-founded if he or she "(1) possesses a characteristic a persecutor
seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already
aware, or could.., become aware, that the [individual] possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the
persecutor has the capability of punishing the [individual]; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination
to punish the [person]." (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,226 (B.I.A. 1985))).
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2007) ("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration."). The situation of refugees often
makes it difficult for them to provide documentary or third party testimonial corroboration of their
claims, but U.S. regulations governing asylum, in conformity with U.N. recommendations, specify
that an applicant's credible testimony is sufficient to establish eligibility. See id.; see also UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 196, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA] ("In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will
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authorities approve an applicant for resettlement, the applicant must un-
dergo a medical examination and security checks before travel arrange-
ments to the United States can be made. This process can take several
years, during which time many refugees must live in precarious situa-
tions, often living in refugee camps plagued by disease, violence, and
overcrowding.45
B. Post-September 11 Refugee Resettlement Moratorium
Despite the procedures and security checks described in Part II.A,
supra, and despite the fact that none of the September 11 hijackers were
refugees,46 the United States immediately suspended refugee resettlement
for several months as part of its response to the September 11 terrorist
attacks.47 During that time, the U.S. government carried out new back-
ground checks and investigations of family relationships.48 When the
U.S. refugee resettlement program did resume in February 2002, it was
with the implementation of new, far stricter security mechanisms that
apply even to the highest priority refugees.
First, refugees, including those already accepted for resettlement,
now have to undergo new security checks prior to gaining admission to
the United States.4 9 Even prior to September 11, the U.S. State Depart-
ment checked all applicants for resettlement against the Refugee Infor-
mation Entry Sub-system of the Consular Lookout and Support System
("CLASS"), a database searched using names and dates of birth.5 °
have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without documents. . . .[I]f the
applicant's account appears credible, he [or she] should, unless there are good reasons to the con-
trary, be given the benefit of the doubt.").
45. See generally U.S. COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2004, avail-
able at http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1156 (containing various articles and reports de-
scribing the conditions in which the majority of the world's refugees live).
46. See THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE ET AL., 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 7-31 (2004) (detailing
each of the September 11 hijackers' visa application processes and encounters with U.S. immigra-
tion personnel). Most of the hijackers applied for and received tourist visas. See id. One applied for
and received a student visa after being denied a tourist visa. See id. at 13-14.
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION,
SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2003 (illustrating drop in refugee admissions
during this time) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2003]; see also T. T.
Nhu, Refugee Backlog Remains Sizable; Resettlement Program Resuming After Sept. 11, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2002.
48. See generally MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 84-95 (describing the delays in refugee
processing, particularly those resettling on the basis of family relationships).
49. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FY 2004 - REPORT TO THE CONGRESS iv, available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/44529.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FY 2004] (stating CLASS checks are based on name and date of
birth). A CLASS check is now done efficiently via WRAPS, triggered as soon as the OPE has
acquired the basic individual information needed to perform the check, and the result is also re-
corded in automated fashion. See id. Most cases clear this check and can then be scheduled for the
remainder of the process).
50. See MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 119-20 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL, 9 FAM app. D § 201 (2007)).
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CLASS contains the names of persons for whom the State Department
has information, usually derogatory, pertaining to the individuals' appli-
cation for entry into the United States. 51 In the post-September 11 era,
the results of the CLASS check must now be completed and documented
before resettlement offices may proceed any further on the case.5 2 Al-
though the U.S. State Department claims that the security checks now
only take forty-five days to process, they took several months when these
changes first came into effect.53
Other post-September 11 security measures, while not particularly
time consuming compared to the CLASS check, have delayed travel in
another respect: they have caused the amount of available flights for
refugees to decrease significantly.54 As of November 2001, all refugees
who are fourteen-years-old or older at the time of their entry into the
United States must undergo full fingerprinting upon arrival in the United
States.5 5  This process is so cumbersome that the government initially
imposed a thirty-person per flight limit on refugees, 56 a limit which im-
provements in fingerprinting efficiency have allowed to increase only to
thirty-five refugees per flight. 57 Adding to the need for a per flight limit
on refugees is the 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Re-
form Act 58 requirement that all refugees receive an employment authori-
zation document "immediately upon the[ir] arrival in the United States"
and that the document contain a photograph and fingerprint.59
The cumulative result of these measures is that thousands of refu-
gees selected for resettlement, who have been anticipating imminent de-
parture and the start of a new life, have reverted to the anxious waiting
and uncertainty that had characterized the last several years of their lives.
The United States, although it authorized the admission of 70,000 refu-
51. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 9 FAM app. D § 200 (2007)
(explaining CLASS, Consular Lookout and Support System).
52. See MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 119-20 ("New security measures adopted in
November 2001 strictly require documentation in refugee files that such checks have been com-
pleted before the case can proceed."). Furthermore, the State Department has, since 9/11, been
adding additional names and information to the CLASS database. See id. at 120.
53. Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration,
Remarks at the 2004 Annual Conference of State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement (SCORR)
(July 13, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/pnn/rls/37912.htm; Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant
Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration, Remarks to the 2004 Annual Conference of
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services (LIRS) (June 18, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/37914.htm; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
FY 2004, supra note 49, at 5.
54. See MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 130 (discussing the effect of fingerprinting and
other post 9/11 security refugee flights).
55. See id. (noting a November 2001 decision to do full fingerprinting of all refugees 14 and
older upon arrival).
56. See id. ("INS imposed a 30 person per flight refugee limitation on refugee arrivals").
57. See id. (explaining that after the government was able to transfer the fingerprint work to a
subcontractor they raised the per flight quota to thirty-five).
58. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116
Stat. 543 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.).
59. Id. § 309.
1130 [Vol. 84:4
2007] COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 1131
gees,60 only admitted 27,029 refugees in fiscal year 2002.61 Fiscal year
2003 saw almost the same low number of refugee entries.62 In fiscal year
2004, the United States fell short of its refugee admission ceiling by
17,125.63
The global insecurity and threats against the United States, upon
which President Bush based his refusal to increase the refugee resettle-
ment quota, have indeed posed a significant challenge to refugee proc-
essing. Attacks by combatants in volatile areas against aid workers,64
volunteer medical personnel, 65 and foreign officials 66 combined with
U.S. security measures to slow the process considerably.67  Moreover,
the very situations from which refugees are trying to escape present
enormous obstacles to their goal. Forced displacement, violence, lack of
infrastructure, illness, and lack of stability are not ideal conditions for
preserving formal identity documents such as passports, birth certificates,
marriage certificates, and the like. Many refugees thus commence the
resettlement process with two substantial strikes against them: (1) the
60. Presidential Determ. No. 2-04, 66 FR 63,487 (Nov. 21, 2001) (Presidential Determination
on FY 2002 Refugee Admissions Numbers and Authorizations of In-Country Refugee Status Pursu-
ant to Sections 207 and 101(a)(42), Respectively, of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and De-
termination Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, as Amended);
Regional Refugee Ceilings and Admissions to the United States, FY 1991-2004, REFUGEE REPS.
(Immigration and Refugee Services of America, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 31, 2003, at 9, available at
http://www.refugees.org/data/refugee reports/archives/2003/RRDec.pdf (showing that prior to 2001,
the United States imposed refugee admission ceilings ranging from 78,000 to 142,000 and the actual
number of refugees admitted to the United States ranged from 70,000 to over 132,000 each year).
61. See George Gedda, Admission of Refugees into U.S. Down, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 3,
2003, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IPI -85198340.html.
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2003, supra note 47, at 5 (stating that
the United States admitted 28,422 refugees in fiscal year 2003, 41,578 short of its ceiling).
63. See Press Release, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Refugee Admis-
sions for Fiscal Year 2004 (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2004/36717.htm (stating that the United States admitted 52,875 refugees in fiscal year 2004).
64. See UN Refugee Agency Halts Operations in Troubled Parts of Afghanistan, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.publicintemationallaw.org/
docs/PNW/PNW.24Nov_03.htm#Afghanistan (stating in November 2003, alleged Taliban gunmen
shot and killed 29-year-old UNHCR aid worker Bettina Goislard in Afghanistan; she was the twelfth
aid worker to be killed in Afghanistan since March 2003); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. 03-663, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: PROTECTING REFUGEE WOMEN AND
GIRLS REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE 6 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03663.pdf ("[F]rom 1997 through 2001, 106 relief workers were
killed in the line of duty in Afghanistan, Angola, Rwanda, and Sudan.").
65. Amir Shah, Taliban Claims Responsibility for Foreign Workers 'Deaths, OAKLAND TRiB.,
June 3, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqn4l76/is20040603/
ai n14575526 (stating that in June 2004, Taliban militants claimed responsibility for murdering
three members of a volunteer medical team in Afghanistan).
66. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FY 2004, supra note 49, at
15 (indicating that direct threats to U.S. personnel at the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya delayed
resettlement processing).
67. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, FACT
SHEET: U.S. GOVERNMENT TO EXPEDITE REFUGEE PROCESSING SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (2003),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/prmirls/fs/2003/23356.htm ("[Ilnitial overseas security concerns
severely limited Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) adjudications in the field. INS (now
Department of Homeland Security/Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services DHS/CIS)
interviews overseas resumed in force in February 2002, but then were constrained again by security
threats in East Africa, civil unrest in West Africa, and the war in Iraq.").
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inability to prove conclusively who they are and why they are refugees,
and (2) the presumption that they are involved with terrorism.
III. THE UNITED STATES ASYLUM SYSTEM
Next to the refugee resettlement program, the asylum system is ar-
guably the least hospitable means to secure lawful status for an individ-
ual seeking to infiltrate the United States for terrorism-related activities.
A strict one-year filing deadline, restrictions on employment authoriza-
tion, face-to-face interviews with immigration officers, numerous back-
ground and identity checks, and the possibility of detention combine to
create a less-than-ideal environment for an individual seeking to defraud
the United States.
A. The U.S. Asylum System Pre-September 11
1. Security measures
Asylum applicants must undergo identity verification and back-
ground checks before being eligible for asylum.68 The government is-
sues each asylum applicant a file number, or "alien number," which is
entered into the Refugees, Asylum and Parole System ("RAPS") data-
base.69 RAPS interfaces with the Computer Linked Applicant Informa-
tion System ("CLAIMS") to identify and update asylum applicants' ad-
dress changes, and with the Receipt and Alien File Accountability Con-
trol System ("RAFACS") to keep track of asylum applicants' files.7 °
The asylum office may not grant asylum without first checking the iden-
tity of the applicant against all appropriate government databases, includ-
ing the State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System
("CLASS") 71 and the DHS biometric identification system known as
"IDENT.
, 72
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996
By the mid-1990's, perceived flaws in the U.S. asylum system had
come to the attention of lawmakers. Processing delays had led to a back-
log of several years, allowing asylum applicants to remain in the United
States legally for the duration of their cases. 73 The law also granted asy-
lum applicants immediate work authorization, renewable on a yearly
68. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), 208.10, 240.67 (2007).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, INS, REFUGEES, ASYLUM
AND PAROLE SYSTEM, AUDIT REPORT 98-11 (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/reports/INS/a9811 .htm.
70. Id.
71. IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 383 (9th ed. 2004).
72. Id. at 100.
73. See INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASYLUM REFORM: FIVE YEARS LATER 7 (2000), avail-




basis until the asylum adjudication was complete.74 Concerns abounded
that economic migrants, unscrupulous individuals, and terrorists were
taking advantage of the asylum laws to avoid deportation and then to
abscond while their applications were languishing in the backlog.75
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA").
76
IIRIRA put into effect a number of provisions designed to curtail abuse
of the asylum system. The most significant limitations are a one-year
deadline on applying for asylum, delay in work authorization eligibility,
prompt adjudication of asylum applications, expedited removal, and de-
tention of asylum seekers. With these provisions in place, the hurdles to
obtaining asylum are so great that asylum has become an unlikely choice
for an individual seeking an easy, low-profile way to gain lawful immi-
gration status.
a. The One-Year Deadline
As of April 1, 1997, asylum seekers must file their applications for
asylum within one year of their entry into the United States. An appli-
cant's failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she
filed within one year of entry bars the applicant from asylum eligibility.77
Applicants may only overcome the bar if they demonstrate "changed
circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asy-
lum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an ap-
plication .... The goal of this provision was to ensure that individu-
als applying for asylum were doing so as the result of an urgent need for
protection, rather than as a delay tactic to prolong an unauthorized stay in
the United States.
b. Prompt adjudication of asylum claims and delay in work
authorization eligibility
IIRIRA closed the loophole allegedly exploited by fraudulent asy-
lum seekers to remain indefinitely in the United States with employment
authorization by revoking employment authorization and mandating
prompt adjudication of asylum claims. First, IIRIRA plainly states that
"[a]n applicant for asylum is not entitled to employment authorization..
. .,,79 Congress authorized the Attorney General to provide for employ-
ment authorization via regulation, but stipulated that such authorization
"shall not be granted ... prior to 180 days after the date of filing of the
74. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1993).
75. See INS, ASYLUM REFORM, supra note 73, at 7.
76. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat.
3009, at 3009-546 to -724 (1996).
77. INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (West 2007).
78. INA § 208 (a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
79. INA § 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(2).
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application for asylum., 80 Second, IIRIRA mandates that asylum cases
be adjudicated within one hundred eighty days of receipt of an asylum
application. 81
Given that asylum cases must be completed prior to the passing of
one hundred eighty days, very few asylum seekers will qualify for em-
ployment authorization absent a final grant of asylum. The regulations
stipulate that "[a]ny delay requested or caused by the applicant shall not
be counted as part of' the 180-day employment authorization time pe-
riod.82 Thus, asylum applicants whose cases are denied prior to the 180-
day time period having elapsed remain ineligible for employment au-
thorization while their cases are on appeal.
c. Expedited Removal
The expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA 83 authorize immigra-
tion officers at U.S. ports of entry to expel persons deemed inadmissible
for failure to provide valid entry documents. 84 Expedited removal or-
ders, though issued by fairly low-level immigration officers, are not re-
viewable by a judge.85 An individual who receives an order of expedited
removal is barred from reentering the United States for a minimum of
86five years.
Only those individuals who express a fear of returning to their home
country receive an opportunity to avoid being summarily deported.
IIRIRA provides that individuals who express a fear of returning to their
home country be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine whether
their expressed fear is credible.87 If the asylum officer determines from
the "credible fear" interview that the individual has a "significant possi-
bility ... [of] establish[ing] eligibility for asylum.. ,,,88 the individual
may remain in the United States to pursue asylum before an immigration
judge. 89 If the asylum officer does not believe the individual has a credi-
ble fear of persecution, the individual may be summarily removed. 90
80. Id.
81. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).
82. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2) (2007).
83. INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
84. See INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (rendering inadmissible persons who
attempt to commit fraud to enter the United States); NA § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(7) (ren-
dering inadmissible persons who attempt to enter the United States without a visa).
85. INA §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 242(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
1252(a)(2)(A)(i).
86. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
87. INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
88. INA § 235(b)(l)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2007).
89. 8 C.F.R.§ 208.13 (b)(ii) (2007).
90. NA § 235(b)(I)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(l)(B).
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d. Detention of Asylum Seekers
Individuals subject to expedited removal for attempting to enter the
United States without valid documentation, including those claiming
asylum, are subject to mandatory detention under IIRIRA. 9 1 This applies
even after an individual claiming asylum establishes that he or she has a
credible fear of persecution. DHS usually detains asylum seekers in im-
migration detention facilities, or, more commonly, in county jails from
which the DHS rents bed space.92 An asylum seeker may be detained for
the duration of the adjudication of his or her asylum claim, a process
which often can take several years.
B. The U.S. Asylum System Post-September 11: The Real ID Act of 2005
The asylum system initially seemed to have escaped the fate of the
refugee resettlement program. There was no suspension of asylum proc-
essing, and, other than some backlog-creating adjustments to the security
checks, no significant disturbance to the asylum system. It was not until
nearly four years after the attacks that legislation was passed targeting
the asylum system in the name of counterterrorism.
1. Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Relief from Removal
The Real ID Act of 2005 was passed as part of the Omnibus Iraq
Appropriations Bill.93 One section of the Real ID Act is entitled "Pre-
venting Terrorists from Gaining Relief from Removal, 94 and purports to
reform an asylum system that had become an easy target for infiltration
by terrorists. According to the principal sponsor of the legislation, then-
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee Representative James Sen-
senbrenner:
There is no one who is lying through their teeth that should be able to
get relief from the courts, and I would just point out that this bill
would give immigration judges the tool to get at the Blind Sheik who
wanted to blow up landmarks in New York, the man who plotted and
executed the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, the
man who shot up the entrance to the CIA headquarters in northern
Virginia, and the man who shot up the El Al counter at Los Angeles
International Airport. Every one of these non-9/1 1 terrorists who
tried to kill or did kill honest, law-abiding Americans was an asylum
91. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
92. AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION DETAINEE PRO BONO
OPPORTUNITIES GUIDE 1 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/
probonoguidefinal.pdf.
93. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005).
94. Id. § 101.
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applicant. We ought to give our judges the opportunity to tell these
people no and to pass the bill.
95
Representative Sensenbrenner's assertions regarding the efficacy of the
Real ID Act are incorrect for two reasons. First, the terrorists cited by
Representative Sensenbrenner applied for asylum prior to legislative and
procedural changes to the asylum system, discussed above, that closed
many of the loopholes that they exploited. Second, most of the asylum
provisions in the Real ID Act already existed in case law, albeit in
clearer, more thoughtful language.
2. Credibility, Corroboration and Centrality of Motive
The Real ID Act addresses several areas of asylum law96: establish-
ing credibility; corroborating the asylum claim; and proving the persecu-
tor was motivated by one of the five grounds for asylum. There are two
main problems with the Real ID Act's focus. First, well-established case
law already thoroughly addressed these issues. Second, the Real ID
Act's language obscures and confuses the legal principles contained in
the case law.
a. Credibility
Credibility is arguably the most crucial aspect of any asylum case.
Because specific corroboration is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in
many cases, an asylum applicant's testimony is often the most probative
evidence available. The credibility of that testimony therefore becomes
critical.
Courts have endeavored to strike a balance between protecting the
asylum system from fraud and accepting that certain factors, such as
trauma and cultural differences, may adversely impact credibility. Cur-
rent case law stipulates that asylum adjudicators take into account the
totality of the circumstances when making a credibility determination,
including such factors as demeanor, 97 plausibility, 98 and factual inconsis-
tencies and omissions.99
95. 151 CONG. REC. H453 (2005); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-72 at H2868 (2005) (Conf.
Rep.) (referencing Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman ("Blind Sheikh"), Ramzi Yousef (1993 World Trade
Center bombing), Ahmad Ajaj (1993 World Trade Center bombing), Mir Aimal Kansi (CIA attack),
and Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet (El Al Airlines murder)).
96. The Real ID Act addresses other immigration issues, including withholding of removal
and judicial review. It also addresses border security and driver's license issuance. These provi-
sions are beyond the scope of this Article.
97. See Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that credibility find-
ings based on demeanor deserve more deference that those based on testimonial analysis); Sarvia-
Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an immigration judge is in the
unique position to observe the alien's tone and demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in the testi-
mony, and to determine whether the testimony has "the ring of truth"); Kokkinis v. Dist. Dir., 429
F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that "great weight" should be afforded to the findings of
the special inquiry officer who conducted the deportation hearing, because, inter alia, he had the
opportunity to observe the respondent's demeanor); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 792, 796
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Immigration judges' credibility determinations receive a great deal
of deference from reviewing courts. 00 The Immigration and Nationality
Act authorizes Courts of Appeals to reject an immigration judge's credi-
bility determination only if a "reasonable adjudicator would be com-
pelled" to do so.' 0 ' Similarly, the Board of Immigration Appeals may
only overturn an immigration judge's credibility determination if the
decision is "clearly erroneous.' 0 2  In practice, so long as an adverse
credibility determination is based on more than bare speculation, 0 3 the
Courts of Appeals and the Board will generally uphold it.'0 4 Most Courts
of Appeals, however, have held that discrepancies and omissions that do
(B.I.A. 1997) (recognizing the immigration judge's "advantage of observing the alien as he testi-
fies").
98. See Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that findings of implau-
sibility cannot be based upon unsupported assumptions); Matter of B-, 211. & N. Dec. 66, 71 (B.I.A.
1995) (holding that consistent, sufficiently detailed, and unembellished testimony may provide a
plausible and coherent account of the basis for the fear of persecution, without corroborating evi-
dence); Matter of Dass, 20 1. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that the court is to deter-
mine whether the alien's testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a
plausible and coherent account of the basis for his alleged fear); see also UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA, supra note 44, 204 (stating that "[tihe applicant's statements must be
coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts").
99. See In re A-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1106, 1109 (B.I.A. 1998) (refusing to overturn an immi-
gration judge's adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies and omissions, because
the record revealed that "(1) the discrepancies and omissions described by the Immigration Judge are
actually present; (2) these discrepancies and omissions provide specific and cogent reasons to con-
clude that the respondent provided incredible testimony; and (3) the respondent has not provided a
convincing explanation for the discrepancies and omissions").
100. Credibility determinations based on demeanor receive particular deference because of the
immigration judge's opportunity to observe the applicant's testimony. See Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183
F.3d 1147, 1149-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (affording great deference to credibility determination based on
observation of demeanor); Kokkinis v. District Director, 429 F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1970) (hold-
ing that "great weight" should be afforded to the adjudicator who conducted the hearing because he
had the opportunity to observe the applicant's demeanor); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 792,
796 (B.I.A. 1997) (recognizing that an immigration judge has the advantage of observing an appli-
cant as he or she testifies).
101. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (West 2007).
102. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007).
103. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (overturning an
immigration judge's credibility determination based on "speculation and conjecture"); Unase v.
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an immigration judge's adverse credibil-
ity determination was unsupported by the record when the immigration judge relied on speculation
and tenuous logic).
104. See Kalitani v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding an immigration
judge's credibility determination based upon discrepancies in the applicant's testimony regarding
who procured the documents allowing her to enter the United States, inconsistencies regarding the
applicant's identity, and perceived implausibility in the applicant's account); Wu Biao Chen v. INS,
344 F.3d 272, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding an adverse credibility determination based on the
applicant's hesitant and unconvincing testimony as well as several inconsistencies in his testimony);
Krouchevski v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an applicant's assertions
that the inconsistencies present in his testimony were the result of translation errors and misunder-
standings were insufficient to overcome the "clearly erroneous" standard of review); Matter of R-S-
H-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 629, 637 (B.I.A. 2003) (upholding an immigration judge's adverse credibility
finding based on the "clearly erroneous" standard).
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not go to the heart of the claim are not an appropriate basis for an ad-
verse credibility determination. 10 5
In Matter of A-S-, 0 6 the Board of Immigration Appeals set out the
criteria for determining whether an adverse credibility determination
based on inconsistencies and omissions is supported by the record. First,
the discrepancies and omissions must actually be present in the record.'
0 7
Second, the discrepancies and omissions must provide specific and co-
gent reasons to conclude that the applicant provided incredible testi-
mony. 1 8 Finally, the applicant must have had an opportunity to explainthe discrepancies and omissions and must have failed to do so.10 9
The Real ID Act codifies the long-established prescription that ad-
judicators weigh the totality of the circumstances when making credibil-
ity determinations. 110 Yet, the Real ID Act departs from established case
law, and even INS guidelines,"' regarding whether adjudicators should
take into account minor inconsistencies and omissions by stating that
immigration judges may base a credibility determination on, inter alia,
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods "without regard to whether
an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the appli-
cant's claim ...., This provision of the Real ID Act thus eviscerates
an important safeguard against abuses of discretion and unjust denials of
asylum. Moreover, it does nothing to protect the system from fraudulent,
but well-memorized, claims.
b. Corroboration
Corroborating asylum claims presents significant challenges, espe-
cially in terms of logistics and authentication. Aside from the obvious
difficulty of obtaining direct corroboration from a persecutor, many asy-
105. See Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1053 (2005) ("While minor inconsistencies and omissions will not support an adverse credibility
determination, inconsistencies or omissions that relate to the basis of persecution are not minor but
are at 'the heart of the asylum claim."'); Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)
("Minor inconsistencies in the record such as discrepancies in dates which reveal nothing about an
asylum applicant's fear for his safety are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding."
(quoting Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1988))); see also Leia v. Ashcroft, 393
F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 2005); Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004); Capric v. Ashcroft,
355 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2004).
106. 21 1. & N. Dec. 1106, 1110 (B.I.A. 1998) (noting that an individual fleeing persecution
may have difficulty "remembering exact dates when testifying before an immigration judge").
107. In re A-S-, 211. & N. Dec. at 1109.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101 (a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
111. INS Supplementary Refugee/Asylum Adjudication Guidelines, reprinted in 67
INTERPRETER RELEASES 101, 102 (Jan. 22, 1990) [hereinafter INS Supplementary Guidelines] ("Mi-
nor inconsistencies, misrepresentations, or concealment in a claim should not lead to a finding of
incredibility where the inconsistency, misrepresentation or concealment is not material to the
claim.").
112. Compare Real lD Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Dir. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 303
(2005), with INS Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 111, at 102.
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lum seekers arrive from countries that lack infrastructure, adequate
communication systems, and sometimes even a functioning govern-
ment. l 3  Obtaining documents, even ones as relatively common as a
birth certificate or medical report, can therefore involve logistical im-
pediments that often prove insurmountable. Additionally, persons escap-
ing persecution may leave behind important documents (such as identity
cards, birth certificates, medical records, etc.) when fleeing their coun-
tries, either in haste or in an attempt to conceal their identities from per-
secutors. 114  By attempting to obtain the documents later, an asylum
seeker risks interception of his or her mail, potentially exposing family
and friends to harassment by the persecuting entity. 15 Even documenta-
tion of physical trauma itself can be difficult to obtain, such as in rape
cases, with often little, if any, physical evidence.1 16 In many cases, there-
fore, the more legitimate the persecution, the less likely it is that the asy-
lum seeker will have the required proof.
Courts have recognized the unique challenges that asylum seekers
face in corroborating their claims. In 1987, the Board of Immigration
Appeals decided in Matter of Mogharrabi 17 that, due to the difficulty
asylum seekers often face in obtaining corroborating evidence, "the ap-
plicant's testimony [alone] will suffice if it is credible, detailed and spe-
cific. 1 1 8  Several Courts of Appeals adopted this reasoning," 9 and it
eventually made its way into the Code of Federal Regulations. 
20
113. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugees: 2004 Year in Review,
REFUGEES MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2005, at 8-12 (describing conditions in refugee-producing countries
around the world), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/41 e3a9fc4.pdf.
114. See Michele R. Pistone & Philip C. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still
Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 8 (2001) (explaining that "records may take months or years to
compile because refugees usually leave them behind, and the documents may be available only in
the country from which the refugee has fled").
115. See id. (stating that "[e]ven if friends or family members can obtain copies of the docu-
ments, hostile governments may intercept international mail. Therefore, asylum applicants may
hesitate for a long time before asking others to put themselves at risk by requesting corroborating
records.").
116. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXAMINING ASYLUM SEEKERS: A HEALTH
PROFESSIONAL'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF TORTURE 54-57
(2001). The Guide states:
In the majority of political asylum applicants who allege sexual assault during torture, the
traumatic event(s) will have occurred months or years before the medical examination.
Therefore, most individuals will not have physical signs at the time of the examina-
tion.... Even on examination of the female genitalia immediately after rape there is
identifiable damage in less than 50% of cases. Anal examination of males and females af-
ter anal rape shows lesions in less than 30% of cases.
See id.
117. 19 1. & N. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
118. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 444 (relying on Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767
F.2d 1448, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985)).
119. See Cordon Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that due to "the
serious difficulty with which asylum applicants are faced in their attempts to prove persecution...
this court does not require corroborative evidence" from asylum applicants who have testified credi-
bly); Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360,
362 (6th Cir. 1984)) (holding that an asylum seeker must "present some specific facts, either through
objective evidence or through persuasive credible testimony, to show that his fear of persecution is
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Two years later, in Matter of Dass,'21 the Board clarified its holding
in Matter of Mogharrabi and articulated a general rule for corroboration:
where corroborating evidence is available, the applicant should present
it; when unavailable, the applicant should explain why. 122 The Board
further refined this holding in Matter ofS-M-J-, 123 clarifying that in cases
where corroborating evidence is reasonably expected, it should be pro-
vided. 124 The Board went on to say that if the applicant fails to present
such evidence, it "can lead to a finding that [the] applicant has failed to
meet her burden of proof.' 25 However, the Board noted that "specific
documentary corroboration of an applicant's particular experiences is not
required unless the supporting documentation is of the type that would
normally be created or available in the particular country and is accessi-
ble to the alien, such as through friends, relatives, or co-workers."'
' 26
Matter of S-M-J- also provides examples of the types of facts "easily
subject to verification"'127 for which adjudicators may reasonably expect
corroborating evidence. Those examples include "evidence of [the appli-
cant's] place of birth, media accounts of large demonstrations, evidence
of a publicly-held office, or documentation of medical treatment.'
128
The Real ID Act permits an asylum seeker to corroborate his or her
claim solely with his or her own testimony, so long as the testimony is
"credible ... persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demon-
strate that the applicant is a refugee."' 129 Even if that testimony is suffi-
cient to establish asylum eligibility, the Real ID Act, like Matter of S-M-
1-, permits adjudicators to require corroborating evidence: "Where the
trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be pro-
vided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot rea-
sonably obtain the evidence."'
130
'well-founded') (emphasis added)); Ganjour v. INS, 796 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 576 (7th Cir. 1984)) (holding that an asylum applicant "must
present specific facts, through objective evidence if possible, or through his or her own persuasive,
credible testimony, showing actual persecution or detailing some other good reason to fear persecu-
tion .... ).
120. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b) (2007).
121. 201. & N. Dec. 120 (B.I.A. 1989).
122. Id. at 124-25.
123. 211. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
124. See id. at 725 (holding that "[u]nreasonable demands are not placed on an asylum appli-
cant to present evidence to corroborate particular experiences (e.g., corroboration from the persecu-
tor). However, where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts
pertaining to the specifics of an applicant's claim, such evidence should be provided.").
125. Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
126. Id.; see also Matter of M-D-, 211. & N. Dec. 1180 (B.I.A. 1998), rev'd sub nom, Diallo v.
INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285 (2d. Cir. 2000) (upholding the BIA's determination that asylum applicants
should provide corroborating evidence when it is available).
127. S-M-J-,211.&N. Dec. at725.
128. Id.
129. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101 (a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
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A close reading of this provision, however, demonstrates a signifi-
cant and troubling deviation from Matter of S-M-J-. Note that the statute
does not state, "Where the trier of fact reasonably determines" that the
applicant should provide corroborating evidence. This failure to hold
adjudicators to a standard of reasonableness when determining whether
corroboration is necessary or whether the corroboration provided is suf-
ficient, could potentially lead to abuse of discretion, inconsistent applica-
tion of the law, and the denial of valid asylum claims.' 3 1 Individuals
intending to abuse the asylum system, however, would likely have the
ability and resources to obtain falsified corroboration.
c. Centrality of Motive
An applicant for asylum must prove that the harm he or she suffered
amounted to persecution. The test for whether harm rises to the level of
persecution is threefold. First, the applicant must have suffered harm
severe enough to rise to the level of persecution. 132  Second, the harm
must have been committed by a government or an entity that the gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to control. 133 Third, the harm must have
occurred on account of at least one of the five grounds of asylum: race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular so-
cial group. 134 The Real ID Act addresses the third component, stating
that asylum applicants must prove that one of the five grounds for asy-
lum was or will be "at least one central reason" for the persecution they
endured. 135
Many asylum cases involve "mixed motives," in which persecution
may have occurred on account of one or more non-protected grounds, as
well as one or more protected grounds. In 1992, the Supreme Court held
in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,136 that an applicant must provide "some evi-
dence ... direct or circumstantial" of the persecutor's motive.
37  The
Court further specified that establishing asylum eligibility does not re-
quire "direct proof of [the] persecutors' motives."138 Moreover, "an ap-
131. See Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that "[u]nless the BIA
anchors its demands for corroboration to evidence which indicates what the petitioner can reasona-
bly be expected to provide, there is a serious risk that unreasonable demands will inadvertently be
made.... What is (subjectively) natural to demand may not ... be (objectively) reasonable.").
132. See Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that detention for ten
days accompanied by daily beatings and hard labor constitutes persecution, even in the absence of
serious physical injury); Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that threats and
beatings combined with deprivation of livelihood and ability to leave home amount to persecution);
Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that persistent death threats and
assaults on one's family constitute persecution).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (West 2007); see also, e.g., Galicia v. Asheroft, 396 F.3d 446,
448 (1st Cir. 2005); Abdulrahnan v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); Llana-Castellon v.
INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1097-98 (10th Cir. 1994).
134. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(2)(A) (2007).
135. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
136. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
137. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
138. Id.
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plicant does not bear the unreasonable burden of establishing the exact
motivation of a 'persecutor' where different reasons for actions are pos-
sible., 139 According to the Board of Immigration Appeals,140 "[s]uch a
rigorous standard would largely render nugatory the Supreme Court's
decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, and be inconsistent with the 'well-
founded fear' standard embodied in the 'refugee' definition.'
141
Despite this thorough, long-standing and well-reasoned analysis re-
garding persecutors' motives, the drafters of the Real ID Act saw fit to
require asylum applicants to prove that "race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at
least one central reason for persecuting the applicant." 142 This language
could be interpreted to impose exactly the unreasonable burden against
which the courts have long cautioned. Persecutors generally do not pro-
vide their victims with evidence of, insights into, or discussion about the
atrocities they commit. 143 Requiring asylum applicants to prove where in
the mind of their persecutors the motive resided (center, left of center,
clustered in the center with other non-protected grounds) is an impossible
burden for applicants to meet.' 44 An individual intending to abuse the
asylum system, however, need only obtain falsified documents to satisfy
this particular requirement.
CONCLUSION
The most deplorable aspect of the Real ID Act and the moratorium
on refugee resettlement is that they have harmed innocent individuals
while purporting to fight the war on terror. At best, the proposition that a
terrorist would spend years in a disease-ridden refugee camp, hoping
against all odds to be one of the one-half percent of refugees to be se-
lected for resettlement in the United States, is absurd. Similarly, the pro-
visions of the Real ID Act demonstrate a profound ignorance, or deliber-
ate ignoring, of the reality of September 11: that today's terrorists have
no need to navigate a burdensome asylum system in order to gain access
139. Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988)); see also Romilus v. Ashcrofl, 385 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[N]or
is [the asylum applicant] required to establish [the persecutors'] exact motivations.").
140. Matter of S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 486, 489 (B.I.A. 1996).
141. Id.; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (holding that asylum
seekers must prove only a reasonable possibility of persecution in order to establish a well-founded
fear).
142. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005)
(emphasis added).
143. See Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Persecutors are
hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution."). See also
generally Virgil Wiebe et al., Asking for a Note from Your Torturer: Corroboration and
Authentication Requirements in Asylum, Withholding and Torture Convention Cases, 01-10 Immigr.
Briefings 1 (Oct. 2001) (discussing in detail the corroboration requirements for asylum seekers).
144. See, e.g., Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[R]equiring an alien to
establish the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose insurmountable obstacles .... ").
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to the United States-they need only apply for a nonimmigrant visa in
the comfort of their own country.

PUTTING THE "FORM" IN IMMIGRATION COURT REFORM
REGINA GERMAINt
"Form: procedure according to rule."
-- Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1994)
A number of changes in the immigration court system in the past
decade have brought to light serious problems confronting adjudicators,
applicants and attorneys who practice in the system. To address this
growing crisis,' the Attorney General [?roposed a series of measures to
reform the immigration court system. The proposed reforms, while
greatly needed, fall short because they fail to include one of the basic
tenets of our American court system - rules. It is hard to play by them,
invoke them, or enforce them if there are none. This author proposes
that the Attorney General put "form" into his immigration court reform
proposal by mandating and implementing procedural rules for immigra-
tion courts.
THE PROBLEM
Let's suppose you are one of many volunteer attorneys who has
agreed to take a pro bono asylum case before the Denver Immigration
Court. You might want information about the discovery process, filing
deadlines, briefing requirements, entering an appearance before the court
or basic information such as how to review your client's court file. You
would find very few rules to guide you through the immigration court
maze. If you went to the website of the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review (EOIR), the agency within the Department of Justice which
controls both the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA), and you clicked on the Denver Immigration Court, you
t Regina Germain is Legal Director of the Rocky Mountain Survivors Center (RMSC) and
an adjunct professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. She is also author of the
Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to United States Asylum Law and Procedure (American Immigra-
tion Lawyers Association, 4th Ed. 2005). Prior to her work with RMSC, Ms. Germain was Senior
Legal Counselor in the Washington Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and also taught at the Georgetown University Law Center. She has practiced immigration
law for eighteen years and before six different immigration courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Ms. Germain wishes to thank DU law student and RMSC legal intern, Kelly Ryan, for her
thorough research for this essay.
1. See Ray Rivera, Court Urges Review of New York Judge's Immigration Cases That Are
on Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, at 1.
2. See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.
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would be informed that there are "No Local Operating Procedures."
3
This is a bit misleading, because the Denver Immigration Court does
have unwritten local operating procedures. For example, one judge re-
quires all documents to be filed thirty days before a hearing, another
judge requires fifteen days. According to the EOIR website, there are
currently eleven immigration courts with no local operating procedures
(LOPs). 4  Of course, those courts, like Denver, have unwritten rules.
Courts that do have written operating procedures offer more guidance to
the attorneys who practice before them. Those local procedures can
range from one and one-half pages that the Arlington Immigration Court
has available online,5 to the twelve pages of local procedures from the
Baltimore Immigration Court which includes sample pleadings and mo-
tions.6 Some of the LOPs, however, are more than a decade old and cite
to out-dated regulations.
What might appear most disturbing to an attorney coming to immi-
gration court from a different area of practice is that even when there are
rules, what is noticeably absent from them are some of the most common
areas covered by civil rules of procedure and rules of evidence in other
courts. For example, there are very limited rules of discovery. In fact,
the discovery rules are so limited in immigration court settings that De-
partment of Homeland Security attorneys, who represent the government
in removal proceedings, will often tell private attorneys that there is no
discovery in immigration court proceedings. The few discovery rules
that exist relate to prehearing statements,7 subpoenas,8 and depositions.9
There is no routine procedure for the government to turn over any prior
statements to immigration officials or for access to information contained
in previous filings with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
(USCIS). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests which are
filed because there is no other system in place for sharing documents
necessitates that files be sent to Lee's Summit, Missouri for copying by
FOIA officers, a process that further gums up an already overburdened
system.10 While USCIS recently announced that it will provide acceler-
3. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Local Operating Proce-
dures, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/locopproc.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
4. Id.
5. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Local Operating Proce-
dures, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocijlocopproc.htn (follow "Arlington" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
6. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Local Operating Proce-
dures, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/locopproc.htm (follow "Baltimore" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21 (2007).
8. See 8 C.F.R. § 1287.4 (2007).
9. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(c) (2007).
10. Jill Sheldon, FOIA In Flux, IMMIGRATION DAILY, http://www.ilw.com/articles/2005,0726
-Sheldon.shtm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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ated FOIA access for individuals in removal hearings," that process does
not guarantee that access will be received prior to a removal hearing and
immigration judges routinely deny requests for continuances on the basis
that an individual is awaiting a response to a FOIA request.
Nature, as the saying goes, abhors a vacuum. The vacuum that has
been created because of the lack of rules has been filled by an entity that
has become an all too common source, the federal courts of appeals. The
courts have stepped in time and time again to tell immigration court
judges or the BIA that the unwritten rules they have been imposing are
so onerous that, at times, they amount to a denial of due process or de-
prive the respondent of a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 2 Such
errors require a remand, sometimes resulting in the same decision that
the immigration judge initially made. When the Attorney General has on
occasion reversed the BIA on an evidentiary matter, he has done so in an
unpublished decision that is not binding on immigration courts or the
BIA. 13
WHO'S AT FAULT?
The author cannot fault the immigration judges themselves for the
failure to set forth comprehensive procedures for practice in immigration
court. That type of comprehensive reform must come from the top. As
one federal judge recently stated:
The system is in turmoil as the nation's immigration judges (218 at
last count) struggle to complete some 350,000 cases a year, all with-
out law clerks, bailiffs, stenographers, and often incompetent lawyers
and interpreters. Often, immigration judges are hearing three con-
tested hearings a day and up to 15 in a week. As Judge John M.
Walker, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, told the Senate Judiciary Committee last April, "I fail to see
how immigration judges can be expected to make thorough and com-
petent findings of fact and conclusions of law under these circum-
stances." 
14
And the dissent in that case added:
11. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Fact Sheet: Freedom of Information Act
(Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/FOIAProcessingO22807FS.pdf.
12. Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that it would be odd for
an agency to adopt an even more stringent filter for expert testimony than that used for judicial
proceedings and that therefore the summary exclusion of the expert's testimony was arbitrary);
Kerciku v. Ashcroft, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Solomon v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d
1160, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that there are no court rules requiring the presence of a
witness who has provided an affidavit).
13. In re Marshi, File No. A26-980-386 (Op. Off. Legal Counsel Feb. 13, 2004), 2004 OLC
LEXIS 1, 7 (finding immigration judge erred in disallowing testimony from a U.S. Marine Colonel
who had extensive experience and qualifications, where his testimony would have been material and
supportive of the applicant's asylum claim).
14. Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 886 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007).
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It may be true... that the conditions under which the immigration
judges labor are such that these judges cannot be expected to make
"competent findings of fact." But the majority is wrong to think that
therefore a reviewing court should uphold immigration judges' in-
competent findings of fact. For then an agency could insulate its de-
cisions from judicial review simply by understaffing.
15
Obviously the immigration judges, who have had to keep pace with
an ever-increasing case load 16 cannot be expected to write a comprehen-
sive set of procedural rules. But they should have input and there should
be some flexibility built into the rules.
It should be noted that unlike the immigration courts, the BIA, has a
comprehensive practice manual which addresses procedures for practice
before the BIA, which is updated periodically and available on line.'
7
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS
In response to the growing criticism of immigration judges, the BIA
and the immigration court system in general, 18 the Attorney General is-
sued a memorandum to immigration judges expressing concern about
their conduct and the quality of their work.'9 Later, the Attorney General
issued a document setting forth measures to improve immigration courts
and the Board of Immigration Appeals.2° Many of these measures are
laudable. They include performance evaluations of immigration judges,
giving new judges an immigration law examination, improving training
for both judges and staff, improved reference materials for judges, insti-
tuting mechanisms for promptly detecting poor conduct and quality of
decisions, a code of conduct for judges, an improved complaint proce-
dure, a manual describing the "best practices" for immigration court,
budget increases, improved interpreter selection, and expanded and im-
proved pro bono programs.2'
15. Id. at 898 (Posner, J., dissenting).
16. According to the Denver Immigration Court, its caseload more than doubled in the last
five years, but no additional judges or staff were added despite the increase.
17. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, BIA PRACTICE MANUAL (Sept. 25, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/bia/qapracmanual/BIA Practice Man FullVer.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Gabuniya v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that the immi-
gration judge eagerly jumped on each slip of the tongue or demanded that the applicant be infalli-
ble); Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (the court, in proposing a system with
agency experts, states: "What cannot continue ... is administrative refusal to take a stand on recur-
ring questions, coupled with the reliance on [immigration judges] to fill in for the expertise missing
from the record."); Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (criticizing the immigration
judge for the bias and hostility he showed toward an asylum applicant).
19. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Immi-
gration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-
memo-ijs.pdf.
20. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRATION
COURTS AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (2006), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/P 104.pdf.
21. Id. at 1-7.
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The measures do not go far enough because they do not mandate
that immigration courts adopt procedural rules. What good are trainings
and reference materials if judges are deprived of the guidance they need
to make the most elemental decisions in a case? Suppose an unwritten
rule requires filing thirty days before a hearing but a document arrives
twenty days before the hearing and the applicant tries to file it? Must the
judge deny its admission? What are the exceptions, if any, to an immi-
gration court filing deadline if there are no written rules? If judges are
trained that there should be exceptions, how do they impart that informa-
tion to attorneys and applicants if there are no written rules? 218 immi-
gration judges could decide the issue 218 different ways and the only
way the issue will be finally resolved is through a precedent BIA deci-
sion or a decision from a federal appeals court. This is hardly the most
efficient way to make procedural rules for a court and it is a recipe for
inconsistency throughout the system. Yet this is precisely the body of
law that is developing.
Even a manual of "best practices," while useful in improving the
overall level of practice in immigration court, does not replace the need
for concrete rules of procedure and evidence that can be applied across.
the board to wealthy and poor, represented and pro se, detained and non-
detained. I would advise the Attorney General to change the "best prac-
tices" manual he has proposed into Rules of Procedure and Evidence for
Immigration Court. He should include rules governing entry of appear-
ance, discovery, witnesses, continuances, court filings deadlines (and
exceptions), experts, affidavits, and telephonic testimony.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it is the fact that we are a country of laws that sets us
apart from many other countries in the world. It is unfortunate, however,
that many of the non-citizens who have fled oppressive regimes overseas




Is THERE A HUMAN-RIGHTS DIMENSION TO
IMMIGRATION?




She sat with him for a day, searching for water, never straying too
far away for fear she could get lost. On Sunday, her little boy died....
[Edith] Rodriguez had staggered and zigzagged in her dehydrated
state. At one point, it took a half hour to track just 00 feet of her jour-
ney. Six hours later, they found the boy's body under a mesquite tree.
His mother had neatly placed his shoes to his side and carefully folded
his arms across his chest. Authorities held Rodriguez for three days
while they contemplated charging her with child endangerment. She was
finally released with no charges and returned to Mexico.
INTRODUCTION
Three-year-old David and his mother represent the human saga in
the immigration issue. Immigration has become one of the most conten-
tious issues of our time. People migrate for various reasons, ranging
from searching for a better economy, to fleeing persecution, to seeking
asylum. But, one of the most overpowering reasons why humans mi-
grate is to save their families from a life of poverty and deprivation.
People migrate to a land that is more prosperous than the land in which
they were born. Unfortunately, the current immigration debate in the
United States has been more politicized than ever before, the reasons for
t Dr. Saby Ghoshray specializes in Constitutional Law, International Law, Capital Jurispru-
dence, Military Tribunals, and Cyberspace Law. His work has appeared in the Albany Law Review,
ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, the European Law Journal ERA-Forum, the
Toledo Law Review, Catholic Law Journal, Miami Law Review, and the Georgetown International
Law Review. The author would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her assistance in conducting legal
research and typing the manuscript. Warm thanks go to the members of the Denver University Law
Review Editorial Board and their interest in the manuscript. Dr. Ghoshray can be reached at
sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net
1. Claudine LoMonaco, US. - Mexico Border: The Season of Death, FRONTLINE, June 27,
2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/blog/2006/06/usmexicoborder1 .html
In May of 2006, 3-year-old David Rodriguez Reyes died of heat exposure in the Arizona
desert. Along with his mom, Edith Rodriguez Reyes they were fleeing their poverty
stricken home of Cancun, Mexico. They set out on foot, following the guidance of a
coyote they had paid to lead them to the U.S. border. Along the way, the unimaginable
happened, but it happens all the time. Lack of water, the heat, and the arduous journey
takes a toll on the human body and death ensues, in this case, for little David, too young
to care about the politics and fiery immigration debate.
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which I have discussed elsewhere. 2 While the media personalities bom-
bard the airwaves with their anti-immigration rhetoric, 3 the politicians
cash in on these sentiments, 4 sidestepping the human issues-two areas I
want to focus on in this review. Studies have attempted to show whether
immigration is better or worse for the prevailing economy.5 Research
has also been conducted to understand what impact economy has on the
prevailing employment and how immigration has affected the welfare of
2. See Saby Ghoshray, Race, Symmetry and False Consciousness: Piercing the Veil ofAmer-
ica 's Anti-Immigration Policy, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming).
3. CNN Immigration Problem: Is -Dobbs the Exception-or the Rule?, FAIRNESS AND
ACCURACY IN REPORTING (FAIR), Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2867. In
this context, I refer to the current phenomenon in which the politicians and media personalities
routinely exaggerate the severity of an impending disaster or threat. Politicians and media personali-
ties are in positions of influence and have the ability to shape public opinion. Driven by their per-
sonal agenda, they routinely project a false sense of future calamity. Whether print, radio, or televi-
sion, the media has been notorious in lambasting immigrants and making a case for the harm they
cause in society. For example, CNN anchor Lou Dobbs has been an outspoken voice on the immi-
gration topic, such that on his show "Loud Dobbs Tonight" in a segment entitled "Broken Borders,"
he routinely spells out the dangers of not patrolling on the Southern U.S. borders:
Dobbs' tone on immigration is consistently alarmist; he warns his viewers (3/31/06) of
Mexican immigrants who see themselves as an "army of invaders" intent upon re-
annexing parts of the Southwestern U.S. to Mexico, announces (11/19/03) that "illegal
alien smugglers and drug traffickers are on the verge of ruining some of our national
treasures," and declares (4/14/05) that "the invasion of illegal aliens is threatening the
health of many Americans" through "deadly imports" of diseases like leprosy and ma-
laria.
Lou Dobbs is not alone. His fellow CNN colleague, Jack Cafferty, as well as radio-com television
host, Glenn Beck, have made on-air negatively-slanted comments about immigrants. Id. An article
by the Southern Poverty Law Center notes:
A new study of media coverage shows that a large number of daily newspapers wildly
exaggerated the number of volunteers who actually took part in the Minuteman Project, a
vigilante "citizens border patrol" operation that took place in southeastern Arizona over
the month of April 2005.
Southern Poverty Law Center, Anti-Immigration Movement Newspapers Inflated Minuteman Num-
bers, Summer 2006, http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=635.
4. If one doubts that policy makers have anti-immigration agendas in the ordinances and
zoning codes, here are just two samples of such policies. Hazelton, Pennsylvania, passed the Illegal
Immigration Relief Act. American Civil Liberties Union, Coalition Gains Immediate Halt to Un-
Constitutional Ordinance in Hazleton, PA, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/
26644prs20060901.htmi. The name of the Act has a tone of concern for the illegal immigrant.
However, the Act does not provide relief: rather it mandates that all city documents be printed only
in English, and landlords that rent to undocumented workers be fined $1,000. Id. Furthermore, in
Virginia, officials came up with a clever way to discriminate against immigrants that tend to live in
joint family structures. Using city planning rules, the City announced the "anti-crowding law"
which defined the number of people in a home that deemed overcrowding in one dwelling. See
Stephanie McCrummen, Anti-Crowding Law Repealed: Latinos Were Focus of Manassas Ban on
Extended Families in Homes, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2006, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/l 1/AR2006011102532.
html. The city also defined what make-up of individuals in a relationship creates a family that could
reside together. Id. This ordinance for example, not only deems the number occupants considered
breaking city zoning code, but it also fines any non-immediate family members. Id. To ensure the
enforcement of the code, the city provided a toll free hotline so Virginia residents could call and
anonymously report overcrowding in their neighborhoods. Id.
5. Howard F. Chang, Immigration Restrictions as Employment Discrimination, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 291, 296-97 (2003); Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt, The Impact ofImmigrants
on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth, 9 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 23, 23 (1995); Julian L.
Simon, Public Expenditures on Immigrants to the United States, Past and Present, 22 POPULATION
& DEV. REv. 99, 99 (1996); Scott Thurm, Asian Immigrants Are Reshaping Silicon Valley, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 1999.
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the native-born citizens.6 The current immigration debate in the United
States also centers on the protection of its borders, arising out of the se-
curity concerns and terrorism-related fears. I suggest in this review that
the current debate or the existing literature surrounding immigration is
missing the human-rights factor.
While the immigration debate gets mired in the political quagmire
of Euro-centric policy debate,8 and stays within the narrow trajectory
centered on economic preservation of the native-born Americans,9 I want
to introduce the hitherto uncovered dimension of human rights into this
immigration debate. This new perspective of immigration centers on
asking the profound question: Is there a human right to immigration?
What moral obligations does the target country or the destination point
have? The issue of the human right to migrate is indeed complex, and, in
my view, it resides within an implicit understanding of inherent dignity
of humanity. This recognition of human dignity comes from a viewpoint
that understands immigrants not as threats, but part and parcel of a mo-
saic of color, rhythms, and dreams that define the United States of Amer-
ica. I embark on a step-by-step analysis in this Article to arrive at my
conclusion. Therefore, I ask a series of questions. Analyzing these ques-
tions will help develop a framework to understand the broad issue of
immigration's human-rights dimension.
As I begin looking at immigration from a broader human-rights per-
spective, I am interested to discover if there is a fundamental-right analy-
sis which could help our cause. I want to consider whether there is doc-
trinal support that asserts a fundamental right to immigration. To that
effect, this analysis will evolve in multiple divergent threads. They are
divergent, yet when they are considered together, these threads help de-
velop a more transparent immigration-rights analysis. I will focus on the
scope and dimension of human rights in immigration and consider
whether a moral obligation exists for the target country based on some
doctrinal and philosophical foundation. Furthermore, my inquiry in this
Article seeks to establish whether there is a property-right element that
could bring in more transparency within this complex immigration issue.
I want to consider whether property rights can capture the political vicis-
situdes and partisan argumentation that we see happening in our immi-
gration debate. Additionally, is there a special application of property
right that could be legitimately applied to understand the immigration
right?
6. Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 5, at 23.
7. See generally MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POL'Y INST., AMERICA'S
CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
7 (2003).
8. For a discussion of the Euro-centric viewpoint of immigration, see Ghoshray, supra note
2.
9. For a discussion of economic preservation, see Ghoshray, supra note 2.
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In this Article, Part I delves into a two-prong human-rights analysis
based on developing an economic rationale for liberal immigration pol-
icy in the first segment, followed by an exploration of the politicization
process that subsumes the human-rights dimension. In Part II, I examine
whether other competing views of immigration based on property rights
or moral discourse make sense within the present context, especially
whether these arguments can necessarily advance a human-rights agenda.
Part III seeks to place this human-rights discourse on a firmer foothold,
as it attempts to explore the interplay amongst fundamental rights, natu-
ral rights, and human rights. Finally, I conclude by further discussing
whether a human right to immigration exists, and whether that right is
achievable within the present construct.
I. IS THERE A HUMAN-RIGHTS ELEMENT TO IMMIGRATION?
Consider balancing on a shoddy raft in the hopes of landing on the
Florida shores, or following the arduous footsteps of a coyote across the
blazing, drought-ridden desert in search of the Arizona border. These are
not made-up fables. These are some of the tortuous obstacles individuals
confront when they decide to migrate to the United States. Whether we
are pro- or anti-immigration, we can agree it is complex in its multidi-
mensional impacts and fraught with severe emotional undercurrents. To
some, like the landless Mexican farmer, the U.S. spirit beckons with ex-
tended hands to the tired and weak to come and find rest. Migrating to
the United States promises hope and opportunities to break the cycle of
poverty and persecution. However, these open-hand promises do not
come without resounding cries amongst scores of U.S. citizens that view
immigration as the abrogation of socio-cultural symmetry and a threat to
the majority's economic preservation. The majority's need for self-
preservation is expressed in resistance and has a disappointing xenopho-
bic tone in the demand to end immigration, which is further compounded
by the misunderstanding about the economic impact of immigration.
While literature is replete with economic issues surrounding immigra-
tion, the interplay of race, symmetry, and economy has not been studied
thoroughly. While the importance of the economic effects of immigra-
tion cannot be ignored, the faces of humanity-the Mexican farmer, the
Cuban tailor, and the Nigerian teacher--cannot be ignored either. The
human factor makes it incumbent that we consider the interplay of issues
surrounding immigration. I intend to discuss several of these important
issues in this article.
The public opinion and dividing lines on U.S. immigration, whether
legal or illegal is obvious.10 Print media, television media, and even ra-
10. The immigration debate has been brewing almost since the first immigrants arrived. Since
the turn of the millennium, America has experienced the highest immigration rates to date, resulting
in polarized viewpoints on whether immigration hinders or benefits America's economy. For a
favorable view, see Stephen Moore, Social Scientists' Views on Immigrants and U.S. Immigration
[Vol. 84:41154
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dio media are quick to blame immigrants for terrorism,1 l crime rate
hike, 1 2 socio-cultural change,'
3 and draining the public welfare system,'
4
just to name a few.
Native-born Americans have not always lent a welcoming hand to
new immigrants,' 5 and the feeling of resentment towards immigration
has reached a new peak. 16  The extreme feelings of anti-immigration
have been fueled by the domestic concerns about terrorism and the econ-
omy.1 7 The anti-immigrant feeling as a result of a heightened fear of
terrorism is a more recent phenomenon. Consider the terrorism factor.
Since 9/11 U.S. citizens are bombarded with elevated security alerts,
stricter body searches at public events, and are being persuaded about the
need to build a fence along the Mexican-U.S. border. Consider the
economy factor. The threat of losing jobs and lowering the hourly wage
has been the rallying cry on the issue of losing economic advantage. The
increase in unemployment among U.S.-born citizens, 8 and downward
pressure on wages at all levels' 9 have been blamed on immigrants.
Existing economic literature and empirical economic studies sug-
gest that the public cries about losing economic advantage to immigra-
tion is without merit. Yet, the perception persists that illegal aliens or
foreigners are taking all the jobs from native citizens,20 and that these
same immigrants are overburdening the welfare system.2 1 These percep-
tions have grown in intensity as numerous vested interest groups politi-
cize the immigration issue.22 Also, the many news-media channels rely
on the immigration debate to boost their ratings by constantly propagat-
ing an alarmist viewpoint among viewers.23 The issue of immigration
acts as fodder for those wanting to dramatize and abuse this emotionally-
riddled issue for their vested gain. Respected research on the labor mar-
Policy: A Postscript, 487 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 213, 213 (1986). For a contrary
viewpoint, see George J. Boijas, Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What
Happened to Immigrant Earnings in the 1980s?, 13 J. OF LAB. ECON., 201, 201-02, (1995).
11. See generally MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING
I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX 5-6 (2003).
12. See Donald R. Taft, Does Immigration Increase Crime?, 12 Soc. FORCES 69, 69-70
(1933).
13. See R. Stephen Warner, Immigrants and the Faith They Bring, RELIGION-ONLINE.ORG.
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2946 (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
14. Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories and
Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159, 160-61 (1998).
15. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Conference Paper, America's Schizophrenic Immigration
Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 758-59 (2000).
16. Id. at 767-70.
17. See generally CHISHTI ET AL., supra note 7.
18. See Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 5, at 23.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See Simon, supra note 5, at 99.
22. See, e.g., FAIR, supra note 3; Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 3.
23. See Southern Poverty Law Center, supra note 3.
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ket impact of immigration, however, supports the fact that immigrants do
not displace native workers.24
Studies have established that immigration has a positive impact on
the economy as immigration always produces net economic gain to the
residents of destination countries, especially in the advanced econo-
mies.2 5  In addition, neo-classical economic theory purports that even
with the increase of the number of immigrants there is no observable role
in reducing wages,26 or increasing unemployment. 27 The anti-immigrant
lobby fails to recognize these economic facts. They also ignore that im-
migrants' impact on the economy by increasing the demand of labor and
goods with their own consumption, 28 which runs conversely to the myth
of immigrants only taxing and burdening the system.29 Research on the
economic impact from immigration does not indicate a negative im-
pact.30  Rather, immigration appears to benefit the American economy
and population as a whole. Against this backdrop of positive economic
impact, why then, is the anti-immigration debate predominantly based on
a negative economic perspective? Let us explore this further.
The concepts of equality, freedom, and opportunity for all humans
of this earth form the very essence of a human-rights discourse of immi-
gration, which was also the original premise based on which America
was founded. Within this original premise lies the expanded conception
of a view that this land will provide refuge to the persecuted and will
become ultimately a harbor to those who have been victimized in their
land of origin. Emma Lazarus captured this humanistic yearning beauti-
fully in the poem Colossus.
31
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.. . , the homeless,. . . to
32
me...
24. See Chang, supra note 5, at 304-08.
25. Idat 305, 308, 311-12.
26. Immigrants, whether legal or not, are often feared as a threat to the rule of law and the
degradation of the economic stability of the country. Because of these fears, immigrants are easy
political scapegoats for the ills of society. However, in reality the flow of unskilled labor is not only
needed but will improve the overall economy. See generally NIGEL HARRIS, THE NEW
UNTOUCHABLES: IMMIGRATION AND THE NEW WORLD WORKER (1995).
27. Id.
28.' See Simon, supra note 5; Thurm, supra note 5.
29. See Simon, supra note 5.
30. See generally Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 5.
31. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS, (1889), available
at http://factmonster.com/ipka/A0874962.html. The New Colossus poem was written by Jewish
American poet, Emma Lazarus, in an effort to raise money for the pedestal that the Statue of Liberty
would rest on. Her famous poem was etched on that very pedestal. The meaning of the poem cap-
tured the heartstrings of the millions who immigrated to the United States. The complete poem and
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This openness in welcoming strangers, the immigrants, has been
eroded in numerous ways, by the nativist sentiments, of their own fears
of survival and by fears of losing the American way. The humanistic
discourse behind immigration in America has lost its original premise.
Almost two centuries later, in a world rapidly becoming smaller due to
globalization, America is being seen less as that land of abode and refuge
that originally beckoned the persecuted humanity. The pertinent ques-
tion that comes before us is: What is the genesis of the current anti-
immigration rhetoric encircling the media,33 the policy makers,34 and the
legislation?35  In this present discourse, I do not want to delve into the
reasoning behind this anti-immigration backlash, an area I have covered
elsewhere.36
I have shown that the anti-immigrant vibe of today comes from the
contemporary nativist movement built on the hidden agenda of Euro-
centric, 37 self-preservation, a long-tenured guiding principle that nurtured
the development of the American civilization.38 America was initially
built on a fairly open immigration policy, where European immigrants
were welcomed and encouraged to settle. However, the history of immi-
gration also recorded early nativist backlash against these early immi-
grants. Various exclusionary and restrictive immigration measures also
33. See sources cited supra note 3.
34. See sources cited supra note 4.
35. See H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005). In December of 2005, the House of Representatives
passed H.R.4437, Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005.
Id. Review of this Act finds an anti-immigration tone. Enforcement of this Act would classify any
individual not in current legal status as a criminal. Id. at Sec. 203. This Act would eliminate the
'day in court' approach the U.S. society has long valued. It eliminates due process and it eliminates
judicial review. There would be no judge to appeal to. The overwhelming majority of individuals
that would be harmed by H.R. 4437 are the relatively innocent immigrants that for a myriad of
harmless reasons fall out of legal status. To gain better insight into the details of this Act, visit
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 09-4437.
36. See Ghoshray, supra note 2, at 3-4.
37. See id. at 7-8, 29-30. Here, I provide a brief review of the original immigrants that
founded the United States. For brevity, I focus only on the immigrants that came across the oceans
to colonize America and not those Native Indians already present on the American soil. The first
immigrants to America were virtually all from Europe. The colonial period of the seventeenth
century witnessed immigrants from England that rapidly settled in Virginia and New England. The
colonization process was solidified in Jamestown, Virginia, the famous first settlement in North
America. The influx of immigrants grew and became more widespread as thousands of religious
Pilgrims established the Plymouth Colony in Massachusetts. The values of those first Pilgrims
increasingly influenced the developing colonies. These Pilgrims were the original Anglo-Saxon
immigrants who were white, spoke English, and practiced the Protestant religion. The Anglo-Saxon
immigrant traits and characteristics created the founding bedrock culture of the United States of
America and their impact is still apparent in the twenty-first society.
38. See Seth Kaller, Inc., Thomas Jefferson Signed Naturalization Act: Establishes Law for
Citizenship, available at http://www.sethkaller.net/catalogs/turningpointsdd/l 1232 dd.php (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007). The path to U.S. citizenship was much easier for a white immigrant than
those non-whites. The genesis of restricting immigrants' citizenship based on color and ethnicity has
its origins in the Naturalization Act of 1790, which held that any "white person" would be granted
U.S. citizenship. Further, empirical evidence is abundant which details the profiles of the initial
immigrants and established that they were nearly exclusively white Anglo-Saxon individuals. For
more information on this topic, review the information available at
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAimmigration.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
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made it challenging for non-European immigrants or East-European im-
migrants to prosper and proliferate amongst a predominantly Anglo-
conformist environment, as I have shown in my earlier research.39
The impact of these enforcement mechanisms in shaping the lives
of the immigrants can hardly illuminate the constant tension between the
human rights of the immigrants and the combination of economic, xeno-
phobic, racist reasons that prompt countries to develop exclusionary im-
migration practices. While the poet Emma Lazarus celebrated America's
welcoming of "the poor" and the "huddled masses" into its shores, the
real history of America's exclusionary immigration policies perhaps is
better understood through the eyes of American-born Fred Korematsu40
who endured the ignominy of the Japanese Internment Act4' and the leg-
acy of Korematsu v. United States.42
Exploring the archives of the recorded history of America, we are
painfully constrained to find that the focus of immigration restriction of
the nineteenth century centered on the stated objective to keep the "poor"
and the "huddled masses" out of America's shores using the public-
charge criteria and personal-wealth factor.43 Beginning with the 1882
Chinese Exclusion Act,44 the exclusionary immigration enforcement con-
39. See Ghoshray, supra note 2, at 8, 33-34.
40. See Eric Yamamoto & May Lee, Excerpts from a Brief Biography: Fred Korematsu,
AABA NEWSLETTER (Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area, San Francisco,
Cal.), May 2004, at 1, 4. available at www.aaba-bay.com/aaba/docs/aaba-0504.pdf.
41. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Against the backdrop of World.
War II, President Roosevelt authorized the internment of tens of thousands of American citizens of
Japanese ancestry. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944). President Roose-
velt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, and banned any citizen from the coastal
area along Washington to California and also southern Arizona. See id. The order authorized forci-
bly relocating individual citizens to less than desirable relocation camps controlled by the military.
See id. at 220-21. The vast majority of the individuals who were held captive were of Japanese
ancestry and suffered grievous violations of their civil liberties. The war-time measures were
sweeping in scope and uprooted whole communities. There is no doubt that Order 9066 was in-
tended for Japanese citizens as well as residents. I offer a snapshot of the instructions published in
the San Francisco News on April 2, 1942. The instructions read:
INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
Living in the Following Area:
All that portion of the City and County of San Francisco, lying generally west of the of
the north-south line established by Junipero Serra Boulevard, Worchester Avenue, and
Nineteenth Avenue, and lying generally north of the east-west line established by Cali-
fornia Street, to the intersection of Market Street, and thence on Market Street to San
Francisco Bay. All Japanese persons, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from
the above designated area by 12:00 o'clock noon Tuesday, April 7, 1942. No Japanese
person will be permitted to enter or leave the above described area after 8:00 a.m., Thurs-
day, April 2, 1942....
Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco, Internment of San Francisco Japanese (Apr. 1, 1942),
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist9/evacorder.htmi.
42. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
43. See Maxine S. Seller, Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: Case
Studies and Current Implications, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY) 137,
153-54 (1982).
44. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 167 (Eric Foner & John A.
Garraty eds., Houghton Mifflin Company 1991). The Exclusionary Act was not the only form of
anti-immigration attacks on Chinese immigrants. In an 1854 case, the California Supreme Court in
2007] HUMAN-RIGHTS DIMENSION TO IMMIGRATION
tinued unabated until the 1924 National Origins Quota System.45  Im-
plicit within these legislations was race-based discrimination designed to
stymie the rise of immigration from southern and eastern European coun-
tries, which made it increasingly difficult for nordic and northern Euro-
peans to retain their racial majority.46 In addition, the National Quota
System did not have any provision for immigrants from Asian and Afri-
can countries at all.47 This racially-asymmetric balance was captured by
Harvard Professor, Charles Ogletree Jr., who noted that although the
origins-based quota system gave way to the more liberalized immigration
policy under the Immigration and National Act Amendments of 1965,48
the discriminatory effect remained. According to Professor Ogletree,
"implicit and explicit racial biases still pervade all four major avenues of
legal immigration: family-sponsored, employment-based, diversity and
refugee. The family-sponsored and employment-based immigration
rules appear to be facially neutral, but per-country ceilings and racial
biases in determining eligibility have resulted in fewer immigration visas
for people of color. 4 9 These exclusionary policies were at odds with the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which categorically states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or interna-
tional status of the country or territory to which a person belongs,
whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any
other limitation of sovereignty.
50
Race-based discrimination in processing immigrants' entry to the
United States has been a constant theme within a broader U.S. immigra-
People v. Hall ruled that the testimony of a Chinese man who witnessed a murder by a white man
was inadmissible because the Chinese were:
[A] race of people who[se] nature has [been] marked as inferior, and who are incapable
of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown;
differing in language, opinions, color, and physical conformation; between whom and
[our own] nature has placed an impassable difference [and as such had no fight] to swear
away the life of a citizen [or] participate with us in administering the affairs of our Gov-
ernment.
See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (Cal. 1854).
45. See Seller, supra note 43, at 148.
46. See id. at 148, 151-52.
47. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § l1(b), (d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (1924) (defining
calculation of quotas but omitting "descendants of slave immigrants" and persons "ineligible to
citizenship" from the population for purposes of calculation); Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of
Race in American Immigration Law: A Re-Examination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. OF AM.
HIST. 67, 72 (1999); Seller, supra note 43, at 148.
48. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, sec. 2, § 202(a), Pub. L. No.
89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (instituting per-country ceilings); see Ogletree, supra note 15, at 761.
49. Ogletree, supra note 15, at 761.
50. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/
rights.html.
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tion policy. 5' In sharp contrast to the human-rights ideals of the United
Nations Charters, race-based selective enforcement of immigrants has
been the predominant norm, as seen in countless illegal raids against
legal residents and harassing them for legal documents,52 selective race-
based confiscation of immigrants at checkpoints,53 unwarranted entry
into resident homes54 in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment's ille-
gal search and seizure provisions,55 and discriminatory enforcement of
the identification requirement of ethnic minorities.56 Not only do these
practices of arbitrary and selective enforcement of federal immigration
laws create questions regarding civil rights protection deficiencies, but
they begin to develop a total annihilation of a human-rights framework
within the American immigration system. While human-rights standards
could provide a tool to manage the tension discussed earlier, U.S. poli-
cies of raced-based profiling have not only been restricted to law-
enforcement officers in charge of federal immigration laws, but they
have also developed into a predominant pattern among the consular offi-
cials as documented in Olsen v. Albright.57 Clear consular instructions
further corroborate the explicit racial overtones of an existing policy, as
it categorically states: "Filipinos and Nigerians have high fraud rates, and
their applications should be viewed with extreme suspicion, while British
and Japanese citizens rarely overstay, and generally require less scru-
tiny. 58
These systematic violations of human rights and routine denials of
the legal rights of immigrants compel us to engage in an inquiry that
begins with the profound question we asked earlier: Is there a human-
rights dimension to immigration? Where does the human-rights element
reside within a broader discourse on immigration? How does it come
into play in a broader immigration discourse? I will first attempt to un-
51. See Ogletree, supra note 15, at 761-62.
52. See Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Civil Rights Concerns within




55. See id. (describing warrantless searches).
56. Id.
57. 990 F. Supp. 31, 33-34 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Olsen v. Christopher, 962 F. Supp. 5
(D.D.C. 1997) (emphasizing a concern that the State Department may be promoting racial profiling
in the adjudication of nonimmigrant visa applications). In Olsen v. Albright, a Brazilian consular
officer contested his termination for refusal to abide by a race-based visa eligibility policy. 990 F.
Supp. at 32-33. The lawsuit uncovered startling facts regarding established policy guidelines for the
overseas visa application process, which the Court held was in violation of federal anti-
discrimination law. Id. at 37-39. These polices include (i) general descriptions such as "looks
poor," or "looks rough," and (ii) specific races such as, Arab, Chinese and Koreans categorized for
additional scrutiny for suspicion of major fraud. Id. at 33-34. The court held that, "the consulate's
visa policies stand in direct opposition to the progress this country has made in eliminating discrimi-
nation in the context of immigration law." Id. at 39.
58. Albright, 990 F. Supp. at 34 (internal quotes omitted).
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derstand the human-rights viewpoint for economic and human welfare
concepts, and then examine the global-justice viewpoint.
A. Economic Viewpoint of Human Rights in Immigration
From the days of yore, human migration has centered on economic
grounds, as humanity's primal instinct for survival has caused artificial,
geographical barriers to crumble under the willingness of human desire.
From a purely economic point of view, the drive for immigration comes
from the multitude of factors which include persisting poverty, 59 growing
unemployment, 60 loss of an agrarian way of life,6' and loss of income as
a result of global trading realignment. 62  Under no circumstances do
these constitute an exhaustive list of factors that drive people to the un-
forgiving desert highway along the U.S.-Mexican border in search of a
better life; or that drives a desperate mother and children to stack them-
selves like sardines into the back of a truck with no ventilation which
ultimately becomes the tomb of many of its occupants. This drive is not
so difficult to comprehend when you consider that increasing globaliza-
tion of labor may have brought efficiencies and economies of scale from
a corporate point of view, but from the human point of view, it has
caused a severe and disproportionate distribution of resources.63 This has
resulted in significant inequity among the masses of this world, and I
would argue that we must recognize the issue of immigration from this
broader human-rights dimension.
What then, is the economic viewpoint of the human-rights dimen-
sion of immigration? Does that mean, whenever there is shortage of
food, or loss of avenues for income in any parts of the world, that the
59. Why do People Migrate?, BBC.CO.UK, http://www.bbc.co.uk/print/schools/gcsebitesize/
geography/population/migrationrev3.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). At the very core of migra-
tion are two concepts called the push and pull factors. Id. The push factors influence people in their
migration decisions. Id. First consider the push factors which are issues like political fears, natural
disasters and poor living conditions. Id. Persons migrate away from push factors. The second core
concept is the pull factors. Id. The pull factors are issues like better housing and education, chances
of a job and good medical care. Id. Persons migrate toward pull factors. Id. Because of the overall
wealth, high standard of living and high quality of life compared to other nations, people of the
world have migrated to the United States for many decades.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See Mark Weisbrot, Globalization on the Ropes, Z MAGAZINE,
http://www.zmag.org/globropes.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
63. See id. In his article, Weisbrot notes:
Critics of corporate globalization have focussed [sic] primarily on its most glaring injus-
tices, its environmental destruction, its erosion of national sovereignty-- and with good
reason. The Fund and the Bank are bleeding Africa dry, exacting debt payments from the
poorest countries in the world that are ten times as large (relative to income) as the Allies
considered conscionable to take from Germany after World War I1. Their relentless pro-
motion of resource-intensive exports has hastened the destruction of the world's forests.
And of course there is nothing good that comes from allowing the secret tribunals of the
WTO to substitute their judgement [sic] for that of elected representatives on matters of
public health and safety.
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onus is on the United States to open its borders so people from all over
can come in and work? After all, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states unequivocally: "Everyone has the right to work, to free
choice of employment, to just and favourable [sic] conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment. '" 64 The issue before us is to
identify, therefore, if the problem in other parts of the world necessarily
becomes a human-rights obligation to the United States as it pertains to
opening its border for more immigration. Clearly the growing crisis of
global economic security is one of the drivers of the immigration crisis.
This crisis is deepened when a sovereign state becomes engaged in a
negotiation between two diverging variables, such as, the individual hu-
man right,65 and the economic interest of the target state.66 As I have
shown earlier, the economic impact of immigration in the United States
has been well-researched and, therefore, must not influence any discus-
sion centering on purely human-rights issues. While I examine the ten-
sion between a sovereign state's stronger controlling impulse with glob-
alization's weakening impact on its territorial integrity, I see shades of
humanistic jurisprudence posing challenges toward the restrictive cove-
67nant in immigration. This regulation of immigration, I would argue,cannot be divorced from the analysis of a global-justice viewpoint.68
History has shown repeatedly that humanity's drive for survival is
the most primal of all instincts. Faced with the dire consequences of
survival, an individual from a poorer country will find a way to arrive at
the shores of a richer nation. While the sovereignty of a nation state dic-
tates imposing territorial control to stem the flow of immigration, the
human right to survive presents a unique challenge of not relaxing the
border in order to save lives. Especially in an era of globalization, how
64. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at art. 23, U.N GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/
Overview/rights.html.
65. See generally id. ("[T]he equal and alienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.").
66. Here, I refer to the fact that economic interest of the destination country has been the
focus of much debate as the specter of immigration looms large. Despite the popular sentiments
alluding to the adverse economic impact of immigration, no study has been able to establish a causal
link between excessive immigration and economic crisis in the advanced economies.
67. By restrictive covenants I refer to the current bent in legislation and within the administra-
tion that proposes a stricter immigration control and border tightening. See, e.g., Border Protection,
Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, supra note 35.
68. In my view, global justice must incorporate concern and efforts toward ensuring equaltiy
and justice for all. As Weisbrot notes: "There is nothing natural or inevitable about an economic
order that restricts half of the earth's six billion people to an income of less than two dollars a day."
Weisbrot, supra note 62. To understand some of the issues and concepts discussed within the global
justice viewpoint consider that global justice is an issue in political philosophy arising from the
concern that "we do not live in a just world." Wikipedia, Global Justice,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globaljustice (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). Many people are extremely
poor, while others are extremely rich. Many live under tyrannical regimes. Many are vulnerable to
violence, disease, and starvation. Many die prematurely. How should we understand and respond to
these facts? What do the inhabitants of the world owe one another? What institutions and what
ethical standards should we recognize and apply throughout the world?
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can a nation close its border and enjoy the fruits of economic prosperity
when people could be dying of hunger on the other side of its border? I
would argue, therefore, that the issue of immigration goes beyond a hu-
man-rights discourse, as it also intersects within the moral fiber of the
destination country. Any nation faced with similar issues of "huddled
masses" lining up across its borders, waiting to be fed and rescued, con-
fronts much more than economic choices. This is a moral discourse that
the economically-advanced nation cannot ignore. In my view, the issue
of border protection and immigration control is ultimately dependent on
the resolution of the tension between the enforcement challenges and the
dual challenges emanating from human rights and moral obligations. In
the end, however, this sovereignty issue of stronger control is inconsis-
tent with the global-justice view on various grounds, as I shall discuss
below.
Firstly, from a property rights point of view, as I shall show in the
next section, the restrictive covenant and the exclusionary fundamental
of immigration 69 is not in tune with the current immigration practice.
Secondly, I will explain in Part II, how this human-rights element is
deeply embedded within the moral-rights obligations that the United
States has inherited because of its hegemonic practices and its existing
relationships with various parts of the world. Thirdly, as I shall illustrate
in Part III, immigration discourse cannot be divorced from a broader
human-rights discourse. This is a point of view that is implicit within a
global-justice viewpoint, a dimension of our analysis that is not infected
with the nativist view looking through the prism of narrow Euro-centrism
and partisan politics of the immigration debate.7 °
69. The political climate after 9/11 has increased the restrictions for immigrants, especially
for those who violate immigration law, regardless if the violation is minor or not. Often due process
is overlooked for these individuals. Current immigration policy would increase the restrictions by
returning many immigrants to their countries of origin. These exclusionary and restrictive measures
are often borne out of fearful feelings since 9/11.
Most often these fears translate into a growing selective restrictionism in border con-
trol-including pervasive visa requirements, carrier sanctions, sniffer dogs, retinal and
other biometric scanning, detention of irregular migrants, stringent pre-departure checks
at airports, and computerized data storage and analysis on an unprecedented scale.
Guards on the border between the United States and Mexico are now equipped with infra-
red night-vision goggles. This is an extraordinary display of military measures not used
against any other section of the domestic population.
Jacqueline Bhabha, Reforming Immigration Policy: Start by Protecting Rights, Not Borders,
BOSTON REVIEW (Summer 2005), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/bhabha.html (dis-
cussing the "ineffectual" efforts to solve the problem of migration).
70. See Jeanne A. Butterfield, Immigration Matters: Politics Trumped Substance in Debate,
PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 12, 2006, http://news.pacificnews.org/news/viewarticle.html?
articleid=c5721 a3d9f938468698399a9d4d71b2d?
The U.S. House of Representatives passed a very harsh and punitive immigration bill-
the Sensenbrenner Bill-last December. That bill would criminalize and make felons of
every single undocumented person in the United States, whether they crossed the border
illegally or came on a valid student visa and dropped a class and fell out of status. It
would also criminalize every single priest, lawyer and community service provider who
aided an undocumented immigrant in any way. These two provisions have sparked out-
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Let us try to understand how the issues of unemployment, poverty,
loss of agriculture, and trading patterns impact the human-rights dimen-
sion of immigration. If we look at the immigration pattern, especially
when it comes to analyzing the immigration that is based on economic
necessity, we must take a detailed look at the countries from where peo-
ple are trying to immigrate. Beyond the geographical categorization,
these countries form several broad categories. The first category con-
tains the countries, in which economic resources are asymmetrically al-
located. 7' These are predominantly countries, which are ruled by auto-
cratic dictators72 or oligopolies. 73 I would assert that the United States is
responsible, in a significant way, for allowing these regimes to continue
to thrive and survive politically, despite plundering the wealth of these
countries, thereby perpetuating an uneven distribution system. This
framework leaves countless millions of hapless humanity under persis-
tent poverty with no hope for resurrection. Take an example of some
Latin American countries where, between the 1950s and the 1980s, the
United States has been largely responsible for promoting either a civil
war,74 or supporting the regime for fear of spreading communism,
75
while giving scant respect to humanity's need for equalization of re-
sources. Therefore, having been at least implicitly responsible in impact-
ing these countries' poor economic conditions, the responsibility and
obligation lie with the United States to allow reasonable immigration to
its countries.
The next set of countries I want to examine are those where signifi-
cant world-trade-related pacts have been entered into and resulted in se-
vere degradation to the traditional way of life.7 6 Particular segments of
the population in those countries find themselves under sustained and
growing unemployment. I would argue that the United States bears re-
sponsibility for providing equitable rehabilitative measures in economic
parity for these people. The North American Free Trade Agreement's
(NAFTA's) impact on the agriculture sections of Mexico would bear
rage around the country, as millions march in the streets to say "We are not criminals"
and as major religious and community organizations say "humanitarian assistance is not a
crime."
Id.
71. See generally Sajal Lahiri & Yoshiyasu Ono, Asymmetric Oligopoly, International Trade,
and Welfare: A Synthesis, 65 J. OF ECONOMICS 291 (1997).
72. See Ariel David Adesnik, Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy, THE
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 2006, at 7.
73. See Taft, supra note 12, at 71.
74. See generally Mark Rosenfelder, U.S. Interventions in Latin America, METAVERSE,
http://www.zompist.com/Iatam.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (cataloguing U.S. interventions in
Latin America starting in the 1840s).
75. Id.
76. For a general discussion on trade policies and pacts, see Paul Krugman, Is Bilateralism
Bad, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY (Cambridge: MIT Press 1991); Paul Krugman,
Symposium, The Move Toward Free Trade Zones (1991), available at http://www.kansascityfed.
org/publicat/Sympos/199 1/S9 krugm.pdf.
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testimony to this.77 Evidence has been uncovered that across the south-
ern and southwestern lands of Mexico, NAFTA's impact has been se-
verely felt as the farmers can no longer compete with the subsidies that
are given to the farmers in the United States and the rich heritage of agri-
culture mechanisms to which U.S. farmers are privy. Therefore, in terms
of both the quality of production and the quantity of production, Mexican
farmers are falling behind, and resorting to the abandonment of their
crops and farm lands. 78 These landless farmers, are the very immigrants
that put their fate in coyotes and cross the border the borders into Amer-
ica in search of a better life.
Let us examine why NAFTA was created. Though equality and eq-
uity was the premise for creating NAFTA, it was designed to dominate
the North American agricultural sector and to give an upper hand to the
American farmers. While this agenda was successful, it had an adverse
impact on the farmers in Mexico, who cannot compete with their U.S.
counterparts. A simple example makes this point abundantly clear. The
Mexican farmers are lucky to have 5-7 acres of land to work, whereas
their American and Canadian counterparts enjoy the blessings of 250
acres on average. 79 This simple fact alone issues a death sentence to the
Mexican farmer. Should we now close the border and let these people
die of starvation and malnutrition? Herein rests the human-rights dimen-
sion, hitherto missing from today's scholarly debate.
B. Politicization of the Immigration Issue: Submersing the Human-
Rights Dimension
In the previous section, I examined how various economic factors
impacted the human desire to migrate in search of economic stability,
and I have shown in unmistakable terms that there exists a profound hu-
man-rights dimension that cannot be denied within our current immigra-
tion discourse. Now, I want to examine how this human-rights element
could get subsumed within a more powerful impulse, and what we must
do to protect the human-rights discourse. In my view, immigration is
complex in its multidimensional impacts and fraught with severe emo-
tional undercurrents. Its invocation conjures up two diametrically-
77. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a treaty between Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States and was signed in January of 1994. North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, art. 32, Jan. 1, 1994, 32 1.L.M. 289 (1993). NAFTA eliminated a large
number of tariffs on goods shipped between the three countries. Id. Designed to be an economic
benefit to the three nations, research has uncovered evidence that NAFTA has been a disaster to
many in Mexico who cannot compete with the American market. See Katie Jo Keppinger, NAFTA
Harms Mexican Farmers and Biodiversity, 10 GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER 3 (2000), available
at http://www.panna.org/resources/gpc/gpc_200012.10.3.08.dv.html (discussing the harmful effects
of NAFTA).
78. See Keppinger, supra note 77; see also Pav Jordan, Mexican Farmers See Death Sentence
in NAFTA, REUTERS, Dec. 28, 2002, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/
1228-07.htm (discussing the objections of Mexian Farmers to NAFTA).
79. See Jordan, supra note 78 (discussing the difference in average farm size among Ameri-
can and Mexican farms).
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contrasting imageries: To the alien immigrant, migration comes as a
beacon of hope where human aspiration takes a fanciful flight away from
persecution and poverty. To the native population, it is a harbinger of
the abrogation of socio-cultural symmetry and a threat to the majority's
economic preservation. Therefore, political polarization on the issue of
immigration takes place within a broader conflict in cultural, political,
and economic aspirations of various stakeholders.
By carefully viewing immigration as a privilege, as opposed to a
right, the Euro-centric political entities have been immensely successful
in advancing the rationale of discretionary implementation. I would ar-
gue, whenever there is discretionary scope, exclusionary elements exist,
which I have examined in detail in the previous section. How does this
happen? In my view, the exclusionary bias of immigration is borne out
of both a misguided perception of the economic impact of immigration
and a fearful fight for self-preservation.8 ° While literature is replete with
economic issues surrounding immigration, 81 the interplay of race, sym-
metry, and the economy has not been studied thoroughly. 82 Economic
impacts shape policy, but when countless lives are at stake, it is para-
mount that we take the blinders off from our collective consciousness
and take an introspective look at the human-rights issues surrounding
immigration. As history dictates, by eliminating the moral and human-
rights dimension from immigration, the anti-immigration lobby is able to
place the issue of privilege in a direct collision course with the issue of
human rights.83
Why must we establish whether immigration is a privilege or a
right? Because where the privilege becomes a matter of discretion and
rights become a matter of absolute entitlement, abuses do arise. When it
is a privilege, the administrative enforcement becomes far more aggres-
sive as it no longer requires satisfying the human-rights dimension, as
has been witnessed in the obvious U.S. policy changes since 9/11. As
the government responded with vengeance, hundreds of thousands of
legal resident non-citizens became subject to the full fury of the U.S.
Justice Department. By focusing suspicion on groups of individuals,
based on religion or national origin alone,84 the USA Patriot Act
85
unleashed its expanded power to invade people's privacy and imprisoned
them without due process. For example, the Patriot Act allows law en-
forcement agencies to search a person's dwelling or workplace with a
search warrant when the occupant is away, take photographs and physi-




84. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SANCTIONED BIAS: RACIAL PROFILING SINCE 9/11
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/racial%20profiling/20report.pdf.
85. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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cal property, including communications equipment, and not inform the
owner or occupant until later.86 Such intrusiveness of basic freedom
comes from the provisions within the Patriot Act which approve the de-
layed notice to occupants after the search has already been conducted.87
What most Americans do not recognize as implicit within these new
policies and practices, is that within them there resides an absolute abro-
gation of human-rights ideals that has been the heartbeat of American
democracy.
Most Americans also do not consider that the government's no-
holds-barred strategy of interjecting criminalization within immigration
has not only taken away the basic freedom of thousands of American
citizens and non-citizen residents, 88 it has also destroyed numerous fami-
lies along the way.89 The contentious issue, therefore, is translated into a
determination of whether immigration is an absolute entitlement or a
matter of discretion. While scholars may argue that there is no right to
immigration as such, migrant workers are entitled to the rights enshrined
in the major international treaties.90 Some of these rights, such as the
right to freedom from discrimination, family reunification, freedom from
arbitrary arrest, detention and expulsion, and the right to equal justice,
work, and health, can go beyond the discretionary measures as they take
on particular significance within the immigration context.
86. Id. § 213.
87. Id.
88. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 84.
89. ACLU Legal Director Steven R. Shapiro stated that the "ACLU is part of a broad-based
coalition that filed a amicus brief calling on the Supreme Court to assure that the GuantAnamo de-
tainees have access to the courts to challenge the legality of their detention." Further:
More than 600 people from 44 countries are being held indefinitely by the United States
at Guantinamo with no charges filed against them and no access to lawyers or to their
families. Most have been held for 18 months or longer. The government has refused to
treat them as prisoners of war, and has refused to say when (if ever) they will be returned
home. As a result, they have languished in a legal limbo that international law does not
contemplate and that American constitutional law does not permit. Indeed, the govern-
ment has claimed that it can continue to hold even those detainees who may eventually be
tried and acquitted by military commissions.
Steven R. Shapiro, Constitution at the Crossroads: Landmark Post- 9/11 Cases Before Supreme
Court Will Test America's Values of Fairness and Justice for All, Apr. 12, 2004,
https://www.aclu.org/scotus/2003/17465prs20040412.html; see also Christopher Drew & Judith
Miller, Though Not Linked to Terrorism, Many Detainees Cannot Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2002, at Al.
90. Although international law recognizes the right of States to control entry to their territo-
ries, it is essential to provide migrants with information about their rights, and with independent,
accessible, free or affordable legal advice without indefinite and arbitrary detention. If people's
human rights are to be respected, it has to be made real and effective, rather than merely theoretical
and illusory. As such, all States are bound by international and national law from distributing inhu-
man or degrading treatment to migrants or asylum seekers. For example, The European Commission
of Human Rights held that the prohibition against torture and inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment contained in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits system-
atic racial discrimination in immigration control against a particular racial group in certain circum-
stances. East African Asians v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 4403/70-4419/70, 3 EUR. H.R. REP. 76,
86(1973).
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Understanding the human-rights dimension of immigration requires
recognizing the human faces of immigration, which becomes extremely
difficult in the present environment. This is difficult because, against a
strong sentiment of national security, the discriminatory value assigned
to the lives and the rights of immigrants are justified by the compelling
national-interest argument.9' While the human-rights element is sub-
sumed within this strong sentiment of national security and self-
preservation, the immigration policy of today is being hijacked by both
Euro-centric and hegemonic discourse. By constraining the immigration
policy with the enforcement mechanism, the anti-immigration lobby has
been largely successful in taking the human elements out of the present
debate.
Within this construct, therefore, the issue of immigration becomes
more of a privilege rather than a right enshrined within a broader dis-
course of fundamental, human rights. Clearly, the human-rights dimen-
sion is not explicitly visible within our current immigration debate, as it
is not transparent within our existing jurisprudence. I shall now embark
on exploring whether compelling arguments exist as I continue to trace
the contours of a human-rights dimension to immigration, looking
through the multiple prisms of property rights and moral obligations in
the next section.
II. EXAMINING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE THROUGH THE DUAL
RATIONALITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS
The immigration debate of today can be seen as the fulcrum that is
rigorously trying to balance the stronger sovereign impulse of regulating
inflow of outsiders with the weaker humanistic impulse of global justice.
Within this global-justice viewpoint resides a number of competing theo-
ries, each of which, in its own way, attempts to influence the immigra-
tion debate. These include property-rights doctrine and moral-obligation
viewpoint. Having established a broader human-rights framework, I
want to dissect each one of these doctrines to examine how they measure
up against the human-rights discourse of immigration. My objective
here is to develop a narrower focus to identify some other dimensions of
immigration that could strengthen the human-rights dimension.
91. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Allow Policy of Silence on 9/11
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al ("[T]he plaintiffs said that, 'times of crisis and fear
demand vigilance from citizens and their courts to assure that the countermeasures adopted by the
executive are consistent with our fundamental values and constitutional principles.' The brief said
the court should grant review 'to ensure that even after Sept. 11, the judiciary will continue to fulfill
its constitutional and statutory obligation to provide meaningful review of the exercise of executive
power."'); see Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927-28 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
1168 [Vol. 84:4
2007] HUMAN-RIGHTS DIMENSION TO IMMGRATION
A. Property-Rights Doctrine of Immigration
This global-justice dimension can be seen through an expanded
scope of a common property concept.92 So, where does this property-
rights viewpoint come from? Scholars have proposed a liberal immigra-
tion policy based on the original ownership viewpoints.93 The original
ownership theory contends that, in the beginning, the uninhabited earth
was owned by no one in particular, or rather, jointly owned by all of the
inhabitants of the earth. Based on this, could any particular race or eth-
nic group stake a specific, definitive claim against a particular swath of
land? What this doctrine is perhaps advancing is a more expansive view
of an open-border concept in which a sovereign State's right to control
its border could be challenged against the rights of all individuals to im-
migrate.
In my view, collective-ownership doctrine94 is in conflict with the
moral claims based on the first occupant's rights.9 5 If everyone submits
his or her claim for a collective ownership of earth, the problem expands
into an unsolvable chaotic mess, where every single competing claim has
to be determined against billions of similar claims. This is an untenable
proposition and, as such, could not support a broader human-rights di-
mension of immigration on a number of grounds. First, the collective-
ownership doctrine cannot be applied judiciously in a present-day sce-
nario as this will require abolishing the existing geographical boundaries
of nation states and will make the concept of sovereignty a mutable con-
cept. Second, this will give rise to an immigration quandary that goes far
beyond a fundamental human-rights viewpoint. Could the Kantian view
of communal possession of earth's surface 96 be helpful in advancing a
more amenable premise in support of an expansive neo-liberal immigra-
tion policy?
The Kantian view of communal possession proposes that when
earth was created or discovered, the land did not belong to anyone in
particular.97 If we focus our attention on the United States, we find that
92. Common property can be defined as a construct that is similar to the physical commons,
which is conceptually similar to the wiki (creative) commons. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1253 (8th ed. 2004) (defining common property), with Wikipedia, Wiki,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) (defining "wiki"). By definition, it
conveys the meaning of a property that cannot be owned by individual entities by virtue of their very
nature. This includes physical spaces, such as, air, water, wildlife, functioning ecosystems, etc. See
Michael Blake, Is There a Human Right to Free Movement? Immigration and Original Ownership of
the Earth 2 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy School of Gov't, Paper No. RWP06-012, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=902383.
93. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 92.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS sections 6, 13 (1797), re-
printed in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor ed. , trans., 1996); IMMANUEL KANT,
PERPETUAL PEACE (Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1957) (1795).
97. See sources cited supra note 96.
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the land belonged to the Native Indians or the indigenous populations of
the United States. The systematic destruction of the socio-cultural fabric
of the Native American Indians has been well-documented in the annals
of American history,98 an area I have discussed elsewhere.99  Without
going into the details about how America was conquered, I would simply
assert that the European settlers were the first occupants that attempted to
bring in their form of civilization to the original inhabitants of America.
Through illegal means of historical betrayal, Europeans have managed to
conquer the original inhabitants. 00 Does that give them the absolute
right to this communal property, this land, this piece of earth we know as
America today? Philosophers, historians, and moral theologians will
differ in their opinion. I will argue here that, from the surface, this Kant-
ian view does not lead us to a fundamental right to immigration. How-
ever, it opens up possibilities under various scenarios which could very
well support the relative rights of mobility or differential rights to safety.
In addition, the communal rights alluded to here could eventually lead to
rights to obtain refuge or the right to work. In the end, however, the doc-
trine of property right is not a robust right that can be enforced upon the
sovereign States, and in my mind, is not consistent with supporting
broader fundamentals of a humanistic jurisprudence of immigration.
Finally, the doctrine of common usage of land or common usage of
property starts with the premise of all things as equal and every person as
a co-owner. Then the issue becomes more complex as we are confronted
with a litany of questions as follows: Who are the first occupants and
what differential rights must be bestowed upon them? Who are the in-
termediate occupants and what relative rights must be accorded to them?
Who are the final occupants? What criteria must we employ to chart the
course of future immigration?
B. Moral Dimension of Immigration Rights
Is there a moral argument to the debate surrounding immigration?
Earlier, I argued that economic realities of survival make practical justi-
fications for migration to an economically-advanced country. The primal
instinct of a parent to feed and clothe their children is obvious to all.
98. See generally JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY FOR
BEGINNERS (Topper Sherwood ed.,Charleston, W.Va: Appalachian Editions 1993); see also General
William T. Sherman, The Useless Indians: An Assessment by General William T. Sherman, available
at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/historyofus/web08/features/source/docs/COl.pdf; see also United States
v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). The Court's opinion sends an obvious message of a superior vs.
subordinate race and sends a message of dehumanization to the Native Indians. The opinion reads in
part: "The people of the Pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and
disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and domestic government.
Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely
influenced by superstition and fetichism [sic], and chiefly governed according to the crude customs
inherited from their ancestors, they are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people." Id. at
39.
99. See Ghoshray, supra note 2.
100. I have discussed this in great detail elsewhere. See Ghoshray, supra note 2.
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President George W. Bush captured this humanistic yearning during one
of his election campaigns: "Family values don't stop at the Rio Grande
River,. . . If you're a mother and dad, and you got kids to feed, and
you're making 50 cents and you see someone in Iowa making $50, and
you care about those kids, you're coming."'01 The issue I want to ex-
plore in detail in this section is, under what circumstances does America
as a country inherit moral responsibility to develop a broader, liberal
immigration policy? Or, does America need to adhere to a morality-
laced argument surrounding immigration? I would suggest that three
specific lines of argument exist, that together make a compelling moral
case for developing an inclusive immigration policy.
First, the United States, by virtue of its economic dominance in the
world, has been somewhat responsible in shaping a world economy that
is impacted by uneven distribution of wealth in various parts of the
world. Therefore, it is morally obligated to provide economic parity to
these people. Second, I would argue, that the United States has a check-
ered history of colonization, where it has either been in the forefront of
colonization or has supported countries that have colonized others. This
process of colonization is still continuing by means of economic coloni-
zation of rest of the world. Therefore, the United States has inherited the
moral obligation to provide a semblance of economic parity to those
people it has colonized in the past or where it is still in the process of
colonization in some form. The most efficient way to impart economic
parity, I would argue, could come by means of extending the economic
fruits of immigration to its shores. Third, I argue that because of Amer-
ica's dominance in the world-trade market, it has been the intellectual
leader to implement different treaties like NAFTA, and the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") movements. Economic reverses confronted by
other countries as a result of economic treaties that have historically
benefited the United States should require at least a moral obligation on
the part of the United States to open its doors for a more liberalized im-
migration policy.
The examples above provide ample basis to assert that the United
States has a moral obligation to develop an expansive immigration policy
that is more inclusive than exclusive. Clearly, this moral obligation
emanates from economic rationales. Let us revisit one scenario here. As
discussed earlier, NAFTA resulted in the destruction of agrarian infra-
structure in some places in Mexico, 10 2 so much that thousands of people
were left with no alternative for their financial future.10 3 Do these people
have legitimate rights to immigration to the United States, as they have
101. GOP's Bush Calls for Increasing Legal Immigration Levels, MIDDLE AMERICAN NEWS,
Feb. 2000, available at http://www.americanpatrol.comREFERENCE/FamilyValuesDontStop-
BUSH.html.
102. See Jordan, supra note 78.
103. Id.
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been directly affected by the aggressive U.S. fiscal policy? Or, stated
differently, does the United States have a moral obligation to provide
economic sustenance to those affected by NAFTA? Suppose we agree
that because of America's undue influence, situations were created in
other countries that have a derogatory impact on their citizens. How
could we measure the true economic impact and how that impact could
be used to develop an immigration policy? The question becomes more
complex when we have to identify eligible candidates for immigration.
This is a complex set of issues that must be considered.
The objective of this paper is not at this point to develop a compre-
hensive immigration policy. Rather, I want to influence the traditional
thought process by going beyond the conventional dimension by which
immigration analysis has been done so far. Taking into consideration
this moral-obligation aspect of immigration would allow the policymak-
ers to incorporate other policy directives. In what other areas might we
see that the United States has such moral obligations? From a colonial-
ism dimension, my view is that the United States has been the forefront
of colonialism that took place in 1700s. The colonialism was initiated
with the implicit premise of advancing the American agenda abroad,
with the unstated objective of extracting resources from other regions of
the world, by means of world domination. I would argue that sustained
periods of colonization have caused these countries to fall behind in their
process of evolution towards becoming independent and self-sufficient.
For example, American civilization is over 200 years old, whereas the
countries that have achieved independence within the last 100 years are
technically behind by a century. What obligation does the United States
have to incorporate a liberal immigration policy when it comes to indi-
viduals from these countries? Past colonization makes it incumbent on
the United States to develop a more liberal immigration policy, specifi-
cally as it relates to citizens from the countries that had been colonized
previously. However, the recent restrictive bent in U.S. immigration
policy is not in conformity with this liberal viewpoint of immigration. It
is therefore incumbent on the United States to capture these past deeds as
the administration restructures its immigration policy.
III. CONTINUOUS SPECTRUM BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In this section, I will argue that the concept of the right to immigra-
tion as a human right emanates from an expanded conception of an indi-
vidual right enshrined in the constitutional jurisprudence of the devel-
oped countries. In this way, the concept of immigration as a human right
goes to the very core of fundamental rights bestowed upon humanity. In
my view, this second thread of rights to migration as a human right is
based on the fundamental-right doctrine developed contemporaneously
both in common and civil-law jurisprudence. Earlier, I suggested that
the right to migration as a human right comes from a broader interpreta-
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tion of the right to the highest attainable status for an individual. The
question, then, is whether there is a fundamental right to migration, and
what is the test we can employ to determine if this is indeed a fundamen-
tal human right?
First and foremost, let us begin with the concept of rights, and how
they are created. Most countries' constitutions contain a set of rights,
just like the U.S. Constitution has certain enumerated rights. On the sur-
face, it seems that the government should support certain rights, but not
all of them may be necessarily protected by the Constitution. A strictly
originalist point of view would support the constitutional interpretation
that we must only protect those rights which are actually located in the
Constitution, and support legislation to protect other rights.' °4 A more
dynamic constitutional interpretation,10 5 however, would suggest a dif-
ferent conclusion where rights could emanate from various sociological,
doctrinal, and environmental developments. There should be certain
rights that could be created as a result of the evolution of human under-
standing. For example, as our understanding of the limitation of natural
resources matures, and as our ability to gauge the adverse impact of envi-
ronmental degradation on the sustainability of our human civilization
grows, primacy ought to be given to certain rights. These rights could
include the right to pollution-free air, or right to flowing water, or right
to choose protection of environment over excessive water commodifica-
tion. There should be binding legal instruments that could protect these
rights from the corrosive impact of any governmental regulation, corpo-
104. I have detailed the various shades and hues of originalist interpretation of the constitution
elsewhere. See Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court Citation: Dissecting Originalism,
Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism, 69 ALB. L. REv. 709, 712-13 (2006).
105. Here we are confronted with the issue of strict constructionist vs. dynamic constitutional
interpretation. Dynamic constitutional interpretation argues for the need to expand the meaning of
constitutional clauses as a result of changing values and complex sociological dimensions. I will
argue in this Article, that the changing realities based on the evolving nature of our understanding of
human existence makes it incumbent upon all of us to extricate ourselves from the frozen, static-in-
time version of the Constitution to embrace a more dynamic Constitution. By referring to a dynamic
Constitution, attention is drawn to the process by which the Constitution adapts to the changing
conditions in the society, we are confronted with its dynamic aspect. In most parlances, the dynamic
Constitution and the living Constitution are terms used synonymously. See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1-2, 12-13, 269 (2004). The term "living" is used to denote that the Constitution is still evolv-
ing in consonance with the evolving needs of the society, rather than possessing a fixed in time,
definitive meaning. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958). The concept of a living Con-
stitution is noted by the Court in Trop v. Dulles, "[T]he words of the [Eight] Amendment are not
precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. The concept further gained
currency in a 1987 lecture of Justice Thurgood Marshall titled, The Bicentennial Speech, where he
argued that the Constitution must be interpreted in light of the moral, political and cultural climate of
the age of interpretation. See Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S., Remarks at the Annual Semi-
nar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association: The Bicentennial Speech (May 6,
1987), available at http://www.thurgoodmarshall.com/speeches/constitutionalspeech.htm; see also
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S., Remarks to the American Society of International Law:
A Decent Respect for the Opinions of [Human] Kind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication (Apr. 1, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/
ginsburg050401 .html; Ghoshray, supra note 104, at 709-43.
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rate privatization, or any combination of the two. These rights strictly
belong to human persons or natural entities as they predominantly
emerge from humanity's interaction with nature. These rights do not
accrue to a legally-created entity, such as a corporation. Implicit in this
expanded conception of rights, I will argue, resides the guarantee that
there are some rights so fundamental that can never be regulated by ei-
ther the government or the legislature. Therefore, no majority, no matter
how large, could violate the rights of individuals. These are indeed the
fundamental rights that could emanate either via humanistic jurispru-
dence or from natural-rights doctrine.
The discussion above points to certain rights, which are fundamen-
tal, yet may not have been properly enumerated within the Constitution
because the historical development of civilization did not recognize them
at the time of the Constitution's writing. These rights could very well
not have been protected by the litany of international laws, develop-
ments, and treaties that form the broad spectrum of international law.
For example, these rights may not have found explicit invocation in the
development of The Hague or Geneva stream of laws, or other U.N. Dec-
larations. On the other hand, these rights are so fundamental, that with-
out them, the very existence of a human being becomes unconscionable.
How could this happen?
Not all rights are automatically incorporated in the human-rights
doctrine, nor do they become enshrined in the relevant constitution of the
nation state. Along the journey of our civilization, historical develop-
ments take place which determine humanity's need for certain protection
or expansion of certain liberties. Rights are created in such opportune
moments of time, but when they are recognized is a different story. The
legitimate question comes to the mind then, what is a true test, a test that
can be employed to identify whether a right truly belongs to the category
of human rights or fundamental rights? Allow me to bring to focus the
"shock the conscience test."'' 0 6 By performing this test, we are able to
determine whether an action or behavior falls outside the standards of
civilized decency. Does the human right to migration require the crea-
tion of new enumerated rights, such that the fundamental nature of that
right is so profound that denial of such right will pass the shock-the-
conscience test of constitutional adjudication?
The basic premise of the shock-the-conscience test of certain rights
resides in the premise that follows. Certain rights are so inherent, so
106. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). The "shock the conscience" test was
popularized after Justice Felix Frankfurter writing for the U.S. Supreme Court established the shock-
the-conscience test, based on the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against states depriving any
person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Id. This test attempts to determine
whether an action or behavior falls outside the standards of civilized decency. Id. The test, how-
ever, has its detractors that criticize permitting judges to assert their individual views on what consti-
tutes shocking. See, e.g., id. at 175-76 (Black, J., concurring).
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fundamental in the current conception of our human existence, that any
abrogation of such right or explicit denial of it must be viewed as shock-
ing the conscience. Not all rights are fundamental rights nor are they all
human rights, as rights could be envisioned, rights could be structured,
rights could even be derivative of existing rights. In order for them to
qualify as analogous to basic fundamental human rights, the rights must
pass the shock-the-conscience test. From this discussion, it is natural to
see that the right to migration would be within the premise of a human
right, but does not pass the shock-the-conscience test unless a gross and
egregious violation of humanity is taking place. Simply invoking the
economic rationale is not the way to cross the threshold for establishing a
fundamental right to migration. Next, I examine whether there is a basis
to identify migration as a human right that is derived from the natural-
law conception of basic rights. 1
07
Why natural law? The right to migration has to be seen through the
prism of human existence, a broader meaning of human existence, and its
interrelationship within the common property ownership doctrine dis-
cussed earlier. If fundamental economic rationales are so compelling
that the very sustenance of humanity is at stake, we must exert extreme
prudence in adjudicating our administrative decisions regarding immi-
gration. This is also the essence of right creation with the fundamental
relationship between earth and human as the humans try to control its
own destiny. Therefore, the dual paradigm based on the basic premise of
natural-law doctrine to establish the right to migration as human right
and the economic reason for sustenance of humans brings us to a poign-
ant issue. Which do we choose, the unbridled right to economic suffi-
ciency and material comfort to the first occupants, or the basic necessi-
ties for all humans within a shared-resource paradigm? The final answer
must come from the deeper meaning of life, the meaning enshrined in the
perpetuation of natural tendencies of humanity. It is a very difficult
paradigm. Primacy must be given to the possibility of a scenario where
countless millions of individuals could be deprived of the basic necessity
of life, as they cannot afford to sustain themselves. Are we bold enough
to choose life over luxury?
107. Generally, natural rights are viewed as the identical twin theory of universal human rights
that are part and parcel inherent in humanity. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available
at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. Often in discussions, the merit of natural rights is
developed and viewed alongside human rights. Id. While there is no formally, globally accepted
doctrine, natural rights are accepted by many that a natural right is a right that exists in a state of
nature, like the right to life and liberty. Id. To me, the definition of a natural right is intrinsically
linked to the very nature of us as human beings. However, the issue of natural rights becomes com-
plicated by the governments we elect to help protect our rights, and also these rights can become
competitive. In this Article, I refer to natural rights which are linked with human rights and that
include the inherent right to life.
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Right to migration as a human right is based on a conflict between a
State's natural impulses to maximize the potential for those who reside
within its border over the fundamental right of preserving basic necessity
for all of humanity. How does natural law define this? These are the
questions we must answer. My natural-law analysis would assert that,
the compelling national interests of the more advanced, richer countries
must not supersede the fundamental right to survival of people from
other parts of the world. As neocolonialism rears its all-encroaching
tentacles to grab every natural resource it finds in its wake, the more
powerful countries owe it to the rest of the world to share in the bounty,
the natural right and the human right doctrine should surface in order to
protect that right of all humanity. Indeed, this right may not be enshrined
within the established jurisprudence in the developing world, but must be
recognized by the more advanced States within a broader humanistic
viewpoint.
CONCLUSION
Despite living in a global village that is more interconnected today
than ever before, humanity is scattered in isolated islands of a disjointed
economic environment. Uneven distribution of wealth in today's world
is so egregious that it begs the question of where is humanity as the civi-
lization marches towards unprecedented technological advancement. On
the other hand, politicized anxieties have taken a new dimension as the
specter of economic deprivation within the domestic United States has
become fodder for a vigorous anti-immigrant sentiment. Against such
manipulated, exclusionary ideals and a manufactured crisis of confi-
dence, I began this enquiry to understand if the immigration debate could
be captured through the lense of a broader humanistic viewpoint. As the
preponderance of evidence clearly indicates, popularized fear of eco-
nomic deprivation resulting from immigration is largely unfounded, and
a set of strong economic rationales exist that posit a more humanistic
discourse on immigration. Could this humanistic discourse arise from a
global-justice viewpoint, or could this be the genesis to uncover a hu-
man-rights dimension of immigration? This has been the objective of
my review in this Article.
This enquiry centered around two substantive premises on which
the human rights dimension of immigration has to be understood. In the
first, I explored all the possible viewpoints that support a blanket human-
rights claim to immigration. This enquiry is centered upon an explicit
understanding of the possible economic drivers that directly develop a
case for human rights to immigration. Queries I entertained are as fol-
lows: What is the dimension that would allow the collective conscious-
ness of the Americans to rise beyond politicized distortion of economic
realities of the native American and look beyond its shores to understand
the economic calamities of others? Is this economic reality of others a
sustainable doctrine based on which expansive immigration jurispru-
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dence could be developed? Does this human-rights dimension have a
moral center of gravity, and what are the driving forces behind such mo-
rality-laced argumentation?
In this Article, I have examined this morality-centric immigration
discourse from three diverging perspectives. I have established that, the
United States has a moral obligation not to engage in exclusionary immi-
gration policymaking based on a number of tangible grounds. These
obligations come from its colonial past, its economic dominance in the
world, and its hegemonic economic policies. This moral obligation
should also be understood from the other side, which beckons us to probe
into humanity's eternal yearning for sustenance, for survival, and above
all, for the continuation of its progeny. In this review, I have established
that the jurisprudence of American immigration policy is riddled with
arbitrary exclusion, racial profiling and unwarranted, unconstitutional
race-specific enforcement against ethnic minorities, which is inconsistent
with the moral obligation of the United States. Delving deeper into this
phenomena, while disturbed by the racial overtones, I assert that the
paradox of U.S. immigration policy can only be overcome via humanistic
approach.
In the second thread of my inquiry, I examined whether property-
rights doctrine is tenable to advance a humanistic viewpoint of immigra-
tion. Despite an expansive dissection, I find no reason to believe that a
more fundamental property-rights view based on a collective-rights con-
cept could establish inclusive immigration jurisprudence. My argument
centered on the fact that collective-rights doctrine is in sharp contrast
with the rights of first occupants is such structurally unstable as it can not
explain the basic concepts of state sovereignty and national security.
While a traditional property-rights analysis may not have a derivative
claim towards rights to immigration, I do, however, propose that, the
property rights doctrine can be efficiently invoked in establishing certain
other rights that are more fundamental and may have a natural-rights
basis than the rights to immigration.
In addition, I argue that the rights to immigration fall within a con-
tinuous spectrum between a fundamental right and human rights. This
right may not emanate from the fundamental concept of natural rights,
but it is well-enshrined within the corpus of rights in the human-rights
jurisprudence. In the end, the issue is not whether we characterize this as
a human right or not, rather it is in humanity's ability to act upon recog-
nizing this right. That is where humanity's biggest challenge comes.
Finally, this review goes beyond the hackneyed analysis of the im-
pact of immigration at a macro level. Instead, it penetrates a deeper con-
struct and brings out the more sublime issues surrounding immigration.
This is important from both legislation-development and policy-
implementation points of view, which require further research. While
the exploration continues, I can't but end on my belief in the inherent
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dignity of humanity. That dignity, I hope, will allow us to recognize the
full spectrum of a human-rights dimension of immigration, which sees
every human as part of a vibrant human race, and not as an isolated, in-
dividual threat to the United States of America.
